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Dunn 08 [Kevin, Professor at Hobart & William Smith Colleges in Geneva, NY., Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, chapter 2, Page 51-7, ] <Jericho>

Defining ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ The first step in interrogating white male privilege is to illuminate white maleness. This may seem obvious, but most white males do not actively think of themselves in those terms. White males tend to think of themselves as just people. The dominant racial and gender discourses in Western societies tend to powerfully bind whiteness and masculinity to assumed claims of realness (Halberstam 2002: 353). For example, in his work on whiteness, Richard Dyer (1997) begins by examining how white people are imagined within white cultural production. He argues that while other people are raced, white people are self-represented as being just people. ‘This assumption that white people are just people, which is not far off saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else, is endemic to white culture’ (ibid.: 2). The often unreflective claim to be just a person is an attempt to define the bounds of normality. Such self-representations are both a manifestation of power and an assertion to power. As Dyer notes, ‘there is no more powerful position than that of being “just” human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race’ (ibid.: 2). Often unreflectively, white males simultaneously seek to define what is normal and speak for humanity. Admittedly, this is not a particularly novel insight. Simone de Beauvoir observed in The Second Sex: ‘Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth’ (1952: 161). This obliviousness to gender and, I would argue, race is achieved because white males often assume that whiteness and maleness have little meaning. To refer back to Bourdieu, the social capital white males enjoy given their race and gender is largely invisible. As Harlon Dalton claims, such a disposition is largely ‘the natural consequence of being in the driver’s seat’ (Dalton 1995: 109). But this invisibility does not mean there is a failure to discuss white males as subjects. Most of the time white males speak about nothing else. Because white males frame the conversation in terms of people in general, however, they are everywhere in representation but rarely recognized as such (Dyer 1997: 3). This is a convergence of the simultaneous privileges of race and gender. Whites, in general, and males, in particular, often fail to recognize their own subject positions while seeking to represent all of humanity. At its root, this particular manifestation of white male privilege is about the power to define and lay claim to normality. The normal is the product of discursive practices, and the discourses defining normal in world politics privilege the white male subject position as the human one. Within the academic discipline and practice of IR, one can see a lengthy tradition of North American and western European white males writing about world politics from their own subjective position. Interrogating white male privilege 53 In doing so, they are both drawing from the dominant discourses from which they are privileged and also actively reproducing and entrenching those discourses through their habitus. That is, they are both products of discursive systems and active agents in the maintenance of those systems. To take but one simple example, much of IR theory relies on assumptions about human nature. These assumptions about human nature are manifested in myriad ways: from the myth of the stag hunt to various imagined state-of-nature scenarios. But in virtually all these cases, the actors are expressions of idealized white male subject positions. Introducing race, gender or class into the mythical stag hunt narrative, for example, produces a much more complicated and open story and, as such, a more varied discussion of human nature. Feminist theorists working within the IR discipline have done an excellent job of exposing the privileged yet hidden male subject positions in traditional IR texts. For example, J. Ann Tickner’s engagement with Hans J. Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism is an excellent study in how one IR theorist wrote from within a specific narrow structural/linguistic frame of masculinity, while claiming to generalize out to all people and humanity. As Tickner pointed out, the list of six principles ‘is a partial description of international politics because it is based on assumptions about human nature that are partial and that privilege masculinity’ (1988: 433). In some ways, the target is too easy, since Realists are so explicit in their claims to objectivity and universalism. There is a lack of self-awareness, since given the assumption that they are just people they can generalize from their own historical experiences and cultural values that are internalized and unquestioned. Thus, Realists like Morgenthau can claim to speak of and for people and humanity while other interpretations are characterized/categorized as being gendered, racialized, cultured and/or classed. This is not an exclusive characteristic of Realism but is representative of most IR theories in general, since Tickner’s tactic could be reproduced in countless white male theorists, from Kant to Keohane, Machiavelli to Marx.3 The normalizing discourses of whiteness and masculinity have enabled definitions and concepts that privileged this narrow segment of the world’s population to become accepted as the norm within IR theory and practice, such as power, the state, civil society, security, and so forth. These concepts are placed at the centre of our intellectual project, which often means that females and non-whites must employ them if they are to be taken as serious IR scholars. Moreover, the meanings and Two 54 normative values attached to these concepts are discursively bound to and typically nurture the needs and interests of the privileged white male subject position and dominant norms of masculinity. While this clearly has important implications for the construction of theory, it also has significant methodological repercussions. That is, white male privilege is not only embedded in our structures of knowledge, it also delineates acceptable systems of inquiry (Ackerly et al. 2006; Cohn 1987). Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis observe, ‘The characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are described as societal norms – as the way things are and as what is normal in society. This normalization of privilege means that members of society are judged, and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by the privileged. The privileged characteristic is the norm; those who stand outside are the aberrant or “alternative”’ (1996: 14). This is extremely relevant for IR theory, particularly in its normative manifestations. For that reason, let me offer a few examples. Given the privileging of white male subject positions in the dominant discourses (doxa), the habitus generated by many IR theorists, who are predominantly white males, tend to create a system of dispositions positing their historical experiences and cultural values as the norm for the international community. As such, an idealized image of the Westphalian state serves as the norm. This is clearly articulated in the vast literature on state failure and state capacity. Taking an idealized North American/ western European state as the norm, much ink has been spilled about how and why many non-white experiences with the state are aberrant. Rarely does this literature engage in critical self-reflection, exploring how the assumed norm is the product of subjective experiences, values and imaginations. Thus, we are presented with a towering mass of work on failed or failing African states, for instance, but rarely is the assumed norm troubled or its racial and gender underpinnings exposed (Dunn 2001).4 In its most pronounced manifestations, this body of literature contains dangerous policy prescriptions. Often policies are constructed to make the non-white, non-male other more like us – for their own good. As Peggy McIntosh has observed, ‘whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, average, and ideal; thus, when we work to benefit others, it is seen as work which will allow “them” to be more like “us”’ (2005: 110; see also Eng and Kazanjiian 2002). Of course, it would be a mistake to assume it is always the goal to make others like us. A good deal Interrogating white male privilege 55 of energy has historically gone into the project of constructing and violently policing the boundaries between us and the deviants who challenge accepted understandings and practices of whiteness and masculinity. For example, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the racist and sexist discourses operating in western Europe engendered acts of colonial conquest and domination (McClintock 1995; Lindqvist 1992). Today, in its liberal humanitarian articulation, constructions of alterity have contributed to violent interventionist wars in Iraq and the Balkans. Informing these policies is a manifestation of white male privilege: white North American and western European male IR scholars and practitioners claiming to speak for all humanity because they believe their race- and gender-informed experiences and values are the norm. One can see this pattern repeated throughout mainstream IR theory. Democratic Peace Theory is firmly constructed on an artifice produced by race-, gender- and class-informed subject positions. As Ido Oren (2002) argues in Our Enemies and US, American political science in general, and the scholars advancing the idea of democratic peace in particular, are informed by the dominant discourses in which their own subject positions are privileged; in the case of Democratic Peace Theory, this has resulted in a fluid and historically contingent understanding of democracy shaped by America’s experience and its historical rivalries. The gap in Oren’s otherwise damning critique is his failure to adequately expose the racial and gender components so clearly present in the political science scholarship he investigates. The development sub-field of IR is also representative of how scholars operate under the assumption that their subject position is the norm and that they can speak for all humanity. One can see this within the modernization school, with its explicit attempts to make the non-white world more like the white one. But it is equally true for the neoliberal approaches to development, with their subjective agendas obscured behind claims of universalism. While neoliberalism is in principle gender and race neutral, R. W. Connell notes there has been a ‘sharp remasculinization [and racialization] of political rhetoric and a turn to the use of force as a primary instrument in policy’ (2005: 1815–16). Neoliberalism functions as a form of masculinity politics, and ‘[m]any mainstream policies (e.g., in economic and security affairs) are substantially about men without acknowledging this fact’ (ibid.: 1816). What is at play here is not merely the ability of white males to define the parameters of normality, but also the inability of white male IR theorists to deal with the problems that arise in the way they construct difference. Two 56 Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney eloquently explore what they see as Western culture’s ongoing inability to deal with cultural difference in their International Relations and the Problem of Difference (2004). Drawing on the work of Tzvetan Todorov (1984), Inayatullah and Blaney claim that, since the discovery of the Americas, Western culture has engaged the other through a double movement: ‘difference becomes inferiority, and the possibility of a common humanity requires assimilation’ (2004: 10). In the first move, difference is regarded as the complete absence of commonality, which opens up the possibility of conquest, enslavement and eradication. The second move recognizes commonality, but only as a precursor to assimilation. The possibility of recognizing the other as both the same and different has yet to be realized. Inayatullah and Blaney chart this inability to deal with cultural difference through the foundational texts of IR to the neo-modernization approaches of contemporary IR, most notably in the literatures on liberal peace theory, global civil society and pluralistic global community (ibid.: 1116–21). The protagonist in Inayatullah and Blaney’s narrative is Western IR, but I would suggest the that fact that all the theorists they cite are white males is not immaterial.5 While I wholeheartedly agree with their critique, I would suggest that putting a finer point on Western IR’s inability to deal with cultural difference is both a manifestation of white male privilege and a mechanism for obscuring and maintaining that privilege. Inayatullah and Blaney’s discussion of the problem of difference and the double movement of conquest/assimilation brings to mind Herman Melville’s classic novella Benito Cereno. The protagonist is an American male captain who stumbles on to a ship that, initially unbeknownst to the American, has been taken over by the slaves it was transporting for trade. The story unfolds as the captain gradually sees the blacks he initially sees as docile and inferior childlike creatures who inspire both his pity and a desire to uplift become, in his eyes, bloodthirsty murderers and crazed killers. As Toni Morrison (1997) has pointed out, it is precisely this transformation of slaves from simple, friendly and childlike creatures deserving our help and sympathy into irrational violent monsters which displays the full spectrum of the racist gaze. The first impulse is one of assimilation (like contemporary neo-modernization IR theories), while the second is one of conquest and eradication, like traditional colonially informed understandings of power politics. Both positions deny the possibility of strategic, rational, calculated and intelligent action by those believed to be different from us. Melville’s narrator Interrogating white male privilege 57 is blind to his racism because it flows from his habitus, just as with most scholars. Like Melville’s narrator, white male scholars fail to see that the structures of power, in terms of both the structuring structures and the structuration of practices highlighted by Bourdieu, leave them in a position of privilege, from which they define what is normal and judge others who fail to meet that norm.

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