It’s on the brink.
Tertrais ’19 [Bruno; July 29; Master’s Degree in Public Law of the University of Paris; Washington Quarterly, “Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?,” p. 48]
But the context is now changing. If one describes the nuclear deterrence question as a matter of supply and demand, things have evolved on both ends:
– On the demand side, Russia’s new assertiveness and territorial aggression has triggered a renewed interest in Europe about the means to guarantee their existence and territorial integrity. This is true in particular not only for countries that became members of NATO at the turn of the century (such as Poland and the Baltic States) but also for EU members which are not members of NATO (Finland and Sweden) and thus do not rely on a formal U.S. guarantee, but worry about Russia. The end of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, as well as uncertainties about the future of the Iranian program, tensions in South Asia, and North Korean nuclear progress are additional reasons for Europe to reconsider deterrence.
– On the supply side, doubts about the reliability of the American guarantee to Europe have rarely been as strong as under the current U.S. administration. The brutality of Donald Trump’s tweets, body language and policies is unprecedented in transatlantic relations. This has led many in Europe, notably in Germany, to question the wisdom of relying solely on U.S. protection. In parallel, the European Union has consolidated its security and defense identity through the Lisbon treaty of 2009, and also taken more recent steps which were made easier by the prospect of Brexit. Also in 2009, France rejoined NATO’s military structure, a move which alleviated the suspicions of some of its partners about an alleged French intention to build a European security entity that would compete with NATO. Interestingly, while Paris was a leader in the European nuclear debate of the 1990s, this time, voices in Germany have been at the forefront.2
Thus, the time seems ripe for thinking anew about Europe’s nuclear role in securing the continent. This paper seek to dispel a certain intellectual and political confusion when one reads or hears about a “European deterrent,” a vague expression which covers a range of scenarios ranging from a declared European role for French (and possibly British) nuclear forces to a full-fledged “common Bomb” in the hands of Europe, and sometimes including a German nuclear program. Not all of them are realistic. This depends heavily on one key variable: will the current NATO nuclear arrangement continue to exist? So this paper will proceed with two sections—first on what could happen assuming the NATO arrangement continues and, second what could happen if it were to break down.