Allied prolif isn’t inevitable, but the plan flips assurances.
Lanoszka ’18 [Alexander; 2018; International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo; Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, “How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation,” Chapter 1]
Perhaps such pessimism is warranted amid the Teutonic shifts in international politics that attend the rise of China and the apparent decline of the United States. Yet the view that the future is unlike the past is an overstatement. American security commitments will come under stress, just as they have in the past. The difference may well be that the United States would not have the same clout over its allies as before if predictions of its relative decline are correct. If the United States had trouble suppressing the nuclear interest of industrializing allies like South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s, then future nonproliferation efforts will be much more hard-pressed to achieve success. Nevertheless, as in the past, the United States may well continue to hold sufficiently strong military and technological capabilities over adversaries.35 As such, allies’ behavior could reflect how the United States decides to allocate its strategic attention and military resources more so than deep structural trends. Nuclear proliferation among allies is not inevitable, but the choice is for the United States to make in order to prevent it from happening.