Deterrence theory invests in a theory of human nature that tends towards instability within anarchy, which posits counter-hegemony as criminal and capitulating to humanism
Jurgutis 18 [Jessica E., department of political science and international relations @ McMaster University “Colonial Carcerality and International Relations: Imprisonment, Carceral Space, and Settler Colonial Governance in Canada” https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/24059/2/Jurgutis_Jessica_E_2018September_PhD.pdf, 22 nov 2018 ] <Jericho>
The Prison Industrial Complex (PIC) is a global phenomenon. Women worldwide, and especially poor women of colour are the fastest growing prison population and practices of imprisonment are implicated in upholding racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power (Davis, 2003; 2005; 2012; Sudbury, 2005; 2008; Gilmore, 2007). At the same time this has garnered very little attention in a discipline whose founding narratives claim the Prison and Prisoner as their own. The significance of a growing carceral apparatus for questions of safety, well-being and global justice have seen little meaningful engagement in orthodox IR. On one hand, the reality of the PIC—a central formation within the global system—has yet to be engaged from outside a critical political economy tradition. On the other hand, critical IR’s engagement with imprisonment has largely been confined to an emphais on various modes of detention, surveillance and new governance practices, while less work has focused on more mundane practices of incarceration as a feature of colonial relations, and especially settler Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 25 colonial states within empire.12 In this chapter I argue that the prison and prisoner are foundational to, and yet eclipsed by IR, and that the failure for IR to ‘see’ imprisonment has much to do with its inability to see (settler) colonialism. In the Canadian context, this requires taking seriously how Canada’s own history of employing systems of confinement as an everyday tool and strategy of settler colonial governance has largely been taken for granted by IR and the broader discipline of Political Science. Beginning from this starting point my aim is to show how the global political economic and state-making implications of these practices of punishment and carcerality are organized through gendered, racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies that are reproduced and even transformed through these efforts. This means that I understand the prison and prisoner as categories that are upheld by white supremacy and heteropatriarchy within global capitalism. 13 This chapter will begin by examining the lineage of one of IR’s founding metaphors, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to consider the work it does to order and discipline IR’s relationship to practices of imprisonment through claims to universalism and rationality, which serve as methods to “resolve” social conflict through the use of force. I trace its deeper intellectual commitments and lineages to modern liberal thought in order to consider the purpose and role of prison and punishment within the settler state, arguing 12 Here I am informed by Tuck and Yang’s (2012) discussion of internal and external colonialism where they argue that neither fully accounts for settler colonial contexts. They state, “Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony” (p. 5). McCoy, Tuck & McKenzie (2017) point out that these are not mutually exclusive, especially as many settler states colonize other lands. 13 As stated in the introduction, this project also begins from the starting point that reproductive work is a terrain of struggle that must be taken seriously as the necessary underpinning of a transnational political economy of carcerality and carceral space. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 26 that the utility of imprisonment rests on its embeddedness within the social contract and methods of coercion and non-consent. In addition to providing insight into the extent to which the prison and prisoner are substantively under theorized in the field, by connecting the prison and prisoner to orthodox international and political theory, I argue that the prison and prisoner are indispensable to an imperial and settler colonial project, because they are integral to the theft of people’s bodies, land, and labour through practices of criminalization. This lends insight into how practices of imprisonment, as well as settler colonialism are substantively under theorized in the field. By examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought I show that the utility of the prison and prisoner and their corresponding logics resides in their attempt to hide and naturalize the violence required to maintain an international order reliant on the theft of bodies and lands. In doing so I establish connections between land, labour, criminalization and punishment, which links the histories of settler colonialism with the production of carceral space in order to understand the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project through how it is required to reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, economic interests, well-being and ways of being are to be secured and whose can be criminalized. Finally, this chapter will begin to explore how to make sense of the land-labourpunishment and criminalization nexus within global context. There has been a number of important works that provide postcolonial critiques of the imperial foundations of modern Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 27 political thought. My aim in this chapter is to build on them in order to help to make sense of the relationship between the production of carceral space and settler colonialism. Equally, in the chapters that follow, I provide a more sustained analysis of how these relationships and struggles took shape in what would become Canada. Thus, though tracing these histories in the global context is important, the historical context of a particular place and the land matter a great deal in how contemporary carceral projects can be realized, as well as how methods of criminalization continue to be used as strategies to suppress and quell these longstanding struggles that seek to disrupt their place within empire, and through that attempt to envision and build worlds otherwise. Unpacking and Interrogating the Prisoner’s Dilemma in IR The prison and prisoner have been marked with a conspicuous level of presence and absence in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Game theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular, are central tenets of rational choice models in the discipline. The use of game theory became more pronounced in fields outside of economics in the latter decades of the last century and as part of a larger positivist tradition within IR and Political Science. What IR knows as the prisoner’s dilemma has come a long way from the initial intentions and questions of RAND Researchers, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (Poundstone 1992, 106). Flood and Dresher hoped to understand why, if cooperation yielded higher payoffs, would rational actors choose selfdefeating strategies? The ‘pair of prisoners’ story was actually added later to provide a Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 28 narrative structure to the model (Marks, 2004).14 Through its widespread deployment in IR it has become more emblematic of a desire to explain and predict the behavior of states as units of analysis and as a method of determining the impact of those outcomes. The way rational choice perspectives have been taken up in IR fails to recognize and grasp the very real presence of the global terrains of imprisonment and a growing carceral apparatus, and demonstratively does not consider them as a worthwhile and serious phenomenon of study. In this sense, there persists a curious level of visibility and invisibility when it comes to understanding the prison and prisoner in IR that intersects theoretical, empirical and methodological terrains. There has not only been a failure in recognition, but a gap in taking seriously its role in informing and reproducing contemporary relations of power in global politics. Presented as a hypothetical test ground for mathematical models and theory building within rational choice perspectives, the prisoner’s dilemma is a formative metaphor in theorizing and producing the international (Marks, 2004).15 The dilemma can be understood as a both a narrative strategy, or metaphor, as well as a model used to organize and predict the actions of rational actors in international politics based on judging and responding to the strategic moves of another in order to achieve maximum payoff. Similar to the other metaphors of game theory, the narrative argues that each rational actor will make decisions that are in their best interest in order to receive the 14 As Marks (2004) explains is not actually required for the ‘dilemma’ to manifest since game theory was never intended to replicate anyone’s lived experience. 15 For an elaborated discussion of the role of metaphors in IR, see Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors, Magicians, Mutinies (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 29 greatest reward. These approaches have sought to use the prison among other visual imagery as an illustrative scenario to demonstrate the validity and viability of the mathematical models rational choice theories are premised on for the purpose of prediction and explanation. The result is that that assumptions about how prisoners rationally choose their self-interest over collective cooperation for mutual benefit can help to predict the behaviors of states. The narrative says that two prisoners have committed a crime and have been caught, separated, and offered a deal from police that they cannot consult each other on. If one of the prisoners confesses to committing the crime while the other does not, the partner that has confessed will go free while the other that has not will go to jail for ten years. If both prisoners confess both will go to prison for five years, and if each prisoner denies, then both will go to prison for six months. Drawing on this scenario Realists have endeavored to show that in situations where there is instability, or when there is mistrust and information and communication is limited, the actor will logically choose self-interest and reward at the expense of mutual benefit and cooperation, whereas Liberals have been more apt to demonstrate that cooperation is possible and conflict is not the inevitable outcome (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1990). According to this model, our understanding of states and global structures are reduced to outcomes of conflict (anarchy) and cooperation (order) where states jockey to acquire gains and minimize losses, and where relative strategic success becomes defined in these terms.16 Perhaps the most well-known adoption of this model in IR is Deterrence Theory. 16 For a thorough critique of the limits of Game Theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma see Marks (2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 30 Situated within a Realist framework deterrence theory states that in order to avoid the worst-case scenario, it may be in an actor’s best interest to defect even if it produces some consequences that are undesirable. The rationale for this is that, as outlined, these consequences will be better than an alternative scenario in which the other actor defects and we are left with more severe consequences (whether in the form of nuclear fallout or a longer sentence). This strategy is intended to create the conditions to avoid unwanted wars and, in situations of international crises, acting first is considered a strategic move to avoid the worst consequences (Jervis, 1976).17 As Snyder states, “[t]he central characteristic of the game is that, although the parties could enjoy mutual benefits by cooperating, the logic of their situation forces them into conflict and mutual loses” (1970, p. 67). Importantly, in this framework each actor will want to be first to confess even if they will still be punished, since this will still mean less punishment over all.18 What questions does the Prisoner’s Dilemma raise and attempt to resolve for IR? Here it is worth noting that the conditions within which states must act are ones of constraint—a detail that is both crucial for the model to work and exemplified fittingly in the use of the metaphor of the prison. For Liberals, the prisoner’s dilemma narrative implies the possibility of negotiation and cooperation through “collective security” achieved through international agreements and institutions (Snyder, 1971), and shared norms. However, in reality power is not shared equally. This means that although both Realist and Liberal interpretations suggest that their frameworks seek to preserve security 17 For example, as is the case with the security dilemma, arms races and Mutually Assured Destruction (Snyder, 1971; Jervis, 1976). 18 Snyder (1971) explains that within Realist thought this instability is generated from the international system itself, whereas within Liberalism it is generated by uncertainty about opponents’ intentions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 31 and diminish violence overall, there are a number of assumptions at play that ensure the prison and prisoner cannot be substantively engaged as sites of study in international politics. Both Realists and Liberals ignore that the very presence of the prison and police already assume the use of force as necessary to manage societal conflict. Deterrence theory illustrates this and therefore it should come as no surprise that the idea of the prison would be subject to similar disciplinary conditioning. In a framework that already assumes the use of force and constraint, it is notable that the idea of punishment can become conceived of as a necessary evil or the least violent alternative to minimize and reduce overall harm within a conflict driven and constantly shifting international state system. Here it becomes evident that beyond a narrative or metaphor that becomes applied to the international realm, the prisoner’s dilemma is about producing and sustaining certain logics and practices of IR, which rest on both the material, discursive and knowledge production practices of carcerality. These are the same logics and narratives that eclipse the prison and prisoner as an analytical site in the field. These narratives of conflict or cooperation share a positivist epistemology and a “belief in the universal rationality of economic logic” (Waltz, 1979, as quoted in Ling, 2002, p. 115). Realists like Jervis (1970, p. 73) have aspired “to preserve the international system and the signals that lend it greater predictability” since it is this predictability that they claim will enhance the model’s function overall. For instance, claiming this will be achieved when “the actors value the system, prefer long-run over short-run gains, and have more in common than conflicting interests” (Jervis, 1970, p. 73). This means that the Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 32 system functions better when everyone buys in to or trusts the rules of the game through the punishment and reward system. But as Agathangelou and Ling (2009, p. 15) expose, strong states that set “the rules of the game” that other states must then play by. They go on to say, “[s]hould compliance fail to ensue, or[…] outright violation occur, the Self [i.e. strong states] must discipline the Other” (2009, p. 15). Of course, the Prisoner’s Dilemma was never intended to model human interaction or experiences though it undeniably has implications for how we act, experience and create our worlds. It has come to reproduce assumptions about human nature in constrained conditions as extended and embodied by states in ways that deny the complexity and vast range of human experience within and beyond prison walls (Marks, 2004). Marks aims to rectify this by compiling a more accurate representation of prisoners and their experiences to build a more useful and exemplary metaphor for IR.19 As much as I concur that the metaphor of the prison shapes our actions and our worlds, prison is not simply a metaphor. An understanding of it as such, though certainly opening a valuable vantage point from which to examine prison from a more nuanced, institutional and empirically rigorous standpoint, does a disservice to those for whom it is daily reality and fails to bring us to a more politicized understanding of the global system of incarceration that helps to stitch the fabric of the contemporary neoliberal capitalist world order. That is, the prisoner’s dilemma is not only problematic because of the artificial limits imposed by the payoff structure and the ways this translates to the international 19 His Constructivist commitments lead him to this important argument, but it is also these same commitments that limit the extent of his critique. I am supportive of Marks’ desire to include prisoners’ experiences and to consider what a more sustained analysis of the prison system would yield us in global politics. See for example Der Derian (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 33 (Marks, 2004), but because it takes for granted the full set of power relations that produce the prison itself.20 So despite the desire to shine a spotlight on the work outside the discipline that seriously complicates otherwise simplistic notions of prisons as institutions and the people within them, it fails to help us recognize the substantively material and ideological work that prison and prisoners do for us in global politics, or bring us closer to a more inclusive or transformative vision of justice. Thus, I approach this in a way that does not take the prison as a political-economic institution, set of practices and logics for granted, and which aims to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. Another way of saying this is that the prison and prisoner have been glossed over in IR for many of the same reasons as settler colonialism. One of the implications of taking the Prisoner’s Dilemma seriously as a set of competing, though not substantively different logics, is that we can begin to see their deep and intertwined history with imperial thought. The focus of this dissertation is to examine what is exposed about settler colonialism when the prison and prisoner are made visible and unpacked as a feature of its inner workings. In particular, the specific ways that coercion and the use of force feature in the prisoner’s dilemma, as constituted through claims to universalism and rationality, indicates that the category of the prisoner is also crucial to the formation of racial hierarchies of superiority and inferiority. In doing so this work follows a tradition 20 So, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system they will reap rewards. This means punishment becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as the interests of particular states. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 34 of challenging the idea that narratives can continue to be reproduced in mainstream IR literatures as a substitute for analyses of power (Grovogui, 2001). As Grovogui claims, often such “hermeneutics [of race]” depends on understanding “that Africa has served as the counterpoint to the European trajectory in order to provide a justificatory trope for the ontology of international relations, morality, hierarchies, and structures of authority and legitimacy” (p. 426, 427). This can also be said for the Americas and the complimentary, but distinct role that Indigenous peoples were scripted within the civilizational narratives of empire (Beier, 2002). Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair (2002) argue for the interrogation of the power asymmetries and hierarchies that uphold states and their position within a global system, as well as the ways that the imperialist juncture and its related historical processes feature so prominently in these productions. Such an entry point unpacks questions of “the state, sovereignty, order and anarchy” in order to consider how the discipline’s mainstream, is premised on an understanding of power that privileges hierarchy, “rationality,” and a predominantly Eurocentric worldview, thus mystifying the ways in which states and the international system are anchored in social relations. (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002, p. 3). But further, bringing these social relations to light requires moving beyond critical approaches in order to account for the intersectionality of these erasures so as to theorize power in IR (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002). They advocate for the need to interrogate the Eurocentric, white, rationalist, masculine and elite assumptions of mainstream approaches and the coercive definitions of power and conditions of unfreedom they make possible. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 35 Thus, though the state has been interrogated in critical perspective,21 there remain important connections to the material and discursive ordering and operation of power made possible through (in)formal institutional, policy and socio-legal practices and arrangements and their enforcement. The ways the power relations of the prison must be erased in IR also gives us insight into the ways in which colonialism, and especially settler colonialism, must also be continually be eclipsed. Therefore, in this project I hope to provide an intervention that foregrounds an analysis of power and the ways colonial hierarchies work alongside methods and practices of settler colonial law and institutional formation in order to make possible the prison and prisoner as institutions, practices and categories of subjectivity on which settler colonialism and empire relies. When we take imprisonment for granted, we hide a crucial strategy and means by which colonial violence as harm to bodies and lands is made possible. These of course, are not only made possible through the punitive logic at the level of the international, but at the level of state-making. For settler states, the deployment of these logics has profound implications for the terms on which inclusion and exclusion are conceived. In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it produces a limited and clearly defined set of choices, punishments and payoffs. In this way, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the 21 Chowdhry and Nair (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the gaps in critical IR scholarship in pages 6- 10. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 36 state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system, they will reap rewards. In such a framework, punishment additionally becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as a means by which dominant power extends itself over the bodies and lands of others.22 Therefore, the logics which underpin this invisibility take for granted the use of force at the same time that they deny the invasive and transnational methods of governance that were required to make colonialism and settler colonialism possible.23 This is enabled by how the state is taken for granted as a unit of analysis, as others have argued elsewhere.24 However, I want to suggest that when we consider the ways these methods have implicated the prison and prisoner in IR it is possible to gain insight into how the struggle to get colonialism and settler colonialism seen in IR is also compounded by the inability to see the prison and prisoner as well. This means that it becomes difficult to separate practices of imprisonment from colonial and imperial projects historically and on an ongoing basis. Arguably, the prisoner’s dilemma rests on much more longstanding ontological and epistemological commitments in modern liberal thought regarding the centrality of the use of force to good government and governance, as well as the ways these philosophies have often been naturalized and obscured through their application within IR. Despite their differing levels of willingness to engage with questions of power and 22 Marks (2004, 113) has also shown, both prisoners and states have the ability to affect and alter the circumstances or conditions in which conflict or cooperation occur to demonstrate that the international system is not in fact a fixed reality. 23 This is reproduced when, for example, a game theory model is deployed to give an account of the scramble for Africa. 24 See for example, Walker (1997), Campbell (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 37 violence, both Realists and Liberals take the prison as an institution and set of practices for granted: the reality of the prison and prisoner are assumed in the question itself. The implication of this is that practices of imprisonment as well as the prison and prisoner remain invisible and yet absolutely central features and figures in global politics. Marks identifies that, “what matters most in the application of game theory in international relations theory is not the unique imagery inherent in each game’s underlying metaphor but how all the games taken in their entirety convey the same picture about what international relations is about” (2004, p. 35-36, emphasis original). This is true; however, I would like to both broaden and add specificity to this statement by suggesting that the prisoner’s dilemma can be further unpacked by establishing how it is premised on and works alongside other deeply established ontological commitments and erasures in the field. In the following section I read the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a set of logics with deeper roots in modern political thought, and as adding insight into understanding the ways in which abstraction and erasure of the prison and prisoner have become enshrined in IR. By doing so I believe we can gain greater insight into the specific ways prison and prisoners have become both central to and absent in the discipline. Punishment and Criminal Subjectivity in Modern Political Thought Social contract theory rests on the premise that there is agreement to enter into society under certain conditions in exchange for security and protection from the sovereign or government. It is within this agreement that prison and punishment become possible and even desirable, since they are tools that allow the law to be upheld while also Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 38 acting as a deterrent for future violations. But what can be gained by examining the role of punishment, constraint, and coercion within these frameworks? In this section I examine the role of punishment and property in social contractarian thought to highlight that their co-constitution has been under theorized. Paying particular attention to the role of punishment, I show how claims to rationality and universalism continue to structure processes of criminalization along racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed lines. I argue that ways of being in relation to land and labour perceived as deviant become criminalized, which subsequently provides the grounds for coercion and non-consensual inclusion, as well as the means by which the use of force is normalized against particular populations. Examining these relations indicates a more comprehensive lineage of erasure in how the prison and prisoner ensure punishment and criminalization as central strategies of the settler state within empire. Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the “state of nature” works alongside and informs the Prisoner’s Dilemma narrative to establish claims about human nature under anarchy and the behavior of states in an anarchic system. As Marks (2004) identifies, in the same ways Realists establish anarchy as the central problem of IR through the use of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature,’ they also make implicit assumptions about the prison. Namely, that despite an overarching and imposed structure, they are anarchic, violent and primitive— attributes that are easily scripted onto prisoners themselves. Though these assumptions are not widely shared beyond the mainstream of the field, they are difficult to escape and still inform the basis of the most powerful schools of thought within IR alongside other such metaphors (Marks, 2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 39 The Hobbesian story of human life in the state of nature as being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (1981[1651], 186), is well known and not without problems in the way that it has been central in theorizing sovereignty and upholding the order/anarchy divide on which orthodox IR theories have been premised (Walker, 1993; Beier, 2002). For Hobbes, the state of nature is one of perpetual insecurity because under conditions of scarcity human beings will always need to seek their own self-preservation and causing the security dilemma to ensue (Walker, 1993). As Walker claims, Among (proto bourgeois) individuals, Hobbes argues, structural relations of insecurity demand a superior sovereign for an ordered polity to be constituted. Hence, the powerful resolution of the relation between sovereign individuals and sovereign states through a contract that is both freely entered into and yet necessitated by structural conditions. (Walker, 1993, p. 93). This conception of human nature necessitates a sovereign or Leviathan, since peace and order are impossible without. Walker suggests that Hobbes provides a way of negotiating claims of autonomous individuals with a political community since, …[A]ccounts of consent, participation and representation that came to be articulated as a way of holding apart, yet also reconciling, the claims of supposedly autonomous individuals with the claims of obligation to a broader collective, the community of citizens, the people, the nation, the state. (1993, p. 147-148) Beyond the fact that reconciling freedom with sovereign authority under capitalism naturalizes the acceptance of subjugation and asymmetrical relations of power, I want to suggest that Hobbes’ account be understood as one which argues that the social contract must be entered into under conditions of constraint. This is not only because structural conditions naturalize social hierarchy but because consent as described by Hobbes, is actually about coercive “agreement.” John Locke on the other hand, understood life in the state of nature, though Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 40 insecure, to be relatively calm, cooperative and pleasant, so long as everyone followed the rules. Locke argues that though the state of nature is one of equality and liberty, it is not one of license as “no one ought to harm another in their life, health, liberty or possessions” (1980[1690], p. 9). Similarly, to Hobbes, Locke naturalizes his own conceptions of reason, morality, property and punishment through using the state of nature as a rhetorical device that adopts his theorizations about political society. Locke’s conceptions of property have been shown to be of central importance in understanding his theorizations “since the creation of property and its preservation constitute the foundation of the state of nature and civil society respectively” (Arneil, 1996, 60). At the same time, the question of punishment is actually one of the first subjects addressed in Locke’s discussion of the state of nature, where punishment and property are already married. Hobbes’ understanding of punishment follows rather predictably from his ideas of power, authority, order and obedience. Punishment is an action permitted by the sovereign in the event that the law is violated, since the right for security has been surrendered to the sovereign. Likewise, where there is no law, there is no crime: … that the Civil Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accursed onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. Then therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. […] That when Sovereign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no Power, there is no protection to be held from the Law; and therefore, everyone may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of the Sovereign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety where of all Sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 337) In other words, there is a hierarchy of violence and crime is only possible when there is a law to violate. Even though in the state of nature the use of force can be used against Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 41 another for self-preservation, the difference is that no one has an obligation to submit. At the same time Hobbes locates the making of sovereignty in the preservation of life in the state of nature. When the law is broken his position is that the state has no obligation to uphold the social contract with criminals since they, as the initial violator of the law (the social contract), become enemies of the state (Brettschneider, 2007). This is consistent with his position that the punishment for many crimes should be the alienation of citizenship.25 Since criminality depends on a “defect in Reasoning” and is “Of the Passions” (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 339, 341), unreasonableness is a criterion of criminality and vice versa. Though Hobbes projects that since rational and reasonable men enter into the contract on agreement, this ignores the structural conditions of constraint that make up the state of nature and necessitate the sovereign. Thus, when violators of the law are inevitably accused of unreasonableness and the punishment justified, this is simply an extension of the coercion and violence that is naturalized in the state of nature and foundational to the contract itself. Although Hobbes and Locke come to different conclusions about the conditions and circumstances with which citizens authorize the just use of force in society, I argue that both try to reconcile freedom with conditions of constraint. Hobbes attempts to reconcile freedom and right with supreme and excessive sovereign authority under 25 Brettschneider (2007) also points out that not all social contractarians take such an extreme position. He says, “Whereas Hobbes labels criminals “enemies” outside the social contract, contractualist justification views even the worst offenders as citizens and requires that the coercion they face be reasonably acceptable to them” (2007, p. 181). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 42 capitalism to achieve peace and order, whereas Locke attempts to settle it with a form of collective agreement that claims to be more measured in the use of force, but still rests on the naturalized marriage of property and punishment. Therefore, both Hobbes and Locke argue that the social contract must be coercively entered into in different ways. This means that political community and state formation are about non-consensual relations even on their own terms.26 According to Brettschneider (2007), social contractualism is a not a theory of actual consent, since “[c]ontractualism aspires to be a theory of legitimate coercion” (p. 182). He goes on to argue that, “Never is a state more coercive than when it punishes, [making] punishment a paradigmatic example[…] contractualism hopes to justify.” I however want to suggest that the criteria of assessing the extent to which social contract theory attempts to legitimate coercion may be more effectively perceived by looking to the more insidious forms of its operation and contractualism’s core assumptions. Of course, the moment of punishment lends crucial insight into the operation of power and authority because of the explicitness with which personal, physical, emotional, and psychological boundaries are violated, but this moment is connected, and indeed made possible by the earlier erosion of autonomy and freedom through coercion, constraint and non-consent. Likening the state of nature and the role of punishment for Hobbes and Locke to Realist and Liberal revisions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests that more baggage may 26 Those with the option to enter in to even this coercive agreement included white bourgeois men with an interest in maintaining their security of person and property. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 43 be at play than an understanding of game theory alone makes room for. If the question the prisoner’s dilemma suggests is not if force will be used, but when and how (to what degree), I want to suggest that referring to Hobbes and Locke can give us some indication about the underlying assumptions that are necessary to answer this question. By making the case for the right to punish as foundational to order and good government, the assumption of punishment by force is certainly not exclusive to IR alone, but to Political Science more broadly. In this sense, the concepts of conflict, cooperation and order become illuminated, since punishment resolves any tension, or non-cooperation towards these ends. For Realists and Liberals alike power and cooperation through coercion is the answer that the prisoner’s dilemma provides for IR. This is not simply present when the law has been violated but has a foundational purpose in the formation of political society informed by social contract traditions. Despite the fact that Realists have selectively drawn on Hobbes for theory building purposes, the state of nature metaphor has become established in the field by the theoretical mainstream. Drawing from the work of Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova, Beier (2002) points out that social contract theorists relied on accounts from European travelogues of the “New World” to formulate the ontological basis of their theories— namely their conceptions of the state of nature.27 Though Locke’s articulation of the state of nature differed from his predecessor, both rested on many of the same racist and Eurocentric ideas (Beier, 2002). If Hobbes has been a staple influence in the discipline’s mainstream theoretical debates, it is not to say other conceptions of the state of nature 27 See for example, Farr (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 44 have not come to bear. Acknowledging Hobbes’ regard among Realists and others alike should be read within a broader context of the discipline’s indebtedness to the foundational assumptions of social contractarian thought and the Westphalean state system, as well as the ways even critical approaches within the field take this foundational colonial and racist violence for granted.28 Locke’s ideas about the state of nature may not have been as readily picked up by IR theorists; however, as others have pointed out, Locke was involved in colonial missions himself and his work has been shown to make arguments that provide much of the intellectual groundwork that formed modern Liberal thought and that would justify colonial conquest in the Americas (Tully, 1993; Arneil, 1996; Hsueh, 2006; Farr, 2008). Locke is also instructive here because, though he shares with Hobbes a propensity in drawing on gendered and racist interpretations of the “New World” and its inhabitants, we can read his argument as a political-economic one explicitly because of the centrality that property takes in his theorizations. In their naturalizing of contractarian theories of property, both Locke and Hobbes’ claims about the state of nature also served to diminish the life ways of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas (Nichols, 2005). In other words, social contract theory provided both the justification for their indigenous removal and the means by which this could be accomplished. In his piece, The Colonialism of Incarceration, Nichols (2014) indirectly follows 28 For example, this has become especially prevalent in the post 9/11 era where, in an attempt to draw attention to the profound violation of civil, political and human rights, a large body of critical scholarship reproduced the notion that extending rights makes it possible for the liberal democratic state to regain its moral and just status. This in effect serves to erase the violence at its foundations and within ongoing practices and institutions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 45 on this point to argue that it is for this reason that Indigenous claims provide a critique of practices of imprisonment that are based on a different normative foundation than other over-incarcerated racialized populations in the Americas. Despite the accuracy of the statement that critical prison studies has “insufficiently attended to the centrality of colonialism to the origins, scope, scale, and legitimation techniques of carceral power in North America,” he does not develop an analysis of carceral power that takes account for its transnational dimensions and therefore replicates its domestication within the bounds of the state.29 Thus, though he is able to take account for the role of imprisonment in dispossession, through this framework we none the less lose access to a way of understanding relationships between punishment and property as ones that rest beyond territorialized sovereignty. This changes our understanding of carcerality itself. An analysis of property without acknowledging punishment presents a partial image of Locke’s theorizations and what we can infer from them about the way dominant power became secured. For Locke (1980[1690], p. 19), anything that occurs in nature could be possessed by adding one’s labour to it for its improvement: “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature that hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” As scholars have shown, Locke’s notion of property—specifically the conceptualizations of land and labour that it relies on—have a number of deeply 29 This would in turn alter the distinctions he outlines in his formulation of the critique that Indigenous peoples’ claims provide about carceral power, including whether it can be contained to the notion of critique. Similarly, though Nichols’ (2014) discussion challenging the difference between the logic of war and social pacification is helpful and a discussion to which I hope this project contributes, we miss a chance to explore the role that capitalism plays making a more nuanced theorization of violence and carcerality necessary. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 46 problematic implications for Black and Indigenous peoples (Armitage, 2004). These assumptions include viewing slaves as property (i.e. owned labour that could be used as a tool to accumulate property for the owner), and Indigenous peoples as part of the state of nature (since they were considered as having no government or recognizable way of working and thus owning the land).30 This latter move was particularly useful to Locke and his involvement in colonial settlement in the Carolinas, since it produced both an economic and ethical justification for English colonialism in the Americas, and land theft in particular (Arniel, 1996).31 Locke highlights that land—the earth itself—“is the chief matter of property” and makes clear the superiority of European ways of working the land (i.e. agriculture, cultivation, enclosure) and relating to the land (a hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship in which white men own and control land, labour and all that comes from it) (1980[1690], p. 21, emphasis original). The fact that Indigenous peoples’ lifeways were not understood as meeting this criteria was utilized to provide the intellectual justifications for delegitimizing Indigenous claims to the land where they have resided since time immemorial. Informed by the doctrine of terra nullius, these ideas contributed to the depiction of Indigenous lands vacant and empty, or as Bonny Ibhawoh has put it, “that aboriginal land was in effect no man’s land and that by conquest and “improvement,” European settlers could make legitimate claims to them” (Ibhawoh, 30 Locke makes these claims by both using Amerindians as examples to justify this theory of property and diminish any indigenous claim to land through this framework (Arneil, 1996). 31 Though the emphasis in this project is on the Canadian context, at this moment in history the Carolinas were embedded in the British imperial project. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 47 2013, p. 8; Weaver, 2003).32 Although enclosure has been documented as one of the primary tools of extending colonialism in the Carolinas (Arneil, 2006), this would not be possible without the first move of universalizing settler claims and rationalizing settler possession via terra nullius and hierarchies of value which ascribed European ways of relating to land as superior. 33 Though Locke’s state of nature is less popular among orthodox IR, it is necessary for understanding the economic rationality that is assumed by them. For Locke, the state of nature not only provides the justification for a more responsible or measured version of sovereignty in comparison to Hobbes, but at its center is the necessity of a centralized authority to uphold preconceived moral and political standards for the right to punish and the right to property. It is made clear in his claims about the state of nature that both are crucial in forming the foundations of political society, yet this relationship seems to be sorely under theorized.34 For Hobbes and Locke criminality is a major criteria of assessing reasonableness because, as previously mentioned, those who break the law are understood to do so because they do not possess the capacity to reason.35 It is on these 32 Terra Nullius was a legal doctrine whereby indigenous lands were constructed as unoccupied or ‘empty space’ as a means of facilitating European occupation and theft (Ananya, 1996; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Whereas terra nullius was used in the case of colonization of North America as justification for land theft, in the scramble for Africa it was used to refer to whether a territory was occupied by other Europeans and ultimately “served the role of international law in prescribing ways to avoid conflict between rival European powers” (Ibhawoh, 2013, 6; Keal, 2002). I will discuss the specificity of terra nullius in the context of Canada in Chapter 3. 33 For example, requiring Amerindians to erect fences around their land and to provide land allotments and boundaries to settlers (Arneil, 1996). 34 It is beyond the scope of this project to fully theorize the relationship between punishment and property in social contractarian thought. My intent is to point out this omission in order to establish some of the intellectual foundations for the presence and absence of prison, punishment and settler colonialism in the discipline of IR. 35 In addition to the power relations previously outlined, the connection that is established in social contractarian thought between criminality and reason also maps on to ableist discourses as well. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 48 grounds that it becomes possible to identify when the use of force is normalized as justifiable, acceptable, rational and measured. In short, when the mundane use of violence by the state is both made invisible and naturalized. The ways in which Liberal conceptions of punishment become secured through Locke’s formulations of political society are telling precisely because they, alongside property, provide justification for criminalization, slavery and Indigenous erasure and land theft in the Americas. If Indigenous life ways were made to be null and void and if the “New World” was a blank space, then there was never any room or purpose for Indigenous peoples and knowledge on the way to progress, according to Locke. Without mixing one’s land and labour in what resembled European agriculture, proof of right would be difficult to establish (Arneil, 1996). Thus, this was part of the political and economic justification for why Indigenous peoples of the Americas were argued not to own the land on which they lived. In light of the under examined connections between the naturalization of punishment alongside property in social contractarian thought, it is instructive to consider how ideas of private property (and the assumptions of land and labour on which they rely) require enclosure, objectification and possession through the control and/or criminalization of undesirable people and deviant ways of life. Locke’s theories about labour are equally important here, since his writings indicate that not all human beings are afforded life in the same ways. Since human beings could become property according to Locke, his theories simultaneously produce an intellectual justification for slavery alongside that of the land theft required for settler colonialism. If criminality is determined based on the acceptability of particular ways of being Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 49 and relating to land and labour, and not only when breaking the law, then the practice of criminalization is connected to law, but not solely grounded in it.36 And given charges of irrationality and inadequacy, we can also see how diffuse the idea of “reasonableness” and “rationality” is. For Hobbes, Locke and other social contract theorists criminality is a major criterion of assessing reasonableness because those who break the law must be without critical faculties to understand that they are challenging authority and “asking” to be punished. It is on these grounds that the use of force is deemed as required since those who are irrational cannot cooperate or respond to dialogue. As such, force becomes justifiable, acceptable, and naturalized. The IR orthodoxy has done very well to draw on the “state of nature” and its corresponding assumptions as described by Hobbes and Locke to make claims about the international state system. Indeed, social contract theories have been central to the development of the modern western state. The depth with which these analogies and their suppositions permeate the discipline is part of why they come to matter when reading the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Examining their role in the intellectual and material constitution of the international can work towards demonstrating how the foundational disciplinary and positivist frameworks of Realism and Liberalism have understood prison and prisoners all along. This reading of the prisoner’s dilemma not only makes this stark empirical absence visible, but also highlights a much longer lineage of utilizing assumptions about the necessity, purpose and centrality of punishment by the privileged in the service of 36 In Chapters 3 and 4 I will discuss the complexities around settler colonial claims to ‘law’ in the Canadian context, especially in light of the erosion of the treaties and longstanding international agreements between Indigenous and European nations as a result of Canada failing to uphold its responsibilities. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 50 universalist claims about the world. The additional context reading Hobbes and Locke provide is to suggest that questions of land and labour, through questions of colonialism and imperialism, are in fact central to how violence, constraint and coercion is constitutive the of the international system, and yet must continually be hidden and erased. Reading Punishment and Criminalization as Features of Settler Colonialism Instead of treating punishment as secondary to other concepts like freedom, right and equality, Andrew Dilts (2012, p. 60) asks what we can learn from Locke’s Second Treatise of Government from the point of view of the centrality of punishment? He points out that it is especially the social contractarian cannon of political philosophy that presumes “the seeming inevitability of punishment” in order to ground and operationalize its conceptions of the social contract and natural rights, since they “have no empirical referent” (Dilts 2012, p. 58-59; McBride, 2007, p. 122). The usefulness of punishment for Liberalism according to McBride lies in the way it serves as an instrument “to establish itself as a political order” (Dilts, 2012, p. 59). The logical purpose of punishment resides in being able to produce criminality in contrast to innocence, and therefore its power lies in its confounding and slippery qualities, so much so that even those who seek to deal with this as a central feature of Locke minimize the tensions it raises or attempt to resolve the contradictions punishment presents (Dilts, 2012). The utility of the question of punishment for Locke is in the ways it comes to embody the inherent instability and unknowability of political life. This excess and instability is displaced onto the criminal in order to make possible the production of stable subjects with the ability to enter into the social contract on the grounds established (Dilts, 2012). In other words, the production of stable subjects is only possible against those who are not: criminals, savages and other degenerates. By making criminals, (Dilts primarily discusses the figure of the thief), to carry the “burden of danger and irrationality” they not only become a physical threat that plagues the state of nature with uncertainty, risk and violence towards one’s property and oneself, but presents an ontological threat as well (Dilts, 2012, p. 61). As figures beyond reason or ability they are unknowable and must be judged through their status with the label and identity of criminal, which simultaneously allows us to know them by their past actions while controlling the uncertainly imposed by the future threat they necessarily must embody. This threat of unknowability and risk of theft and violence, having the potential to spiral out of control in the state of nature, is what necessitates Locke’s foundational claim for the commonwealth, since it is grounded only through making the distinction between the State of Nature and State of War and “the attempt to stabilize the unstable right to punish” (Dilts, 2012, p. 62). In this conceptualization of crime as the use of force and as subjugation the thief is likened to tyrannical power and argued to produce an existential threat to one’s property and oneself simultaneously. 37 Whereas in the state of nature acts of crime may easily veer into a state of war through reciprocal punishment and slavery, within the commonwealth civil society is maintained when a crime has ended since at that moment the use of force has ceased and it becomes possible to categorize the offense and 37 Tyranny is defined as the use of force without right. In this sense, the thief becomes indistinguishable from the murderer and crime is an act of war within the state of nature (Dilts, 2012). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 52 determine proportionality (Dilts, 2012). Society therefore becomes restored in the just use of force in the form of punishment. Slavery is intimately tied to Locke’s logic and rationality of punishment as a liberty of the transgressed, since a transgressor may remain under their master’s power indefinitely.38 The slave, according to Locke, was someone who was “biologically alive” but without the “rights and powers” of humanity (Norris 2005, as referenced in Dilts, 2012). This echoes Rousseau’s own crude articulation: “In taking an equivalent of his life, the victor did not spare it: instead of killing him unprofitably, he killed him usefully” (Rousseau as quoted in Dilts, 2012, p. 67). Indeed, for Locke, the unstable position of punishment and slavery within the State of Nature provide the drive for civil society. Here it is worthwhile to note that it is in this context of having no resolution to justified punishment and slavery that a government must exist to restrain the right to punish criminals and identify aggressors in exchange for protecting one’s life, liberty and property: “[t]his is done by producing the criminal as necessarily beyond reason, as animalistic and dangerous, and constitutively defining the obedient subject as rational, innocent, and, above all, free” (Dilts, 2012, p. 72). Thus, the Lockean project was already about the production of subjects devised to determine who is a rational actor by nature, 38 Dilts argues that, Proportional punishment, on these terms, has no boundaries, and generates the disorder and chaos that characterizes the State of Nature. While the possibility of crime might make the State of Nature unstable and dangerous, the practice of punishment makes it unacceptable. As suggested by Farr, Locke’s argument in favour of slavery follows a “just war” tradition emphasizing action (2008) and in this sense differs from naturalistic accounts (1980). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 53 but also through the foundational act of punishment.39 This determination marks out the conditions of inclusion for both bodies and land. The rational actor is the only fully human figure in Locke’s framework. The slave and property-owning white man’s innocence is secured at a rate higher than all else in this account and by virtue of criminalizing deviants. Therefore, the work of punishment is that the criminal must not just be managed in light of their actions, but for a way of being (Dilts, 2012). It is exactly this ‘way of being’ that makes space to consider how the identity of the criminal maps on to the other identities that become vilified through claims to rationality which racial, gendered, classed, sexualized and colonial hierarchies have already been established in relation to. These figures are either incapable (i.e. deficient) or uncooperative (i.e. unwilling) to enter into the social contract on the terms set out, and therefore must be coercively included through performing distinct roles that are constructed to legitimate its existence: the slave, the Indian, the criminal, and so on. What this demonstrates is that it is also the substantive difference in the claims to land and labour other ways of being suggest that threatens the legitimacy of the contract. But beyond thinking about this as exclusion from the social contract, criminalization presents the means by which both labour and land, (property in addition to territory), are required through methods of coercion and extraction to make the capitalist settler state possible. Recalling Audra Simpson’s (2017, p. 20) words at the outset of this chapter: 39 This included, “Lunaticks and Ideots,” children, “Innocents,” “Madmen” etc. Criminals are also referred to as “wild Savage Beasts”—as animals, which places them in the state of nature and with others who never leave nature (Locke, 1980[1690], p. 34). On this point, we can begin to contextualize the relationship between criminality, madness and ableism, and how it overlaps with other relations of power through claims to rationality. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 54 “For Native people, this ruse of consent marks the inherent impossibility of that freedom after dispossession, a freedom I argue is actually theft.” Simpson exposes how claims Indigenous people are free through inclusion are impossible and untrue, because of the theft of Indigenous bodies and lands on which the settler state rests. Thus, the social contract is made possible by legalized theft, (and the continued erasure of that theft), both at its founding and in perpetuity—though it can never be acknowledged as such—at the same time that punishment provides the mechanism by which claims that challenge any such reality as legitimacy become criminalized, managed and contained through the explicit use of force. Colonial Carceral Erasures This reading highlights that Realist and Liberal uses of the Prisoner’s Dilemma through claims to universalism and rationality actually serve to make invisible the role and function of the prison and prisoner within IR. Constructivists, like Marks, may be able to question how these institutions and subjectivities produce the international, but they do not offer a way to interrogate the prison and prisoner as providing the material requirements of land and labour that has driven and continues to compel imperial and colonial expansion in the current moment. Critical scholars in IR, though directing attention to imprisonment and carceral space, often do so in a limited way that often reproduces this same erasure of land and/or labour in varying capacities.40 In order to avoid this in this project I strive to take account for the role of the prison and prisoner, 40 I will elaborate on this discussion in Chapter 2. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 55 and thus a reading of carcerality and criminalization, at an imperial juncture that rests on the widespread theft of bodies and labour through the transatlantic slave trade and external forms of colonization, at the same time that it birthed forms of settler colonialism that require the theft of land that continue today in ways that cannot be captured in an extractive model. Doing so requires a refusal to take the prison and prisoner as a political economic institution, form of subjectivity, set of practices, and logics for granted, and aims instead to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. The ways the power relations of the prison are eclipsed in IR gives us a great deal of insight into how the power relations of settler colonialism are elided as well. The use of force is not only present during the act of punishing the prisoner, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems to imply. Here we can recall that the prisoner who does not cooperate or act within the terms set out for them receives the harshest punishment in the form of a ten-year sentence. Social contract theory gives us insight into the ways claims to universalism and rationality undergird cooperation through legitimate coercion, while providing the grounding necessary to disavow the use of force and non-consensual forms of inclusion. These claims also ensure that the making of criminal subjectivity is informed by racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power. This means that contrary to the story the Prisoner’s dilemma supplies for IR, punishment and the use of force are not exceptional actions introduced periodically or where necessary in order to diminish violence. Rather, violence in the form of the theft of bodies and lands are necessary for the myth of sovereignty, global capitalism, and the making states within the international system itself. Indeed, you cannot steal people’s bodies, labour and land without carcerality. But because the imperial and colonial power relations must necessarily seize bodies and land as property or as targets of elimination, these erasures are in fact (settler) colonial ones which are continually evidenced in the ways carceral institutions are required to manage the relationships between bodies and land.41 Examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought shows how practices of punishment and criminalization become a method of erasing and “resolving” social conflict within ‘the international,’ as well as settler state contexts. In doing so land, labour, criminalization and punishment are mutually constituted in ways that link the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, well-being and life ways are secured through innocence and whose ways of being must be criminalized. We have reason to interrogate the unquestioned status of the prison and prisoner as a central institution and figure in IR, as well as the roles they play in society and in our lives. Indeed, the very presence of the prison, its foundational assumptions, and status as an uncontested and under examined institution in IR can be understood as ones to ensure conditions of the international system continue to be founded on colonial violence and maintained though forceful constraint in the contemporary moment. Settler states continue to rely on the production of criminality and carceral space in order to redefine and reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. These ongoing histories are ones that must be historicized in place in order to fully unpack the lineage of settler state and capitalist expansion in ways that illuminate how carceral logics, imprisonment and the production of carceral space developed as a settler colonial governance strategy on Turtle Island. In the end, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can tell us very little about prison and prisoners as an everyday occurrence in IR. It can tell us little about how and why so many poor and racialized people are killed or in an increasingly privatized and expanding global prison system, or why it is predominately poor and racialized women who are increasingly criminalized or at the very least made to bear the entire burden of work and grief when their loved ones are. Prisoners cannot be conceived as citizens and workers, or even on their own terms and both the land on which prisons are built and the ways in which bodies, labour and resources are organized in order to re-constitute power and accumulate wealth and profit can be linked to ongoing settler colonial projects within political systems that still embody assimilationist, genocidal and master-slave narratives, even if not explicitly. Asking questions of the prison and prisoner in this way is central to moving towards a transnational and decolonial feminist engagement with questions of imprisonment and carceral space, which is the subject I turn to in Chapter 2. There I will draw on feminist interventions in global politics and IR to further theorize the relationship between land, labour and criminalization for the purpose of working towards a reading of imprisonment and carceral space that relies on ongoing colonial violence.