The 1ac’s drive to emerge into space is built off of American ‘transcendence’ – the way in which America centers itself as the centre while expanding is military and social project of imperial control
Sage 14 (Sage, Daniel (2014). Daniel Sage is a professor at the Institute of Geography and Earth Science, University of Wales. How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315587189) // JLHS AA
In the preceding eight chapters I have argued that some of the unique qualities of outer space—vastness, Otherness, sublimity, timelessness, spacelessness—are just as integral to extra-terrestrial projections of US geopower, as its well-known capacity (Arendt, 1963; Cosgrove, 2001; Dickens and Ormrod, 2007; Dolman, 2001; Macdonald, 2007) to function as an Archimedean high point to monitor and control the surface, and atmosphere, of the Earth. While the focus of my study has been the United States, and more specifically NASA, the implications of this cosmic projection of geopower—the American transcendental state—are global in reach, from enabling and shaping imperialistic ideologies (Chapters 1-3 and 7) to fuelling the extension of technocratic managerialism (Chapter 4-6 and 8). What is more, messianic hope in America remains a global commodity, consumed, for example, through the internationally franchised Star Trek television episodes and films (Penley, 1997: 98-99), multinational ‘Space 2.0’ corporations, like SpaceX (Chapter 6), worldwide audiences to the addresses of American presidents (Chapter 6) and global tourist attractions like the National Air and Space Museum and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). These global circulations suggest that while my empirical focus in this study has been on the extra-terrestrial assemblage of the American transcendental state, as viewed from within the borders of the US, the salience of my analysis is geo-political. The development of the American transcendental state through space exploration must also be viewed as an integral component of a far older geopolitical project—the production of an American identity defined in terms of the transcendence of limits, whether technological, economic, spiritual or territorial, enabling the moral aggrandizement of the past, present and future of a horizontal strata of sovereign territory and its peoples (McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; O’Brien, 1988; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995). Over the last decade or so, a growing number of scholars, including geographers, have turned their attention to how messianic-exceptionalist visions of America as the ‘Promised Land’ of ‘Chosen People’ have inflected various imperialistic projects including: the pursuit of democracy through military intervention in the ‘global south’ (Anthony, 2008); the technocratic ‘greening’ of Western global capitalism (Singer, 2010); the building of a ‘culture of war’ in foreign policy (Marsella, 2011), the circumvention of international institutions (Agnew, 2006); and most prominently perhaps, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ where invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq became justified as a ‘cosmic struggle between good and evil’ (Agnew, 2006: 183; see also Barkun, 2010; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). All of this work indicates two points: first, the enduring Apocalyptic influence of dispensational pre-millennialism1 on both interventionist and isolationist currents within American (geo)politics (Strum and Dittmer, 2010: 18); and secondly, the rise of a religious cosmology that positions America at the moral, geographical, and spiritual, centre of the universe (Strum, 2010: 150). My analysis of American spaceflight adds to this body of work on religion and geopolitics by drawing attention to five less discussed conduits of this pious vision of American geopower: (i) the secular—museums, family theme parks, systems management; (ii) the sublime—astronomical artwork, Moon landings and distant Nebula; (iii); the profane—Nazi slave labor camps, technocratic patriarchy, and dead astronauts; the technological (iv)—rocket production lines, O-rings, electrical wiring; and (v) the revolutionary—female astronauts, May 1968, and Richard Feynman. Analytically, these diverse registers suggest the utility of working with a broader, less explicitly spiritual, set of theoretical assumptions, to address the cosmological aspects of American geopolitics. This is why I mobilized the concept of the ‘American transcendental state’, rather than ‘deified nation’ (O’Brien, 1988: 41) within this study. This deliberately hallucinogenic sounding term captures some sense that the messianic-exceptionalistic projection of American geopower is a more diffusive, experimental, fantasmic, embodied, and ostensibly secular, affair, than conveyed within much discursive analysis of the religious undercurrents inflecting American geopolitics (for example Agnew, 2006; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). I would like to suggest now that there is another benefit in bringing together these diverse practices under a broader analysis of the American transcendental state: their common geography becomes all the more obvious. That is, all these practices involve thinking, doing or resisting, celestial transcendence as an apparatus of American geopower; hence they can all be rightly considered ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Elden, 2013; Graham, 2004; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). This label has developed to identify a body of work addressing how the circulation of American geopower involves more than two-dimensional geographies of area. It currently includes analyses of; drone warfare (Gregory, 2011); aerial bombardment (Graham, 2004); police helicopters (Adey, 2010); satellite surveillance (Macdonald, 2007) and satellite drone navigation and targeting (Gregory, 2011). Elden (2013: 40) explains that ‘vertical geopolitics’ is mostly focussed upon how state political technologies allow diverse populations to be measured, calculated, controlled and killed, ‘from above’, and occasionally ‘from below’ (for example Elden, 2013; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). By contrast, the vertical orientation I have adopted here, while related, is different. Specifically, I have described how aspects of the projection of American identity, geopower, and territory, also involve a vertical spacelessness—a deterritorialization—a potential collapse into sublime, cosmic, insignificance; in short, rather than the ‘view from above’, the perspective I have traced has been a ‘view into the above’ (and back). In part, therefore, my study can be considered a response to Elden’s (2013) recent question: ‘How would our thinking of geo-power, geo-politics and geo-metrics work if we took the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth processes and understandings of the world as the central terms at stake, rather than a looser sense of the ‘global?’ (p49) I propose we add to this list celestial entities, including the Moon (Chapter 3), the Martian surface (Chapter 6) and the Eagle Nebula (Chapter 7), as well as God (Agnew, 2006; Dittmer and Strum, 2010; Strum, 2013). Thus, perhaps we should be cautious of Elden’s (2013b) rather geocentric call ‘about how geopolitics might be thought as earth-politics rather than simply a synonym for global politics’ (p59). Instead, it might be more useful to bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 101) argument that even absolute deterritorialization—something akin perhaps to the mathematical cosmic sublime of Kant (Nye, 1994: 7-8)—always involves reterritorialization(s). Recall how Charles Bonestell (Chapter 2), William Clancey (Chapter 6) and the National Air and Space Museum (Chapter 7), respectively, and persuasively, associated vistas of the Moon, Mars and the Eagle Nebula with the American West, and by extension locate America at the centre of God’s universe (Boime, 1991; Stephanson, 1995). This analysis of American spaceflight also sheds light on seldom acknowledged connections between religious and vertical geopolitics and technocracy. The relation between critical analysis of geopolitics (O Tuathail, 1996) and technocratic management (Alvesson, 1987), remains remarkably undeveloped. Arguably this lacuna says more about the disciplinary separation between critical security studies and organization studies (Grey, 2009) than the various intellectual cross- fertilizations between organization studies and human geography (Clegg and Kornberger, 2006; Dale and Burrell, 2008; Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, there are, as Grey (2009) maintains, clear resonances: Indeed it could said that, in the same way that the development of security studies in particular, and organization studies to an extent, was shaped by geo- politics of wars both hot and cold, so too many current and future directions be in part a reflection of developments in contemporary geo-politics (p31). Some organizational practices are of course, very much on the ‘front line’ of practical geopolitics; that is, they comprise the ‘the foreign policy bureaucracy’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 4) through which geographical concepts are deployed to aid ‘conceptualization and decision making’ in ‘everyday foreign policy’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Examples here include the work of the US Air Force, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the UK’s Foreign and Common Wealth Office. There are also a host of other organizations that no doubt influence how practical geopolitics is produced, from security analysts like the RAND Corporation to global defense contractors like McDonnell Douglas. However, analysis of the relationship between organizational and geopolitical practices remains embryonic. For example, Anderson’s (2011) study of urban counter- insurgency and Gregory’s (2011) of drone warfare, do no more than merely infer that the rise of the ‘networked organization’ is reworking the projection of American geo-power. Correspondingly, two organizational studies of the military only hint that, for example, masculine discipline (Godfrey et al., 2012) and team identities (Corona and Godart, 2010) shape and are themselves shaped by grand geopolitical narratives like the ‘war on terror’. But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics. However, I am all too aware that in stressing the widespread application of this concept of the America transcendental state to understand American geopower— and, concomitantly, the fecundity of bringing together analyses of religion, verticality and now technocracy within critical geopolitics—I run the risk of constructing a totalizing, monstrous, edifice. The reader might rightly ask at this juncture, paraphrasing Nietzsche, have you not gazed into the cosmic abyss of American geopower for too long; are you not also reifying American geopower in the cosmos rather than challenging it? Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters I made reference to a rather singular sounding concept of the ‘American transcendental state’. But, as in the introduction, I must stress again here, that I took this decision for reasons of analytical clarity rather than to suggest I have revealed an independent, singular, definite and a priori reality (Law, 2006), some essence akin perhaps to what Agnew (2006: 184) refers to as ‘Americanism’. Instead, within each chapter I have traced the progressive assemblage of the American transcendental state—that is, nothing less than the divinely sanctioned, exceptional, and messianic, right and duty, of America, and its leaders in its name (Wallace, 2006: 225), to command cosmic space and time by evoking forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Agnew, 2006; Strum, 2010). But the immutability of this cosmic vision (Strum and Dittmer, 2010; Wallace, 2006) belies the transformative, fragmented, heterogeneous components that sustain it, across landscape artwork, through Kennedy’s Moon Speech, to the O-rings of Space Shuttle Challenger. Throughout this study I have suggested countless relations through which this vision is not only produced (Dijink, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995; Wallace, 2006) but circulated, maintained, resisted, repaired, transformed, and experimented with. How then to conceptualize this heterogeneous, but obdurate, cosmic being? Latour’s actor-network theory (1987; 2005; 2012) is useful to an extent here; first, we can conceptualize the transcendental state as an ‘immutable mobile’ that ‘ends up traversing the universe’ by ‘pay[ing] for each transport with a transformation’ (Latour, 2013: 127); it is ‘not displacement without transformation but displacement through transformation (Latour, 2005: 223); second, the transcendental state can be understood as offering a prophetic, but partial, ‘panorama’ of the ‘world [cosmos] to be lived in’ (p189) which must then, in turn, be: ... carefully situated inside one of the many Omnimax theatres offering complete panoramas of society—and we now know that the more thrilling the impression, the more enclosed the room has to be. [American] Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability. (p242) Read against Latour’s concepts of the ‘immutable mobile’ and the ‘localizable panorama’ it is easy to see why my analysis of American transcendental state has involved mapping circulations within as well as beyond our lives. And this is a political move too, because it suggests that opportunities to test and resist the American transcendental state are closer to hand than we might think. As revealed in Chapter 8, a great deal of effort is required to keep the transcendental state circulating because the heterogeneous conduits it passes through—electrical wiring, teleconferences, flight readiness reviews, budget decisions and O-ring joints—are capricious and experimental; that is, affective. Other Chapters acknowledged similar fragility accompanying the assemblage of the transcendental state, including; the partially-owned Declaration of Independence (Chapter 1), the globally unifying Earthrise photograph of Apollo 8 (Chapter 3) and the rusting rockets on display in the gardens of the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). Now located within this chain of heterogeneous transformations, what strategies might aid us in purposefully transforming this now confined totality? Or put differently, how might we engage outer space to resist this cosmic deification of America (O Brien, 1988)? In concluding this study, I propose three techniques but no doubt there are many more. First, we can expose the void at the heart of this messianic-technocratic projection of geopower (Wallace, 2006). This approach was evidenced in Chapter 1 by Derrida’s (2002) deconstructive reading of Declaration of Independence. Derrida (2002) emphasizes how signing the Declaration in God’s name entails no democratic ownership over America’s future, in outer space or elsewhere. Across the development of American spaceflight, the perils of messianic, free- floating, notions of ‘Progress’, ‘Exploration,’ ‘Frontier’ and ‘The Future’ are all too apparent, not least for NASA itself. Lester and Robinson (2009) suggest the emergence of this critique within the American space policy community: We should accept that “exploration” is a multivalent term, with many meanings, some of which are contradictory, and all of which have historical precedent. For too long we have looked at the history of exploration selectively, seeking to find the antecedents which justify our own vision of exploration: as science, as human adventure, as geopolitical statement. This is a definitional fight which cannot be won. Space policy must acknowledge the multiple visions for space exploration, developing a clear-eyed metric of value which avoids the vagaries of lofty “exploration-speak”, If the merits of human exploration of the Moon and Mars are primarily symbolic and geopolitical, what are these goals worth in terms of federal funding? I am unconvinced by the economically instrumentalist conclusions made by Lester and Robinson (2009) about putting a value upon even NASA’s ‘softer’ geopower, but the general caution about harnessing nebulous messianic mythologies to advance American space exploration is valuable. Of course the problem is this tradition of finding our God in the cosmos is long-established as Olsson (2007) suggests via this retelling of the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma elish: Marduk is the Lord of lords ... Hail to the Chief! Fifty were his names, so numerous that if ever attacked he could always hide behind another alias. Never catchable as the specific this or that, always on the move as an ambiguous this and that ... Ungraspable multiplicity. ... In this mist-enveloped region of religion naming is the name of the game, an exercise in ontological transformations where earthly people appear as projections of heavenly gods, social relations as signs in the sky. ... a signified meaning searching for its own coordinates (Olsson, 2007: 23). Perhaps a more modest approach is required: we should simply resist the urge to name, and tame, the cosmos as a Whole, by naming a celestial Godhead in it that we claim for ourselves (Wallace, 2006) but cannot ever fully own. ‘Evil is the disaster of a truth when the desire to force the naming of the unnameable is unleashed . ... Evil is not disrespect for the name of the other, but rather the will to name at any price’ (Badiou, 2004: 115-6; original emphasis). Challenging the cosmic aggrandization of America might therefore imply some attempt to resist naming our God/Future/Progress in the cosmos. Put simply, this all too easy act of cosmic de/reterroritalizaiton is too crude, too undemocratic, too costly. A second, related, strategy which can be adopted to resist the American transcendental state was discussed within Chapter 3; this is the capacity to push transcendence to another plane or refuge—to follow one line of flight of cosmic deterritorialization and then re-territorialize the Earth in a panorama that starts with a common human experience, rather than those of any particular nation/ God/future. The aim of this strategy is to mobilize a cosmic imagination that can register something of the shared experience of being human. In Chapter 3 I discussed how the Earthrise photograph from NASA’s Apollo 8 mission have stimulated new cosmic imaginations—including ‘spaceship’ Earth (Cosgrove: 2001, 257-262; Henry and Taylor, 2009; Ward, 1964), Noetic science (Benjamin, 2003: 60-61), global political ecologies (Connolly, 2002)—that defied nationalistic appropriations by inferring a human transcendence. However, as the American author Kurt Vonnegut explains such a transcendental image of humanity, emptied of territorial divisions and difference, is not itself without risk: ‘Earth is such a pretty blue and pink and white pearl in the pictures NASA sent me. It looks so clean. You can’t see all the hungry, angry earthlings down there—and the smoke and sewage and trash and sophisticated weaponry’ (Vonnegut cited in Burrows, 1998: 423). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest we should always remain sceptical that de-territorialization is a progressive act on its own: ‘Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (p500). A third strategy is to augment different affects amid the assemblage of the American transcendental state. As described in Chapter 8, the American transcendental state depends upon the cultivation of confidence in technocracy allied to an affective becoming hopeful—a positive openness to the future as life enhancing—orientated around the transcendence of America in cosmic space and time. But, as Anderson (2006), explains, becoming hopeful does not necessarily need to operate in this transcendental manner: hopefulness can also emerge not to ward off suffering, but through every day sorrows, through diminishment of the body’s potential to affect and be affected. Consider, for example, how Dotty Duke refused to discuss her fears and anxieties with her astronaut husband as she kept the ‘house in order and [took] out the garbage’ (Duke 1990—Chapter 5). Dotty Duke epitomizes a different kind of becoming hopeful—a capacity to remain open-ended about the future in a life enhancing manner through diminishment—devoid of discussion of a better future in Earth or in the cosmos; this is hope that challenges ‘the easy equation between transcendence and a future elsewhen or elsewhere in favor of an imminent transcendence from within vectors of diminishment’ (Anderson, 2006: 749; for more analysis of immanent transcendence related to Space see Smith, 2009: 211). Another affect which is useful in short-circuiting the hopeful assemblage of the transcendental state is boredom. Anderson (2004) describes boredom as the moment when the ‘“forgetting” intrinsic to habit has been momentarily incapacitated. It is the unravelling of habit, a sudden realization of the again’ (p743). Boredom depresses the life enhancing capacity of ourselves to be open to the future, engendering stillness and slowness of thought-action in space- time, where, as Anderson (2004) puts it, the capacity to experience the ‘not yet’ (p749) is suspended. The evolution of American spaceflight might appear to some the antithesis of boredom, but, as Jorgensen (2009) suggests, the American humanization of outer space has gone hand in hand with endless repetition (of middle America): The August 1969 Life Special Issue, released to commemorate the landing, wants to produce sympathetic accounts of the astronauts. It is filled with glossy, high color photographs of the astronauts not only mastering outer space, but their domestic spaces as well. Neil Armstrong bakes pizza, Buzz Aldrin jogs through the suburbs, and Mike Collins prunes his garden. These images resonate with outer space itself, as the astronauts use tools in both terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. The spatula and shears the astronauts use to cook lamb curry and prune roses with resemble the objects they hold while walking the moon, these being a laser reflector, seismometer and solar wind sheet (p179). There is no hopefulness on offer in Jorgensen’s (2009) reading of American spaceflight. Instead the boredom experienced in the cosmic repetition of middle America signals despair: ‘Apollo 11 represented an America that had become unhinged by its own technocracy, its middle class lifestyle, and television’ (p188). Jorgensen (2009) is not, of course, alone in identifying aspects of spaceflight repetitive, even boring. As the emergence of the Teacher in Space program demonstrated (see Chapter 8), NASA itself has historically attempted to introduce elements of excitement, even increased risk, to engage a global audience. Yet, of course, a balance has always had to be struck, as Parker (2009) explains of Apollo: ‘Everything was supposed to be boring, because boredom meant no surprises, and hence the possibility of the adventure in some sense rested on its denial’ (p326). Although fleeting, boredom is surely an unavoidable ingredient in NASA’s technocratic confidence, but when focused and channeled, it does suspend hope in the cosmos as a better place, perhaps providing an opportunity for us to pause and register something of the sublime Otherness of Space, where we concurrently repeat and differ ourselves into infinity: ‘Media representations of space travel turn the vastness of space into the similitude of domesticity, as human familiarity comes to stand in for the infinite. At the same time, the domestic attains the dimensions of the infinite, and in turn becomes strangely unfamiliar to the television viewer’ (Jorgensen, 2009: 179). These three techniques of cosmo-political intervention—refusal to name, human transcendence, and sensitivity to new affects—are all worthy of greater attention, especially when they can be connected up to, and interfere with, the assemblage of the American transcendental state. Clearly not all of those involved directly in the development of spaceflight will want or be able to practise these techniques. Nevertheless even among this group these techniques are intended to offer greater receptivity to new cosmographical imaginations which move beyond the cosmic aggrandization of messianic-imperialistic-technocratic impulses. If we have entered the Cosmic Age where all territorializing assemblages, all States, now derive vital energy from the Cosmos (Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), then the imperative becomes not to simply do cosmopolitics (Latour, 2005) but rather which cosmo-politics do we want to pursue? My favoured vision of a Geography of Space is one where this question is endlessly asked but never answered with absolute confidence.