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The Plan’s Mandated “consent” via fiat undermines Native Consent – which undermines Native Sovereignty recreates a cycle of horror that every Native is sentenced to experience.

Simpson 08 (10/27/2008 7:57:45 AM. Audra Simpson - Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University. Many of the sources cited in this article were obtained by the author from personal interviews with Mohawks from Kahnawake. LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS was thus unable to independently verify this authority. Unless otherwise noted, these sources are on file with the author. “Subjects of Sovereignty: indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and Juridic of Failed Consent” pgs. 197-202) //Don Markos

CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY: LOST REVENUES AND HISTORIES OF FAILED CONSENT A. The Problem of Lost Revenues In both Troubled Waters and The Dark Side of Native Sovereignty, “the problem” was revenue lost to Canada. Canada raised the tax on cigarettes to combat teen smoking in 1989 and then in 199130 and saw a rapid increase in smuggling. By 1994, Canada estimated that it had lost $2 billion (Canadian dollars) in revenue31 and consequently lowered the tax to combat smuggling. The public problem of cigarettes then morphed from a corporeal concern with the young citizen’s body to a public concern over the nation’s economy: “smugglers” were harming not only the former, but also the latter—the nation’s pocketbook. In R.J. Reynolds, one nation-state (Canada) acted as a person and filed a civil-action suit against an amalgamation of business interests within another nation-state. The suit was filed in the defendants’ own territory, within their own legal system, in order to sue for damages under RICO for injuries incurred in Canada. Canada argued that an amalgamation of U.S. and Canadian cigarette traders willfully circumvented Canadian taxation by smuggling contraband tobacco and cigarettes—via the Iroquois from reservation communities in the Northeast—from Canada, across the international boundary line for repackaging, and back into Canada, in order to evade Canadian taxation. In conspiring in these ways and in circumventing Canadian taxation, Canada argued, the tobacco company R.J. Reynolds and others “injured” Canadian property and caused additional damages and costs due to the necessity of investigation and legal proceedings. In ruling against Canada by upholding the revenue rule—which states that one country would not act as an enforcer of the other’s laws—the Second Circuit recognized the sovereign status of foreign nations. R.J. Reynolds offers an occasion for insight into the legal process of how “empire” is negotiated, where legal and political territories are acquired and new boundaries and political subjects are decided through the space of courts. In doing so, the terms—and the process—of political recognition are laid bare for analysis. This is a case in empire-building because its complicated legal reasoning both responds to and effaces, again, indigenous people’s claims of their “aboriginal” right to trade, upholds and reinforces the singular forms of sovereignty (even where distributions in capital deterritorialize sovereignty à la Hardt and Negri32), and disables the very possibility of indigenous participation in a contemporary trade network. In R.J. Reynolds, the possibility of a third legal system at work was not admitted into the analysis, thus solidifying settler sovereignty as normal, natural, and ultimately just. B. Histories of Failed Consent In contrast, Mohawks interviewed in the films spoke of an alternative mapping of territory. Consider this conversation on transport, place, and the law: Victor Malarek: “So these boxes move out every night and they’re headed for the Canadian side, but look what it says here—‘Not for sale in Canada.’ Where are they sold?” Loran Thompson: “Canuga Hogga territory, indigenous to the people of this country—the Americas.” Victor Malarek: “But they end up in Canada.” Loran Thompson: “Maybe to you they do, maybe to people like you they do, but to people like me, nationalists of my country and my government, that word Canada to me is Ganada—a village.” Victor Malarek: “When you see this, ‘Not for sale in Canada,’ . . . you’re not breaking the law?” Loran Thompson: “No.”33 Thompson’s arguments speak from Haudenosaunee legal and experiential history, a history that is punctuated by such exchanges and differential understandings of place and territory. Consider the history embedded in these remarks: You are a cunning People without Sincerity, and not to be trusted, for after making Professions of your Regard, and saying every thing favorable to us, you . . . tell us that our Country is within the lines of the States. This surprises us, for we had thought our Lands were our own, not within your Boundaries.34 The white Man put that there, not us, I don’t know why we have to put up with this bullshit. 35 More than two hundred years separate these utterances, yet not much seems to have changed in the Iroquois perspective concerning the border. The central point of each lament, although inflected differently, remains the same: the perception of territory that underpins Iroquois people’s right to cross the border dividing the United States from Canada is radically different from that of either nation. These border utterances speak from the perception of the Northeast as a territory that belongs to the Iroquois, and as a place that was divided and is administered without their consent. These narratives speak as well to the political relationships that underpin this territory, and to the difficulty that Iroquois people have had and still have in moving through the landscape of the Northeast in a manner that is consistent with their self-perception—and rights—as indigenous nationals of that territory. Why is there such a radical difference between their self-perception and the ways in which Iroquois border-crossings are administered? Why is there such incommensurability between Iroquois’ perceptions of the treaty relationship and those of the regimes that now interpret it? What accounts, then, for the dissonance between Iroquois self-perception and state-perception? There are several factors at work in these disjunctions. The most significant are the different understandings of the proper relations that Iroquois and settlers have brought to their interactions through the past two hundred years. These different interpretations are brought to the fore in Mary Druke Becker’s important article on Iroquois sovereignty through time.36 Iroquois chiefs deployed the language of treaty—with concomitant notions of “father” when regarding the British—but did so insofar as these terms furthered their notion of the relation between the two as one of equals. Beginning in the late 1670[]s, the English and French began seeking territorial domination over larger and larger areas of land vis-[à]-vis one another. Each nation argued with the other that the Iroquois had agreed to become their children or subjects. The Iroquois had agreed to use the Iroquoain term for “father” when addressing Euro-Americans. This term was used because within the matrilineal Iroquois society a father was an indulgent, not an authoritarian, figure. The term was commonly used among Iroquois nations and by other Iroquois with whom they were in alliance. It implied a reciprocal relation in which care and aid were provided. It was not one which implied subordination.37 These understandings of the Iroquois and by the Iroquois are common to the different positioning and perception of Indians generally through time, and to settler-state formation and asymmetries of power that allow one perception of difference to become institutionalized through law, policy, and other forms of state practice. Indian tribes were first perceived as nations (hence the model of international treaty-making which marks the earliest period of their interaction with the Dutch, French, and English regimes) and were then perceived to be dependant wards who required protection from white unscrupulousness on the frontier.38 Iroquois, in particular, have resisted their interpretive demotion in political affairs; yet, with the rise of the “welfare state,” many perceive Indians on the Canadian side of the border as clients (among many others) who need to be administered and managed. With this transformation of legal perception in mind, what then is the basis in law for Iroquois self-perception, sense of jurisdiction, and movement across the border? It is largely the nation-to-nation, or “linking arms,”39 metaphor of equality among people, reflective of the treaty relationship, that serves as an interpretive frame for Iroquois engagements with other nations, be they indigenous or nonindigenous.40 This is a notion anchored historically in arguments and deployments of the Two Row Wampum Treaty between the Iroquois and the Dutch,41 manifest in reminders and interactions that have been issued in serial engagements in the national and international arenas over the or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever.46 This explicit right to pass, then, implicitly leaves the legal regimes of Canada and the United States with the power to define who those Indian nations are and how that right to pass shall be rendered and respected. As well, and very critically, the regimes of the United States and Canada were bequeathed the power to choose whom they would recognize as members of these communities. It is prudent now to map out how these longstanding forms of recognition then speak to local forms of recognition, and more critically, how they speak to indigenous notions of citizenship-formation and territory. Connecting these discourses illuminates how legal interests and designations not only affect the possibility of movement, but how these interests also work to define, through identification practices, their own territory and boundaries.47 Such connections may illuminate as well how these identifications and legal and interpretive acts are reformulated in practice and how they are not only “resisted,” but circumvented, denied, or ignored.

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