Strategic ambiguity necessary for offensive and defensive military flexibility
Taddeo 17 - Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at Oxford and the Programme Director of the DPhil in Information, Communication and the Social Sciences at the Oxford Internet Institute (Mariarosaria, “Deterrence by Norms to Stop Interstate Cyber Attacks, “ Minds and Machines, September 17, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11023-017-9446-1.pdf) //nt-sg
In this scenario, state actors make policy decisions to protect their abilities to launch cyber attacks. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ is one of such decisions. According to this policy, states decide neither to define and nor inform the international community about their red lines—thresholds that once crossed would trigger state response—for non-kinetic cyber attacks (Taddeo 2011). Strategic ambiguity has often been presented as a way to confuse the opponents about the consequences of their cyber attacks. As the US National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues officer put it:
Currently most countries, including ours, don’t want to be incredibly specific about the red lines for two reasons: You don’t want to invite people to do anything they want below that red line thinking they’ll be able to do it with impunity, and secondly, you don’t want to back yourself into a strategic corner where you have to respond if they do something above that red line or else lose credibility in a geopolitical sense.
By fostering ambiguity, state actors also leave open for themselves a wider room for manoeuvring. Strategic ambiguity allows state actors to deploy cyber attacks for military, espionage, sabotage, and surveillance purposes without being constrained by their own policies or international red lines. This makes ambiguity a dangerous choice, one that is strategically risky and politically misleading.