NATO will flounder when forced to act on cyber
Ucko 10 - Adjunct fellow at the Department of War Studies at King's College London (David H., "Resetting Article 5: Toward a New Understanding of NATO's Security Guarantees," World Politics Review, 10-26-2010, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6838/resetting-article-5-toward-a-new-understanding-of-natos-security-guarantees)//nt-sg
The Estonian crisis demonstrated that today's attacks are unlikely to be the unambiguous, military and territorial attacks imagined during the Cold War, and that NATO, as a military alliance, remains ill-equipped to operate in less-traditional domains or against less-readily identifiable actors. Similar conclusions can be drawn from NATO's sole invocation of Article 5, on Sept. 12, 2001. NATO's response then centered on Operation Eagle Assist, the deployment of Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AWACS) to protect U.S. airspace, and Operation Active Endeavor, the deployment of naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean "to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity." The alliance also pledged to share intelligence on the terrorist threat, provide overflight rights and access to ports and airfields as part of any retaliatory operations, and to assist any state whose support for these measures would prove destabilizing.
At first sight, NATO's response reflected an agile use of structures and capabilities configured for Cold War-era threats. But the first invocation of Article 5 also illustrated the limited relevance of its guarantees against less-conventional foes. Unlike the Soviet Union, al-Qaida was not deterred by the threat of collective NATO action. Nor were NATO's actions following Sept. 11 effective in punishing the transgressor or in forestalling future attacks. Indeed, it took nearly a month for NATO to confirm its invocation of Article 5 and launch Active Endeavor and Eagle Assist, as it first had to establish that the perpetrators of the attack were not domestic actors within the United States. And although the AWACS that NATO provided did free up some U.S. assets for the campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Eagle Assist was peripheral to the broader effort against al-Qaida and was terminated after a mere six months. The Mediterranean operation looked good on paper, but its relation to the al-Qaida threat was unclear, and the ships involved also operated under a limited mandate that precluded involuntary boarding of suspicious vessels.
Some European nations did deploy special forces to Afghanistan in 2001, yet even this response was a far cry, in terms of scale and effectiveness, from the type of reaction associated with Article 5. By the time the U.S. made more concrete appeals for European forces to come stabilize "postwar" Afghanistan, the mood of solidarity had already begun to wane. Having had their initial offers of assistance rebuffed by the then-bullish Bush administration, there was not much appetite in Europe to deploy, and the campaign basically had to be sold as another Balkans peacekeeping operation before European troops began arriving. By that point, the link between the Afghan campaign and the invocation of Article 5 had already substantially eroded.
In short, the threat and actual invocation of Article 5 does not deter less-traditional adversaries and types of attack, nor does it provide for a swift or effective response to these threats. As a military alliance, NATO is ill-equipped and ill-structured to deal with the security risks of terrorism, cyber attacks, political subversion and harassment (over energy or natural resources, for instance). The ambiguity of these acts, whether in their origins, effects, and nature, is also likely to delay NATO decision-making and undermine the alliance's resolve. As a result, the categorical response implied by the wording of Article 5 will be difficult, if not impossible, to put into practice.