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Cyber doomsday scenarios are fantastical – states lack technical means and motive for advanced success

Rabkin and Yoo 17 - Jeremy Rabkin is Professor of Law at George Mason University and John Yoo is the Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley (Jeremy and John, Striking Power, pages 98-99, 2017) //nt-sg

There are good reasons to doubt that even these cyber operations will produce the nightmares drawn by Richard Clarke and other alarmists. The first obstacle is the scale of the technical challenge. A hostile power cannot simply aim a general-purpose cyber weapon at a target system. To take control of a network, the hackers must custom design a special program to penetrate the system. The developers of the cyber weapon must have a detailed understanding of the network, which may take years of snooping inside that system. If the target is disconnected from the Internet, as the Iranian nuclear facility was, the attacker must infiltrate a closed local network. That may prove feasible, but it requires highly specialized and sophisticated intelligence, so that attackers can infiltrate the target system by way of other computers with which it may regularly interact.

The challenge is greater still if the aim is not simply to shut down the target system but to change its operations, as with Stuxnet. The hackers must then figure out how to disguise their program to evade detection by network security teams. The Stuxnet virus is reported to have taken four or five years and billions of dollars to develop. Among other things, the developers built their own model of the Iranian nuclear facility.22 Stuxnet took over the supervisory control and data acquisition program (SCADA) of the Iranian centrifuges. As engineers have pointed out, "the complexity of SCADA systems is one of the best defenses against attack," because their complexity would prevent all but the most patient, expert, and highly informed hackers from redirecting their operations.23

To accomplish a doomsday scenario, an enemy would have to make a huge investment in research and development for each individual target. Enemies are not likely to build models of each mass transit system in the U.S. to work out the right attack program for the controls on that system. Even if they did, they could not expect that all of their efforts would go undetected. If even one such attack were detected or went off ahead of schedule, it would prompt immediate security checks on other transit systems. On the other hand, regular changes in the control systems, which might be updated for any number of reasons, could throw off years of preparation by the hackers. Achieving a simultaneous attack on a series of different targets would be an amazing feat of engineering and deception. Only a handful of states could spare the necessary resources to attempt such a cascade of destruction.

Apart from the technical challenge, there remains the practical question: Why would an adversary want to achieve such mass destruction effects through hacking? If the aim is to generate mass casualties, there are more direct and reliable ways. A hostile state could use ICBMs tipped with nuclear warheads to kill millions. By exploding a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, an enemy could generate an electromagnetic pulse powerful enough to shut down electrical and communications networks. Aerial bombs and cruise missiles could destroy critical transportation nodes. Terrorists might even introduce poisons to a city water supply or disease agents in the food chain. The more catastrophic the desired effect of the attack, the less point there is to deliver it through computer networks.

Alarmist observers also do not explain why deterrence would not succeed with cyber weapons as it has with WMD. It is the announced policy of the United States government that it stands prepared to respond with "military force" to a cyber attack that causes loss of life or substantial damage to property.24 The United States need not try to counter each cyber attack with a comparable response in cyber space. A cyber attack could well trigger kinetic retaliation from a wide range of conventional weapons that could cause worse damage to an enemy regime. Whatever one may think about the inherent logic of cyber deterrence, the record of experience suggests that something is at work. Since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have killed thousands of Americans, even within the boundaries of the United States. In the same period, there have been no U.S. fatalities attributable to cyber attacks.

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