The plan gives adversaries impunity to confidently act below the threshold -- case-by-case evaluation is intentional and advantageous.
Canbolat and Sezgin '16 [Mustafa and Emrah; December 2016; PhD in Management Science from McMaster University, Associate Professor of Operations Management and Business Analytics at the State University of New York; MBA as an International Military Officer from the Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Program Manager at Amazon; "Is NATO Ready for a Cyberwar?" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=810939]
One of the most discussed issues in the international arena after the 9/11 attacks was the Digital Disaster scenario that could be experienced in a member country (Bicakci, 2014). Many countries have incorporated cyber security strategies in their national security strategies in order to address cyber-attacks that could threaten the state. The role of NATO in the case of a serious cyberattack against a member country has been a conundrum.
Due to the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack, NATO appears to have a pragmatic cyber security posture that handles each attack on a case-by-case basis (Burton, 2015). However, NATO officially stated that “NATO will consider (and potentially implement) a collective Article 5 response to cyber-attacks against NATO members, just as it did in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11” (Burton, 2015, p. 308). Nevertheless, the threshold for the cyber-attacks that could invoke Article 5 is not certain. The head of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division, Jamie Shea stated that “[w]e are keeping that ambiguous so a potential aggressor does not get the idea they can carry out cyber-attacks up to a certain level with impunity” (Ashford, 2014, para. 8). Even though setting a specific and certain threshold would make it easier for NATO to determine when to invoke Article 5 against a cyber-attack, keeping it ambiguous gives an advantageous flexibility to the alliance regardless of the attack or adversary (Jones, 2015).
Article 5 was purposely left vague to give NATO more flexibility to assess a threat and determine a response. Therefore, it is also uncertain what kind of a response NATO would give against a cyber-attack. Would it be a cyber or a kinetic operation against the adversary if Article 5 were triggered? The answer to this question is deliberately left ambiguous, reinforcing NATO’s position that it will evaluate cyber-attacks on case-by-case basis.