Ambiguity key for maximum flexibility and effective deterrence
Mowchan 12 – Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and an instructor at Center for Strategic Leadership (John, “On the Razor’s Edge: Establishing Indistinct Thresholds for Military Power in Cyberspace” United States Army War College, 4-23-12, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568852.pdf) //nt-sg
Ambiguous Thresholds. Ambiguous thresholds offer several advantages for employing military power following a hostile cyber-attack against government networks.
First, not establishing red lines allows government leaders the flexibility to tailor response options based on the hostile act, the perpetrator (state or non-state), its effects in the physical and digital world, and how they relate to the current state of affairs in the international system. As such, the employment of military power against a state-based threat would be much different than one against a non-state actor that conducted the same type of attack thus validating the necessity for ambiguous thresholds. For example, in 2009 individuals in China and Russia penetrated computer networks that operate parts of the U.S. electrical power grid. These individuals reportedly inserted malware that could destroy infrastructure components. Although the identities of the perpetrators or their associations with the Russian and Chinese governments were not disclosed, it validates the point that response options must be tailored since a response against hackers or hacktivists would be different from a response against the Chinese or Russian governments.
A second advantage is that the U.S. does not disclose all facets of its strategy to its adversaries. If cyber threat actors know what the U.S. will do in response to particular hostile acts in cyberspace, they will adjust their strategic approaches, modify their doctrine, and develop new cyber tactics, techniques or procedures that skirt the red line. Because neither the national nor the defense strategy for cyberspace explicitly defines a hostile act in cyberspace or how exactly the U.S. will respond, this leaves it open to interpretation. In 2009 General Kevin Chilton, Commander U.S. Strategic Command, stated, "I don’t think you take anything off the table when you provide [response] options to the president. Why would we constrain ourselves on how we would respond [to hostile acts in cyberspace]?" Such an approach is no different than how the U.S. addresses hostile acts in the other global domains. Hostile actions in cyberspace should be no different.
Finally, ambiguous thresholds keep the adversary guessing on how the U.S. will respond. As was brought out by one unidentified military official, “If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks,” Again, ambiguity in when, how, and to what extent to use military power gives political and military leaders maximum latitude in developing a response.