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Attempts to restrain and control crisis creates a state of insecurity that makes conflict inevitable, this creates a vortex of death where the clean up of one crisis only guarantees the next–––exporting violence in order to preserve domestic peace makes instability perpetual

Ssorin-Chaikov 18[Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov teaches social anthropology at HSE St Petersburg and is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Social Anthropology, “Hybrid Peace: Ethnographies of War,” Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 47, pp. 251-262, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-102317-050139]

If this scholarship charts global extensions of US security concerns, how is this assemblage of security and war theorized? Reyna (2016) draws on a Marxist structuralist view of global socioeconomic inequalities and contradictions. He makes a case both for the globalization of US warfare and for its imperial character from the early beginnings of the United States since its independence in 1783. But he focuses in detail on the period from 1945 to 2014. The most recent decades are described in terms of the “situational fixation” on oil and terror (Reyna 2016, p. 309). For instance, the US war in Afghanistan was an attempt to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where they formed from elements of the US-supported anti-Soviet mujahideen movement. But, for Reyna, it is also part of the “scramble” for Caspian oil that started in the 1990s. Because this area was landlocked, “Central Asian [oil] wars have actually been fought outside the Caspian Basin in areas suitable for pipelines,” namely in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Kosovo (Reyna 2016, p. 412). Force is a central category in Reyna’s approach. But it is a complex construct because its use is simultaneously the mark of a given system’s expansion and entropy. Elites’ structural dispositions produce d´elire—a constitutive anxiety that leads to violent action where and when, for this elite, “peace fails” but which in turn does not resolve but exacerbates socioeconomic and political contradictions. In Afghanistan, despite changing tactics and deploying new military technologies, including drones, the US military intervention failed on both oil and counterterror fronts (Reyna 2016, pp. 419–23). It is such a failure that engenders what Besteman (2017) terms a “security empire”: the “imposition” of multiple security regimes, in Somalia as her case in point, that are managed from the outside. These security regimes are constituted through the imperial logic of the US domestic concerns but with unintended consequences. She argues that it was the US foreign policy toward Somalia after 9/11 that enabled the emergence of Al Shabaab as an effective anti-Western terrorist group (Besteman 2017, p. 411). This action, in turn, made suspect, and thus vulnerable, Somalian refugees in the United States. In short, the incoherence and multiplicity of these security regimes are, in fact, generative of the opposite: “spaces of uncertainty, fear and violence” (p. 405). This view stems from Foucault’s (2003) understanding of the foundational role of security for the modern biopolitical state. If Reyna focuses on security elites as agents who decide on going to war, this perspective is about governance regimes over various populations that are continuous across “multiple and often interlocking spatial scales” that branch out from body, family, neighborhood, city, and region to the national and the global and, in turn, generating these spatial scales themselves (Gluck & Low 2017, p. 285). There is a homology between these ¨ spaces and scales, but it is relative. This perspective does not constitute a “Russian doll model of a fixed and nested hierarchy” but one of criss-crossing flows, linkages, and horizontal networks (p. 285; see also Fawaz & Bou Akar 2012, Goldstein et al. 2010). It is also hierarchical; its relatively homologous base is to ensure, however improbably, that there is no violence, whereas its top is to ensure that it can exercise violence. We see a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence distributed unevenly in these spaces—hence the concept of “empire” in the singular rather than that of multiple “empires.” A military isomorphism developed along these spatial scales (Pretorius 2008) in what one may call security metrology, but of course it is not for all kinds of arms. A relative homology may blur the distinction between domestic and international states of security, but other distinctions are clear: There are constitutive acts of warfare that some agents, such as Reyna’s elites, can legitimately do and that others cannot and should not. Hardt & Negri (2000) identify the Christian concept of the just war in the face of the enemy that represents a moral as well as a military threat as underpinning this monopoly of violence. But it is Agamben (2005) who had been influential in linking these forms of governance and specific means of warfare. Drawing on Schmitt’s Political Theology, he highlighted the extralegality as a conceptual foundation of sovereignty, making it possible to address ethnographically the new reality of war, e.g., the unaccountability of its brutality, subcontacting, violations of human rights, use of foreign territories for prisons and violent interrogation, etc. This approach has been useful for understanding the beginning of the War on Terror. But both this war’s duration and its geopolitical effects—some revealed by the ethnographies of war that I discuss here and some that are still to be explored—challenge the analytic developed by Agamben. First, this perspective assumes a singularity of the concept of sovereignty. Here, the work of Asad (2007) on suicide bombing is suggestive of alternative views of sovereignty as well as of dangers of reading such alterity through a Euro-American lens, whether Orientalist or Agamben-inspired. Not all contemporary forms of citizenship are grounded in the distinction of z¯o¯e and bios—of bare or “natural” life versus “full” or “good” life. Not all contemporary forms of sovereignty have a legalistic foundation—specifically, the Roman law to which the state of emergency is a state of exception. Kalinin argues that the contemporary language of the Russian state is Bakhtinian as it draws on the notion of the outside that is nonfinalizable and thus unaccountable but not exceptional. He exemplifies this concept of the nonfinalizable with a statement of Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu about the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine: “It’s very difficult to look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if there’s not any cat. And it’s...stupid to look for a cat [there], if the cat is smart, bold and polite” (Kalinin 2017, p. 5). This statement simultaneously denies and admits, jokes and does not joke. The phrase “polite people” has become a euphemism for Russian troops in Crimea during its 2014 annexation. Second, in the hybrid peace that has emerged as a result of this warfare and global security regimes, these different forms of sovereignty are mutually constituted. The argument that Besteman (2017) makes with regard to Al Shabaab in Somalia as engendered by US foreign policy is applicable to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The comment by Sergey Shoigu that Kalinin discusses is intended for a domestic audience. But if it implies at all the issue of international legitimacy of recent military interventions, it is only to question who exactly is the sovereign who decides on exceptions. In turn, Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical statements beginning with those from his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference consistently called into question the legitimacy of Western interventions from Kosovo to Iraq and Libya. But he also used these interventions to shape his own idiom of Russian sovereignty and its zone of influence (Russkii mir)—and not just to take Western interventions as a mark of a “new normalcy,” to borrow a 2001 phrase from US Vice President Dick Cheney, and not just to assert that the “theater of operations” that this “new” normalcy inaugurates (Masco 2014, pp. 7–8) is not a single-actor stage, but also to ground it in the narrative of the “old” normalcy of the Soviet and Russian imperial legacies. Third, the ethnography of war that I have discussed has raised doubts about whether this view of sovereignty is not contingent on “Schmittean politics” in which both sovereignty and security are territorially bound. Masco makes this point by drawing on the political philosopher Carlo Galli: Globalization is the epoch in which the State no longer protects its citizens from external turbulence. The principle of protego ergo obligo (“protection, therefore obedience”) was the load-bearing column of modern politics, but in the global age, anything can happen anywhere, at any moment, precisely because the State no longer filters disorder from the external environment (terrorist acts, migratory flows, the movement of capital) and is no longer capable of transforming it into internal peace. (Galli 2010, p. 158, cited in Masco 2014, pp. 35–36). Yet even if the state’s goal remains this filtering of disorder, this simply cannot be achieved by a global extension of domestic security. As Gusterson (2016) demonstrates, drone warfare and global surveillance technologies, while creating a global panoptic space, are not accompanied by a territorial rule aimed at transforming this gaze into disciplinary power. These technologies of global vision are deployed to guard security within select red lines and to do so by pointed and “nomadic” interventions (see on this further below). However, the recent shape of the “external environment” to which Galli refers is not simply global. It constitutes distinct territorial patterns of sources of danger and targets of military interventions. For instance, Reyna grounds the decision of US security elites to go to war in what he calls “Shultzian Permission.” This principle takes its cue from US Secretary of State George Shultz’s comments about one of the occasions when the Reagan administration resorted to violence: “If nothing else worked, the use of [military] force was necessary” (Reyna 2016, p. 45). War is a certain time when politics fails. However, this is not just time but also space. George Shultz’s case in point was not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) but Grenada and Panama. Politics has not (as yet) failed in the relations between nuclear powers and in relations between nuclear powers and strong nonnuclear states, such as Turkey. The United States does not conduct undeclared drone warfare against Russia or China. There are places, however, where one can afford to have politics fail and where one can also afford significant enemy casualties while reducing one’s own to a minimum. This worldview is entrenched geopolitically as well as culturally and assumes a hierarchical division of spaces and populations. It was this that Schmitt (2006) has put as nomos: order that constitutes order, an ordo ordinans or “order of ordering” (p. 78). In other words, I argue that the analytical purchase of a “Schmittean politics” looks different if it does not privilege Schmitt’s Political Theology and The Concept of the Political but incorporates his other writing as well.

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