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NATO is an organization structured by colonialism. From Kosovo to the AFF the construction of narratives of “urgency” and “humanitarian necessities” justifies NATOs colonial ambitions and reentrenches an international order that is structurally positioned against those it claims to help.

Erfani 21[Ava Erfani graduated from UNC Chapel Hill in 2021 with majors in Political Science and Interdisciplinary Studies (IDST) as well as a minor in Asian Studies, “Disaster Colonialism: The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),” North Carolina Journal of European Studies, https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/c821gv324#page=28]

The international involvement in Kosovo since 1999 serves as a unique, contemporary case of what I refer to as “disaster colonialism,” borrowing from Naomi Klein’s conception of “disaster capitalism.”5 In Klein’s vocabulary, “disaster” refers to the vulnerable condition of a populace wherein it is unable to express its popular will against undemocratic economic neoliberal reforms, usually due to its focus on survival and recovery following a widespread crisis. Disaster colonialism in Kosovo, I argue, was a project, one which needed the fabrication of a “disaster,” (based on the historical event of the 1999 War of Independence) for a series of international organizations to establish missions that would proliferate following the end of the war. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia over the ownership of territory was seized by the international community as a “disaster,” catalyzing a self-justifying mechanism that foreclosed the expression of popular democratic will in post-conflict Kosovo. Without the watchword of “disaster,” I claim, the interventions in Kosovo, by NATO, the UN, and the European Union (EU) would not have been possible. Understood in this way, disaster colonialism is a programmatic, top-down method of building a state following a crisis that undemocratically implements techniques of governance imported by a colonizing power, bypassing the will or the consent of the populace. By manufacturing a “disaster”—which declares a populace no longer capable of deciding the future of their government or the shape of their own society––the international community was able to format a legal, economic, and political system in Kosovo that served the interests of a Western, liberal-democratic power structure. Disaster colonialism, then, attempts to diagnose the ways in which a foreign governing body is established, exercised, and multiplied in post-crisis situations using universally accepted norms of international human rights discourse to justify the wide-scale modeling of a society to serve not so much the interests of the governed, but rather the interests of the global order. In the case of Kosovo, the 1999 NATO intervention began the project of disaster colonialism by claiming a stake in the future of Kosovo. The UN continued the project for eight years via direct governance over Kosovo. After Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the UN transferred the remainder of its authority to the EU which utilized indirect methods of control––financial imperatives, Kosovo’s lack of alternative sources of growth and aid––to finalize the mission of disaster colonialism.6 The origins of international involvement in Kosovo did not begin with NATO, but the NATO intervention allowed for the colonial mission to take place. It established that the conflict was out of the control of Milošević, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, the KLA, and other regional actors. As it had done in Bosnia-Herzegovina only a few years prior, the international community coalesced around the new governance and peacekeeping project: Kosovo. Thousands of international staff members relocated to the new missions in Kosovo in the direct aftermath of the destruction from the 1999 war. Many Kosovar Albanians as well as Kosovar Serbs faced extreme brutalities during the war, including murder, assault, rape, and forced removal as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign. It was in this environment that the UN and other organizations stepped into Kosovo. UNMIK, the OSCE mission, the EU mission, and the permanent NATO presence combined to create the longest and most expansive trusteeship mission in history.7 Kosovo as a post-conflict site gave the international community a center to focus their operations. For organizations like the EC/EU, state-building was a new field in which they could test their power and efficacy. If the post-conflict missions in Kosovo could be successful in creating a European-oriented, stable state, the international organizations could gain greater reputation and power in their global endeavors. Each major international organization was placed into separate spheres of operation termed “pillars.” Pillar I, “Humanitarian Affairs,” originally fell under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was responsible for the return and replacement of refugees; Pillar II, “Civil Administration,” was run by the UN and consisted of daily administrative management of the territory; Pillar III, “Democratization and Institution Building,” was led by the OSCE; Pillar IV, “Economic Reconstruction,” fell under the jurisdiction of the EU.8 Each partition of tasks made clear the primary objectives of UNMIK in terms of the type of society it aimed to create in Kosovo: a human rights-respecting, bureaucratic, and democratic government (UNHCR, UN, OSCE) as well as an investment-friendly market economy (EU). This level of state-building had not been undertaken before by the UN, making Kosovo the site of the largest modern experiment in government planning and control. The “disaster” of the 1999 war provided the grounds for this colonial experiment, the purpose of which was to prove the efficacy and hegemony of the liberal-democratic humanitarian style of “good governance” and development. In this paper, I will trace the points in which the UN’s disaster colonialism, administered by technocratic governance experts, reveals the costs of occupation, the collateral damage that is part of the state-building mission, and the tensions between expert rule––even from a human rights-centered organization like the UN––and democracy. The International Commission on Kosovo’s 2000 report on the Kosovo crisis found that the intervention was “illegal but legitimate… because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”9 The uncertainty surrounding the legality and morality of NATO’s actions in Kosovo was quelled by this consensus, paving the way for the international community’s colonial project to establish its roots in Kosovo.10 The UN was able to establish UNMIK without request from Kosovo, bypassing its traditional insistence on consensual missions due to the “urgency” of the post-conflict situation which made its power as a humanitarian organization necessary, at least according to the international community.11 It is my argument that UNMIK’s administration was fundamentally colonial: the international community worked to control and shape the people and society of Kosovo, implementing Western governance and economic styles, while working against and around the very systems that they implemented. The difference between the colonialism of “old” and the disaster colonialism of the UN in Kosovo is that the UN’s hypocrisy between its rhetoric and action was due to its prevailing belief in its own mission rather than an ulterior motive to attain economic wealth. Those in charge of UNMIK and international organizations in Kosovo could accept the fact that many of their policies went against European and international legal conventions––some costs were necessary, according to their logic, in order to build a stable state for the people of Kosovo. It is this axiom, I argue, which guided UNMIK and other missions in Kosovo and which made colonialism possible as a humanitarian system of governance in the 21st century. The NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo was officially terminated on June 9, 1999 when NATO and the FRY government signed the Kumanovo Technical Agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia. The document created a framework for dispelling Serb troops from Kosovo and for the establishment of a NATO security presence in the province.12 However, in terms of addressing the roots of the territorial conflict, the agreement was much weaker than the agreement at Rambouillet. Milošević rejected the Rambouillet Agreement before the war began largely because of its proposal that a referendum on the issue of independence would be carried out after three years of foreign international intervention in Kosovo. The Kumanovo Agreement focused more on the establishment of international administration rather than on questions popular will or sovereignty. Prior to international intervention, the KLA aimed to gain national sovereignty and independence for Kosovo; this was, however, irreconcilable with the goals of the North Atlantic organizations. As Ray Murphy writes, “The ultimate goal of the KLA was independence, but this was inconsistent with European Union and United States policy. The latter considered that political autonomy and guaranteed minority rights formed the only internationally acceptable solution to the status of Kosovo.”13 The Kumanovo Technical Agreement focused on the security apparatuses in Kosovo, stating that a UN mission would be deployed under a Security Council resolution and that all Yugoslav military forces would be removed from Kosovo’s territory and air space. The agreement established NATO’s sole authority over the use of force in Kosovo, banning any return of the Yugoslav and/or Serbian militaries. The following day, the UN would establish sole governing authority in the region. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.14 Article 11 of the Resolution gave UNMIK its main objectives: 11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: (a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace- building activities; (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; (j) Protecting and promoting human rights; (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;15 Resolution 1244 was the basis of the UN’s power in Kosovo. It ensured that the functions of Kosovo’s society as well as the design of its future would be in the hands of international staff. The scope of the mission was unprecedented; with no clear terminating clause, UNMIK would be responsible for both administration over Kosovo as well as the facilitation of the territorial dispute.16 In the span of two days, Kosovo lost local authority to self-govern as well as establish its own armed forces. The Resolution was seen as the ex post facto endorsement of the NATO intervention––the subject of legal and ethical debates on foreign intervention and sovereignty among international law experts––by the UNSC which had not initially approved the intervention.17 However, some scholars of international law who did not accept the humanitarian premise of the NATO intervention also questioned the legal validity of post-intervention involvement in Kosovo. They argued that the Kumanovo Agreement, which Resolution 1244 refers to as part of its legal basis, was made in violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”18 The crux of the critical argument centered on the use of unsanctioned force by NATO which was in violation of the UN Charter. Legal debates notwithstanding, the UN mission was able to expand its legal and executive reach after the passage of Resolution 1244.

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