There are strong anti-Western sentiments in Turkey because of opposition to US domination
SWP 22 — Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP"Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia," May 20th, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia WMK
Anti-Imperialism, Anti-Westernism: Varieties of Discontent with the West
As a major driver of Turkey’s geopolitical balancing policy, anti-Westernism or discontent with the West has come to mean different things during different times for Turkey. However, nuance is called for: Discontent with the West and anti-Westernism are not necessarily interchangeable. Discontent tends to be issue-based, whereas anti-Westernism describes a more comprehensive political and ideological stance. Yet an accumulation of discontents, as is the case in Turkey, feeds into and sustains the broader anti-Westernism at the elite and societal levels. This can make these two terms indistinguishable at times. Additionally, elites can exploit discontent on individual issues to serve wider anti-Western political and ideological outlooks. While there are similarities between the Turkish and Russian anti-Western narratives, their policy responses and geopolitical aspirations differ. And that prevents their respective anti-Westernism morphing into a shared vision of and stance on the global order.
There are basically two sides to Turkey’s discontent with the West: political and geopolitical. In the political realm a whole series of political factors have driven wedges between Turkey and the West, and generated mutual discontent, if not animosity: from Europe’s often identity-centric opposition to Turkey’s EU membership to the personalisation of power and the authoritarian turn in Turkish domestic politics; from the West’s tepid response to the attempted coup of 2016 to the evisceration of the rule of law in the post-coup era.
Ankara’s geopolitical discontent with the West has multiple sources. Washington’s support for the PYD-dominated Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s disputes with the EU and European powers over the Eastern Mediterranean conflict are two major issues. The West, for its part, takes issue with Turkey’s military operations in Syria, its drilling activities in disputed waters and its military posturing in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many in the West saw Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence system as a manifestation of a new geopolitical identity premised on balancing, rather than merely a defence purchase. It is noteworthy that Turkey has recently made moves to purchase military equipment from Western sources. Turkey reached out to the US to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter jets and modernisation kits for its existing fleets, and to France and Italy about a potential cooperation on the joint production of Eurosam SAMP/T defence systems. These initiatives are important and can be seen as Ankara’s indirect recognition of the limits of its balancing policy, which included defence industry cooperation with Russia.
Fundamentally, the current anti-Westernism of both Turkey and Russia is primarily US-centric. Both experience status anxiety concerning the US/Western-centric international order. However, as indicated above, what matters – in terms of the implications of their anti-Westernism on their approaches towards the global order– is the difference in their policy responses and aspirations.