Hegemony is a new name for the white man’s burden
Hobson 14 (October 2014. John M Hobson, John Montagu Hobson, FBA is a political scientist, international relations scholar and academic. Since 2005, he has been Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield. “Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line,” pg 88-93) //Don Markos
A further subliminal strategy has been the normative prescription of a “benign” neo-imperial politics that also goes by a whitewashed or sanitised name. Thus neorealist hegemonic stability theory (HST) elevates the exercise of (Anglo-Saxon) hegemony to the implicit status of a civilising mission (e.g. Gilpin 1981), while neoliberal institutionalism does much the same with respect to the role played by Western international institutions, especially the IFIs (Keohane 1984). In both visions, a major rationale of Western hegemons and their international institutions is to culturally convert Third World states along Western civilisational lines: the very essence of the old liberal mantra of the civilising mission. And both approaches echo the manifest paternalist Eurocentric formula of awarding “pioneering” progressive agency to the West and “conditional agency” to the East. These two terms refer to the point that for paternalist forms of Eurocentrism the West is assumed to have the “fully rational” capability to self-generate into modernity (the “Eurocentric logic of immanence”), while the East is said to be blocked from doing so on account of its “irrational institutions”. This led to the paternalist-imperial formula in which Eastern development can occur but only on condition that the rational institutions of the civilised West are delivered courtesy of the benign-paternalist Western civilising mission. Thus for HST and Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism, hegemony and international institutions respectively come to replace the terminology of the liberal civilising mission, even if these former terms perform the exact same logic as the latter. The route into this alternative reading of HST lies with the point that in order to celebrate British and American hegemony Gilpin is forced to suspend some of the cardinal axioms of neorealism. For a key property of hegemony is that it must secure world order and development for all states but in the process this leads inevitably to the relative decline of the hegemon via the “free rider problem”. The immediate problem here is that neorealism, especially in its “offensive” variant that Gilpin supported in the period when he constructed HST (i.e. 1975 through 1987), 6 asserts that states seek to maximise their relative gains over others (Gilpin 1975, 23, 34 – 6, 85 – 92). But it is clear that in HST this principle applies to all states bar the hegemon. Or, put differently, in this vision we are treated to a story in which the leading great power not only does not seek to enhance its relative power over others but instead sacrifices its power for the benefit of others, thereby contradicting the cardinal realist axiom – that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” . Thus in Gilpin’s HST this cardinal realist axiom is precisely inverted: “The weak do what they can and the strongest does what it must.” That the hegemon is exceptional is clear, though why it is so is not explained other than through a circularity as well as through a structural-functionalist mode of reasoning: specifically, that the hegemon self-sacrifices because “that is what hegemons do” (i.e. the circularity); and that without the presence of a hegemon the world economy descends into recession and rising inter-state competition because the international system requires a hegemon to promote stability and world order (i.e. the structural-functionalist assertion). But simply asserting that the system “requires” a hegemon for ensuring world order and stability does not explain why a leading great power chooses to become a hegemon in the first place, especially as all it can look forward to is its decline relative to those that it “helps”. In essence, then, there is no recourse within neorealist logic to explain the highly anomalous altruistic status that HST ascribes to the United States in the 1945-73 period or to Britain in 1845-73. Explaining this gap in the theory requires focussing on the presence of a subconscious American ethnocentrism and subliminal paternalist Eurocentrism which, I want to suggest, lies at the very base of HST. That is, US hegemony reflects the nineteenth-century discourse of “American exceptionalism” and its accompanying neo-imperialist idiom of America’s “manifest destiny”, much as “British exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny” underpinned the idea of the British Empire. For the notion of helping all other states, especially those in the Third World, conjures up the idiom of the “civilising mission” and the “white man’s burden”. Thus I want to suggest that within Gilpin’s theory it is precisely this Eurocentric-imperialist sensibility that underpins the real explanation for why leading Anglo-Saxon great powers choose to become hegemons and why they supposedly sacrifice themselves for the good of others. Still, while my reading thus far is based on logical deduction, nevertheless there is a clear slippage in Gilpin’s “positivist play of mimetic universalism” where he makes explicit reference to hegemony as a benign imperial civilising mission. As is well known, Gilpin begins by differentiating hegemons from imperial powers. Although Gilpin argues that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, the modern world is governed by the progressive non-imperialist politics of liberal hegemons whereas the pre-modern world was based on the cyclical and stultifying/regressive politics of despotic Eastern empires, this distinction is problematised by the obvious point that Britain was the greatest imperial power prior to 1945, as much as the United States has been the greatest neo-imperial power in the post-1945 era. The critical point is that Gilpin attempts to circumvent this obvious inconsistency by explicitly resorting, paradoxically, to the nineteenth-century imperialist trope of the liberal civilising mission. To this end he invokes Karl Marx’s paternalist civilising mission conception whereby modern European imperial powers transferred capital and technologies to the colonies not to exploit but to uplift them (Gilpin 1981, 142 – 3); or again, that the dominant power helps to create challenging powers. Ironically, as Marx himself appreciated, one of the greatest forces for diffusion has been imperialism…. The imperial power has stimulated the colonized peoples to learn its ways and frequently has taught them advanced military, political, and economic techniques. (Gilpin 1981, 176) Here, then, we encounter the key “paternalist-imperial” civilising mission trope, in which liberal empires take on the guise of a benevolent father who teaches his children – both directly and by way of example – to embrace and develop what he has already pioneered so that they can grow up and one day prosper. Thus in defending his “non-imperialist” reading of hegemony it seems clear that Gilpin, like Hedley Bull, is addressing the wrong target. For his assumption is that imperialism is defined by the exploitation of the weak by the strong. But in Marx’s vision – as well as that of the paternalist Eurocentric liberal – imperialism is conceptualised as a civilising mission precisely because it entails the West engaging in the “paternalist uplift”, rather than the coercive exploitation, of the East.