Criticisms of decolonization and suggestions of them being anti black remain attatched to the settler colonial understandings of property and land, black and indeginous struggles are not only compatible but necessary to work with eachother
Curley et al 22[Andrew Curley is a researcher at the University of Arizona, Pallavi Gupta is a PHD candidate at UNC, Lara Lookabaugh is a PHD candidate at UNC, Christopher Neubert is a PHD candidate at UNC, Sara Smith is an associate professor at UNC]
Whereas Garba and Sorentino suggest that land struggles are antiblack, we contend that the authors’ own understanding of land remains ontologically attached to settler colonial understandings of land as property, despite a quick acknowledgment of Native epistemologies of land. This we suspect emerges from the conflation of settler colonial studies as a scholarship, whose categories are most in dispute here, and decolonisation as an Indigenous-led political project that challenges the foundations of white supremacy in the first place (see also A Simpson ; Snelgrove et al. ). To distinguish between these analytics, we follow King’s (:65) designation of white settler colonial studies, in reference to the work of Wolfe () and how his premise and scholarship “end up consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and Indigenous studies”. King (:65) observes that this practice, paradoxically (or not), “enacts a discursive shift that privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement, and settler colonial relations … this works to displace conversations about genocide, slavery, and the violent project of making the human (humanism)” (see also O’Brien ; Snelgrove et al. ). Tuck and Yang (:5) write that settler colonialism undoes Indigenous relationships with the land, cosmologically, epistemologically, and ontologically, rendering Indigenous peoples “premodern” and “savage”. Garba and Sorentino critique Tuck and Yang’s point, accusing them of leaving Indigenous understandings of land undefined. In this way, Garba and Sorentino replicate the ontological violence of colonialism, demanding Indigenous peoples account for themselves while insinuating Native land projects are suspect, or “not methodologically innocent” (2020:772)—guilty of the crime of wanting their land back. If we begin from these categories, we concede to a world that is how the settler-enslaver wishes it to be. We must unsettle these definitions of land. Against an understanding of land-as-property or land-as-resource, Native scholarship provides more nuanced and relational theorisations of land that are not accounted for in settler categories (see e.g. Daigle , ; Liboiron ). As Tonawanda Band of Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman (:71) writes, “maintaining relationships to the land is at the heart of Indigenous peoples’ struggles”. Native feminists help us understand land and bodies as intimately connected, as sites of colonial struggle, relationality, and community (Cabnal ; Denetdale ; Goeman ; Paredes ; Yazzie ; see also Zaragocin and Caretta ). Tanana Athabascan scholar Dian Million (:26) unpacks the difference between Indigenous and settler-colonial understandings of land; she writes, “Indigenous peoples’ lifeways as ancient nations are different ontological and material interpretations of life that question and offer alternative imaginaries outside of capitalism”. We cannot accept the settler-enslaver definition of land or the premise that Black people in the Americas are dispossessed from connection to land through slavery in such a way that past and future connections to land are foreclosed (Lanier ; McKittrick ). While settler-enslaver truth asserts a clear, distinguishable division among colonised subjects, the project of settler colonialism has “never been concerned with which came first, or which is more elemental” and remains pervasive precisely because it rejects its own dichotomies and thrives in ambiguity (Leroy ). As Kauanui (:258) writes, “to assert blackness as ontological is to recapitulate colonising thought, to take colonial ideology as truth”. Cordis (:10; see also Kelley 2017) succinctly describes this problem in settler colonial theory as maintaining the dis/placement of Black bodies “through an implicit association of Blacks as dislocated or attenuated settlers or exploited labourers, eliding the intersection of blackness and indigeneity or Black indigeneity”. Robin D.G. Kelley () points to the acceptance of settler truths as a pitfall of settler colonial studies in Wolfe’s () formulation. Wolfe (:2) declares that the role colonialism gives Indigenous people “is to disappear”, but that, “By contrast, though slavery meant the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonised for their labour rather than for their land”. For Kelley (:268), this limits Indigeneity to the Americas and Australasia, and erases African Indigeneity “through linguistic sleight of hand”, because “Africans are turned into Black Americans”, a renaming that “severs any relationship to their land and Indigenous communities”. Kyle Mays (:43) disassembles the Black/Native binary that settler colonial studies relies on, asking: “what if we take seriously that those Africans who were Indigenous peoples stolen from their own places of home and forced to labour on dispossessed land, were actually Indigenous?” By recognising Indigeneity beyond the Americas, Mays frames Black Indigeneity as an analytic that allows connection between contemporary African American cultural expressions and belonging and Africa. This belonging is generated through cultural practices, but is complicated when claims to land and reparations assume the unimpeded futurity of the settler state as undergirding these claims. Mays’ engagements with Black Indigeneity remind us of the necessity of working through multiple and contextually-grounded frames of analysis and claim-making. As Vimalassery et al. (:3) explain, “when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely … effects and enactments of colonial unknowing”, that is, a refusal to know how colonisation has shaped the world—the “act of ignoring” colonialism is an “epistemological orientation that works to preempt relational modes of analysis” (Vimalassery et al. :1). “Colonial unknowing” also speaks to “the artificial impasse” in academic scholarship, and citational practices. We argue that these acts of unknowing also permeate scholarship. Citizenship and the categories of the white supremacist state, for instance, foreclose the possibility of Indigeneity for both enslaved Africans and migrants. Jackson () highlights how Indigeneity and Black identities come together in the formation of creole racial categories, one example of the multifaceted expressions of Black Indigenous identities which are place-based and context specific. In her work with Indigenous women migrants to the United States from Mexico and Guatemala, Speed (:9) describes how the Indigeneity of migrants is erased when they cross the border into the US and are categorised as Guatemalan or Mexican nationals: “The erasure of Indigenous migrants’ identity as Indigenous people is one in a long series of technologies used by settler states to eliminate Indigenous people, and as scholars we should not participate in reifying settler-imposed national borders in ways that facilitate such erasures”. Building on Coulthard’s () “grounded normativity”, Byrd gives us the language of arrivants, subverting settler-enslaver categories with a more generous reading of land and its ability to enable movement. Byrd’s “grounded relationalities” acknowledges Black and Indigenous people’s relation to land and sovereignty—“in place and in movement” (Byrd et al. :5). Through reduction and conflation, a people’s struggle for liberation is casually disregarded. Reductions limit our understanding of the processes and violence of settler-colonialism and slavery or push towards overdetermination by employing a single framework, inhibiting interdisciplinary dialogue and solidarity. Decolonisation is a political project to end oppression, restore sovereignty, and liberate colonised peoples. In her own work, Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd rejects the impasse and draws on the political agenda of Black feminists to strategise Indigenous liberation. Citing the Combahee River Collective, she writes, “we are left to ponder to make correct this core axiom: ‘If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression’” (Byrd :208).