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Settler Colonialism exists past the act of colonization – the conceptualization of Natives as the ‘Other’ gives way for systems to ignore indigenous groups even through progressive legislation

Veracini 11 (Lorenzo Veracini s a historian and professor at Swinburne University of Technology’s Institute for Social Research. He is the editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies and has been a key figure in the development of the field of settler colonialism. (2011) ISOPOLITICS, DEEP COLONIZING, SETTLER COLONIALISM, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 13:2, 171-189, DOI: 10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215) // JLHS AA

Beyond isopolitical relationships, deep colonizing is also essential to an understanding of settler colonial phenomena. Australian-based anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose introduced ‘deep colonizing’ in a 1996 article dealing with the position of Aboriginal women in the context of recent developments in land claims legislation and indigenous tenure. Aboriginal women, she argued, were being disempowered by attempts to integrate Aboriginal policy and Aboriginal structures of governance. Specifically, she noted, women were effectively prevented from meaningfully contributing to evidence gathering processes. Supporting evidence sustaining Aboriginal land claims was premised primarily, if not exclusively, on ‘knowledge’ forwarded by Aboriginal men: While it is demonstrably the case that many formal relations between Indigenous people and the colonizing nation have changed in the past three decades, as have many of the institutions which regulate these relations, it is also the case that practices of colonization are very much with us. More profoundly, many of these practices are embedded in the institutions that are meant to reverse processes of colonization. A land claim is an excellent example. On the one hand it reverses conquest by returning land to Indigenous people. On the other hand, the marginalization of women, along with [invasive] demands for information, perpetuates the colonizing practices of conquest and appropriation. Colonizing practices embedded within decolonizing institutions must not be understood simply as negligible side effects of essentially benign endeavours. This embeddedness may conceal, naturalize, or marginalize continuing colonizing practices. Furthermore, it can be difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project. Again, land rights offer an excellent example. If the double binds are not teased apart, and if the colonizing practices are not separated analytically from decolonizing institutions, conquest will continue. And if it continues in this form it will be wearing a mask of benign, or even radical, decolonization which will make it far more difficult to challenge at all levels. Deep colonizing is the term I use for this process conquest embedded within institutions and practices which are aimed toward reversing the effects of colonization. (Rose 1996) An ostensibly progressive legislation endowed with unprecedented liberating potential some Aboriginal communities were getting their land back could have, and was having, an oppressive outcome (Rose’s warning was somewhat prophetic: the recolonial federal government ‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory of the late 2000s, when white men were ‘compelled’ to intervene in Aboriginal communities in order to ‘save’ Aboriginal women and children, was also premised on the deterioration of Aboriginal women’s political standing and power within their communities a deterioration that was not countered by the land claim legislation and practice that followed the promulgation of the 1994 Native Title Act).5 Deep colonizing as an analytical tool identifying a particular dynamic, however, should be pursued further and applied to all circumstances where a progressive and decolonizing move for some ends up further compromising the position of others (similarly, even if in an entirely different context she was criticizing the concept of ‘Renaissance’ Joan Kelly (1984: xiixiii) famously concluded that ‘events that further the historical development of men, liberating them from natural, social, or ideological constraints, have quite different, even opposite, effects upon women’). Moreover, deep colonizing is an especially necessary conceptual tool for the specific appraisal of settler colonial regimes: if a triumphant colonial society is a state of affairs where, as noted by Partha Chatterjee (1993), change the promised equality between colonizer and colonized is forever postponed (on deferral as a colonial strategy, see also Conklin 1997), where colonizer and colonized know and ultimately retain their respective places, a triumphant settler colonial circumstance, having ceased to be a dependency of a colonizing metropole, having tamed the surrounding ‘wilderness’, having extinguished indigenous autonomies, and having successfully integrated various migratory waves, has also ceased being settler colonial (Veracini 2010). Colonial formations proclaim their permanence; settler colonial formations on the contrary announce their passing. Since it is primarily aimed at producing the conditions of its own supersession, settler colonialism routinely operate via deep colonizing means. That deep colonizing should not be seen as exclusively characterizing the present condition of the settler colonial polities should be emphasized. As long as the decolonization of the settler colonial situation remains unresolved, settler colonial present and settler colonial past inevitably resemble each other. Settler independence is one important example of deep colonizing. On the one hand, as mentioned, settler colonial formations are charged with an inherently anticolonial dimension; they upset the hierarchical structures and organization of colonial formations. On the other, settler independence a specific type of decolonization is actually an acceleration of colonizing practices. Marc Ferro, for example, defines ‘colonist independence’ as the ultimate stage of imperial conquest, the ‘most advanced stage of white colonial expansion’ (1997: 21213). A settler freedom that is premised on indigenous dispossession, however, is not a unique circumstance in which, to paraphrase Kelly, events that further the historical development of some have quite different effects on indigenous peoples. Civil rights agendas might be mentioned in this context: when W. E. B. Du Bois noted, for example, in The Souls of Black Folks that ‘the problem of the color line’ would be the critical question of the twentieth century (1994: 1), he performed simultaneously an act of anticolonial resistance and an act of suppression of indigenous autonomy (one could assume that in his estimation the ‘indigenous problem’ would not be a problem at all). Similarly, the Subaltern Studies Group has extensively documented how anticolonial nationalist stances failed to represent a variety of marginalized subjectivities. The anticolonial Indian nationalists could and would not represent ‘voiceless’ (often indigenous/Adivasi) rural subalterns. While these anticolonial erasures can be construed as examples of deep colonizing, and considering that ‘eliminationist’ shifts in indigenous policies in settler colonial contexts have been routinely couched in a humanitarian rhetoric emphasizing equality and emancipation from controlling legislation, it is not surprising that indigenous militancy in a multiplicity of settings has repeatedly shown a stubborn reluctance in engaging with other insurgencies and with state driven emancipatory programs. Ellinghaus’s (2007) comparative work on ‘assimilative pathways’ in two settler colonial polities highlights instances of indigenous dispossession framed as ‘emancipation’ (in other words, deep colonizing). For their exemplarity, two contemporary instances of deep colonizing could be mentioned in this context. As recently noted by Jody A. Bird in an article dedicated to his dealings with Native American issues, future US president Barack Obama repeatedly and powerfully articulated during the 2008 presidential campaign an ongoing project of democratic inclusion. One especially memorable (and frequently reproduced) speech epitomised this logic: For when we have faced down impossible odds, when we’ve been told we’re not ready or that we shouldn’t try or that we can’t, generations of Americans have responded with a simple creed that sums up the spirit of a people: Yes, we can. Yes, we can. Yes, we can.It was a creed written into the founding documents that declared the destiny of a nation: Yes, we can. It was whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail towards freedom through the darkest of nights: Yes, we can. It was sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and pioneers who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness: Yes, we can. It was the call of workers who organized, women who reached for the ballot, a president who chose the moon as our new frontier, and a king who took us to the mountaintop and pointed the way to the promised land: Yes, we can, to justice and equality. Yes, we can, to opportunity and prosperity. Yes, we can heal this nation. Yes, we can repair this world. Yes, we can. (Quoted in Bird 2009: 23) This powerful narrative identifies a series of successive emancipatory enfranchisements: of African Americans, of ethnic migrants, of workers, of women. Even the ‘settler pioneers’ are part of this process even they get to be emancipated. And yet, as Bird perceptively points out, there are no American Indians in this picture. Indeed, Native Americans are doubly absent: they are conspicuously missing from this list of emancipatory passages, and they are erased as an obstacle: the pioneers who ‘pushed westward’ did not move against them (unless we are willing to consider the Indian nations that occupied the continent as part of an ‘unforgiving wilderness’). As such, Bird concludes, as ‘the pioneers, immigrants, slaves and abolitionists progressed towards a destined more perfect union, American Indian nations had to be pushed to the margins and then out of the picture altogether’ (23). Operating within a system that routinely demands that we forget that the pioneers were either dispossessing Indians or receiving stolen property (especially considering that he was in the business of winning a close election)? Yes, he was. In November 2009 a year after his election President Obama invited 500 tribal leaders to a massive conference the first of its kind dedicated to developing a comprehensive new approach in the management of Indian affairs. His administration is not uninterested in Indian affairs; this agenda, however, is essentially framed in terms of welfare rather than sovereignty (what in Australian parlance would be referred to as ‘practical reconciliation’, and in a US context has been defined by Jessica Cattelino (2010) as ‘need-based’ sovereignty).6 While this progressive agenda envisaging yet another emancipatory passage for US indigenous people remains ultimately premised on an original disavowal, attempts to address indigenous disadvantage that fail to recognize the need to decolonize a settler colonial system of relationships can be understood as deep colonizing. Besides, indigenous welfare and ‘rehabilitation’ are about (settler) benevolence and (indigenous) need, not about inherent sovereign entitlements (Kauanui 2008: 34). Rehabilitation without reconciliation isn’t rehabilitation. An ocean away, newly elected Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd’s official parliamentary apology to the ‘stolen generations’, as noted by Maria Giannacopoulos (2009), who wrote an insightful typology of Rudd’s rhetorical strategies of evasion, provides another example of deep colonizing (for the text of the apology, see Rudd 2008). Firstly, she notes, Rudd’s apology is strictly about the theft of children, not the theft of land (as if child removal could be separated from the system of power relationships in which it happened). Secondly, by definition, an apology is about saying sorry and about defending one’s actions: ‘Rudd’s apology appears to be less about benefiting Indigenous peoples and more about serving as an exculpation mechanism for white modes of power’, she notes. In the apology, the state is both defendant and judge, and as such it self-prosecutes, carefully circumscribing the limits of critique that may be made against it or, more specifically, that it calculatedly makes against itself. The apology functions simultaneously as the site of blame (prosecuted) and as the site of justification (defence). (Giannacopoulos 2009: 339) In this sense, the apology amounts to a solipsistic act, where the settler sovereign talks to itself about itself, reconciling itself with its past. Moreover, Rudd’s apology carefully contains its scope, and is construed as only applicable in relation to past occurrences. Thus, Giannacopoulos notes, by ‘blaming itself with reference to its past incarnations the current sovereign controls the parameters of critique whilst also exculpating itself for liability in the present’; ultimately, the ‘apology is made by the current sovereign without the acknowledgment that those things being apologized for persist in the present’ (340). This narrative shift produces a situation in which current indigenous grievances are strategically dismissed: the apology is circumscribed to the past; the past Rudd is quite explicit about this cannot be changed, and the present is another story.7 At the same time, by strictly and explicitly defining the period covered by the apology specifically, the years between 1910 and 1970 Rudd strategically avoids focusing on both the establishment of settler colonial relations (the pre-1910 period), and their ongoing current operation (the post-1970 era).8 As the apology blames ‘bad laws’ enacted by ‘bad parliaments’, a double exculpation takes place: the failure was not settler colonialism’s, and not of those who were personally involved in delivering and enacting genocidal policies. Both the system and the perpetrators are thus effectively excused (even if it is acknowledged that both policies and executors were racist). Ultimately, since the apology is construed as a generous gift, ‘instead of Indigenous people being given something back’ it is them who owe acceptance to Rudd (Giannacopoulos 2009: 344). Rudd’s concluding remarks underscore this peculiar inversion: ‘my proposal is this: if the apology we extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation in which it is offered, we can today resolve together that that there be a new beginning for Australia’ (Rudd 2008). Giannacopoulos points out: ‘Rudd is making the apology, but only if it is accepted can his plan succeed. If the future does not shine as Rudd anticipates it will, it will be the fault of those who have not fallen into line [i.e., the Aboriginal people who would not accept the apology]’ (Giannacopoulos 2009: 345). Rudd’s settler repertoire of evasion thus includes blaming indigenous people for settler colonialism.9 Reconciliation without compensation isn’t reconciliation.

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