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The archive of security commitments began with the securitization of indigenous peoples

K-Sue Park 2015 [Teresa K-Sue Park Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Berkeley “If Your World Was Built on Dispossession”]//sheima

This union of unions was not authorized under the charters of the member settlements, which included the newly-created New Haven federation, other federations of the colony of Connecticut, and the colonies of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth. To govern the union, the United Colonies created Articles of Confederation that justified its formation on the grounds that “hostile Native American tribes to the west” posed an urgent, common threat to its members. They explained: … whereas we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange languages which hereafter may prove injurious to us or our posterity. And forasmuch as natives have formerly committed sundry insolence and outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against us. (Pulsifer 1861, 3) ¶ Each colony agreed to maintain its own government and legal order, but approved twelve articles designed to govern their common affairs, including such matters as jurisdiction, procedures for membership, representation and meeting, and proportionate shares of the Confederation’s defense budget and spoils of war, as well as the “removal of residents from one plantation to another; policies towards the Native Americans,” or in other words, immigration and Indian affairs (Pulsifer 1861, 3). To aggregate their power, the colonial federations swore to submit to these Articles, and thereby, to “jointly and severally hereby enter into a firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence, mutual advice and succor upon all just occasions… for their own mutual safety and welfare” (Pulsifer 1861, 3). ¶ Two aspects of this inter-federation compact seem especially noteworthy in light of the foregoing discussion. First, the New England Confederation was analogous to the compacts between individuals that formed its constituent units. Like them, it announced itself as a mutual defense pact, in light of the dangers presented by the hostile relations that they had cultivated with the tribes in the area, or “the state of nature” Locke described. The purpose of this union was similarly to protect colonists’ security and property in America, all of which, in 1643, colonists had but freshly claimed. It facilitated colonists’ ability to hold--but also first to acquire, and then continue to acquire--quantities of goods and land from indigenous people. Another term for this pattern of continuous creation of property through the acquisition of indigenous lands is colonial expansion, which the social compact supported at the inter-group level, as well as the individual level, by making possible the liberal use of violence in transactions with outsiders. The privileges and violence that the social compact distributed placed the collective threat of violence behind every member of the colonial community in its acquisitive, extractive, expansionist endeavors. ¶ Second, the New England Confederation exemplifies a distinct social compact formation that ordered a multi-level system of government. We can thus understand Locke’s narrative as encoding a foundational structural principle that gave rise to a new society in a broader sense, as well as rethinking its character as plausibly historically descriptive. As higher-order social compacts facilitated intergroup cooperation against an ever-expanding background of trade, or “Promises and Barter for Truck” and land, the consent that individuals had expressed to form the lower-order compacts were first once, then twice removed to representatives of the increasingly large imagined communities. The passage of time, or the famous generational problem, did not defeat actual consent within the federated social compact—already an abstraction from the stillfeudal family order-- as much as spatial, territorial ambition, or expansion did. When direct participation became impractical within the government that held itself to be of, by and for the people, consent became synecdochal through political representation.Thus, while the social compacts founding New England towns and uniting colonial federations were analogous in form, they also existed in direct relation to one another and transformed the meaning of consent to political government. By 1700, the growth and proliferation of federations between the originally diverse townships formed by civil covenants, which had determined “where people settled and lived” and “affected virtually all citizens of seventeenth century New England,” resulted in increasing civil and political uniformity (Weir 2005, 236, 233). The United Colonies’ Articles of Confederation emerged in parallel order with the later 1754 Albany Plan of Union, an intercolonial pact that Benjamin Franklin proposed in order to treat with the Iroquois Confederation. Both preceded the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union ratified by all thirteen of the original colonies in 1781. As John Quincy Adams stated, “The New England confederacy of 1643 was the model and prototype of the North American confederacy of 1774” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). In both of these cases, the parties formed the union without authority or sanction from the charters given by the Crown, the authority to which they were supposed to defer. Where the formation of the United Colonies produced tension within this hierarchical relationship, the United States pursued independence through the Revolution, indexing the growing power and appeal of the colonial expansion these unions supported. Adams, indeed, refuted the colonies’ debt of allegiance to the Crown by identifying natural law as the source of authority for these federal compacts, writing, “In both cases it was the great law of nature and of nature's God-- the law of self-preservation and self-defence, which invested the parties, as separate communities, with power to pledge their mutual faith for the common defence and general welfare of all” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). The law of transnational relations, by his account, licensed the Union to organize their forces against both indigenous nations and the Crown, when it allied with the enemies against whom the colonies had joined forces.In short, as the advantages of civil society in the state of nature made social compacts proliferate across New England, these compacts’ intensification of the state of nature they produced gave rise to a higher-order compact and the principle of federalism itself, which was finally enshrined in the Constitution. This emergence of federations signaled the appearance of rototypical modern state forms, whose consolidation and organization of force raised the stakes of the omnipresent threat of war in the state of nature. At this inter-group level, the comparison we drew earlier between compacts and collusion or conspiracy also translates as a project Charles Tilly has called “war risking and state making.” Drawing from the European, rather than American context, Tilly describes states as “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy,” and historical war and state makers as akin to “coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs” (1985, 169). However, where Tilly contrasts this image of states as coercive forces of business against benevolent ideas about the state such as “social contract” (1985, 169), I have tried to show here how the social contract is not the opposite but the essence of the form that organizes and directs the violence of the state that Tilly emphasizes. The historical example of New England, I have argued, sheds light on the Second Treatise by illustrating “the place of organized means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states” (Tilly 1985, 170), from the law-founding consolidation of violence of the first individual and federal compacts, to the new orders of violent expropriation, contracts and compacts that emerged under the United States’ expansion efforts, which I will explore below. ¶ First, however, it is worth noting that the same calculation that incentivized the states to consolidate their force also motivated them, conversely, to seek to splinter their enemies’ power. Even before the Revolutionary War, the accumulated pressures of white immigration, land dispossession and the displacement of tribes were laying the groundwork for a coalition of Northern and Southern tribes, and such a union seemed imminent to colonists by the spring of 1774 (Sosin 1967, 85). As the authors of the Federalist Papers note, the states’ independent activities only exacerbated the threat of a full-blown interracial war; they cite “several instances of Indian hostilities… provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 16). During this period, “[t]he menace of unsettled boundaries was everywhere” (Paxson 2001, 48), and the “vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States” was the source of “discordant and undecided claims” lingering “between several of [the States]” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 34).¶ The creation of a speculative land market based on the conquest of western lands would require cooperation between states and with the federal government, and the formation of a strong counter-union that could face its enemies in war. To lessen the causes of war that a “disunited America” would proliferate, the Federalists therefore argued that a “United America” was necessary to consolidate the power of the states in the service of a common aim; a central power would both constrain and mediate between the states, and between the states and Indian nations (1787, 13-14, 16). For the Federalists, “[t]he utility of the UNION” would be to facilitate continuing conquest: future dispossession would relieve member states of their individual and collective debt, manage internal unruliness by creating a central monopoly on violence, and allow for surplus accumulation that could become the basis of a powerful national economy (1787, 6). On the same principle, under the compact that established the United States, the central government promptly adopted a policy of exploiting longstanding rivalries and hostilities between tribes. This divide-and-conquer approach to Indian Affairs constituted a logical counterpoint to the new, centralized strength of the Union. Under the authority of the War Department, General St. Clair, who negotiated separately with the Six Nations and the Great Lakes tribes, thought he could “set them at deadly variance” (Smith 1882, 113).42 Congress counseled Indian agents to “deal with each Indian tribe or nation as separately as possible,” and insisted that “the tribes were to be kept separated so that negotiations would be easier” (Kades 2000, 1120). ¶

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