Structural Anti-American Turkish sentiment — ensures backlash
Grigoriadis 10 — Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University Ioannis N. Grigoriadis Middle East Journal , Winter, 2010, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 51-66 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20622982 WMK
Anti-Americanism in Turkey failed — until recently — to produce an enduring effect on Turkish politics. Unlike other Mediterranean countries where a legacy of anti Americanism grew out of historical reasons and had a persistent negative effect on their relations with the United States, such a trend did not appear in Turkey's case.8 With regard to Spain, a long historical rivalry in Latin America and the Pacific, along with US support for the authoritarian Franco regime in the aftermath of World War II, created a legacy of anti-Americanism. In the case of Greece, US involvement in the civil war (1946-9) and firm US support for the 1967-74 military regime created a strong popular predisposition against the United States. Despite the rise of the Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s, such a legacy of persistent anti-Americanism did not find fertile ground. This was prob ably because the United States also had strong allies within Turkey who wielded clout disproportionate to their numbers, as Turkey's influential military and bureaucratic elites maintained a clear pro-US position. They prioritized Turkey's strategic alliance with the United States and saw it as the strongest security guarantee for the country as well as its best link to the West. This became more pronounced after the September 1980 military coup, which dealt a heavy blow against the Turkish left and political Islam, and meant that opposition to US policies and the improvement of US-Turkey relations would be dispersed and politically ineffective. As Turkey's democratic consolidation remained un finished, elites could afford to dismiss public opinion. The US-Turkey strategic alliance developed to the point of Turkey forming a regional alliance with Israel in the 1990s, de spite the opposition of a large segment of the Turkish public, spearheaded by supporters of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), which won a plurality of votes in 1995. This reaction was not considered more important than the strategic benefits which this alliance would garner Turkey — mainly the consolidation of the US-Turkey alliance, access to military technology, intelligence, and training, improved economic relations, and a strengthening of its strategic position vis-a-vis Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Armenia. US policies in the Middle East were not always popular within Turkish public opinion. Many Turks felt sympathy for the Palestinians and opposed what they saw as an overtly pro-Israeli US stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, this did not seriously affect the formation of Turkish regional strategy and policymaking. Stra egic alliance and cooperation between the United States and Turkey meant that Turkey would support US strategic priorities in the Middle East, even when this came to the point of forging a strategic alliance with Israel and thus alienating the Arab states and Iran. This equilibrium was disturbed by what followed the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The relapse of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rise of the Jus tice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) to power in 2002, and the US invasion of Iraq in 20039 brought this alliance under considerable pressure. As the interests of US foreign policy shifted towards the Middle East, it became increasingly clear that the strategic and tactical aims of both states could diverge in some of the region's conflicts. The situation became further complicated with the occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies. The expansion of the Kurdish-controlled zone in northern Iraq and the subsequent creation of a Kurdish federal entity there facilitated the re-emergence of the PKK as a significant security threat for Turkey. A milestone in the deterioration of US-Turkey relations was the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003 to allow US troops the use of Turkish territory in preparation for their invasion of Iraq.10 As the United States was preparing an invasion of Iraq in early 2003, it became clear that the chances of a swift victory over Saddam Husayn's armed forces would drastically increase if a second front was opened on the Turkish-Iraqi border. This led to a formal US request for the deployment of US military forces within Turkish territory. Many in Turkey felt that the country would have to pay the price of US adventurism in the Middle East for a second time ? the first being in 1991. While Turkish public opinion was firmly against the US invasion of Iraq,11 the AKP government, led by Abdullah Giil, decided to support the US request, trying to trade agreement for a generous US military and monetary aid package. As time was pressing, a major logistics operation was already on its way when the Turkish Parliament voted on March 1,2003 on a bill permitting the use of Turkish territory by US troops. Despite the wide parliamentary majority which the AKP enjoyed in the Parliament, the bill failed to collect the necessary majority of votes and was thus rejected. About 90 AKP delegates took advantage of the secret character of the vote to express their opposition to the bill and US policies in the region in general. They apparently included in their ranks delegates as high-ranking as the Speaker of Parliament Biilent Anng and Deputy Prime Minister Ertugrul Yalgmbayir.12 The blow against US war planning and prestige was heavy. The US troops ready to de ploy on Turkish territory had to abandon their operations after weeks of preparations, and the planning of the US invasion of Iraq was upset. The war followed suit without a second front in the north. It was only due to the unexpectedly weak resistance of Iraqi troops and the relatively easy victory of US forces on the battlegrounds of southern Iraq that the issue received less attention. This refusal of the Turkish Parliament has been considered a case where anti-Americanism produced tangible effects which harmed US interests. While Keohane and Katzenstein argue that anti-Americanism has failed to pro duce strong global effects on US diplomacy, they add that the March 1, 2003 vote showed how anti-Americanism can be consequential in specific conjunctures.13 Such a change of Turkish policy could not go unattended in the United States. In fact, it alienated Turkey from many of its longstanding allies within US policymaking circles. Prominent Neoconservative figures and think tanks which had traditionally supported Turkish positions and constituted a key part of the US Turkish lobby felt betrayed and exposed by Turkey's decision.14 What made the situation even harder to accept was that opposition to the US campaign did not emanate solely from the AKP government, but also from the Turkish military and bureaucratic elites, old and trusted partners of the United States. While the AKP government had formally endorsed the bill, the military failed to take an open position in favor of US operations. At the critical meet ing of the National Security Council (Milli G?venlik Kurulu, MGK), on February 28, 2003, just a few days before the March 1, 2003 voting, no clear support for the US request was expressed. In the words of the then-US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz: [M]any of the institutions in Turkey that we think of as the traditional strong sup ort ... were not as forceful in leading in that direction. ... particularly the military. I think for whatever reason they did not play the strong leadership role on that issue that we would have expected.15 Turkey's refusal to join the US "coalition of the willing" had a major consequence. The absence of Turkish troops meant that the leverage Turkey had to influence devel opments in post-war Iraq was limited. In contrast, Iraqi Kurds gained increasing sig nificance due to their role as the most stable and trustworthy ally of the United States in Iraq. In addition, the proclamation of the new Iraqi Constitution turned the country into a federal state with a predominantly Kurdish Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north. The growing relative significance of the Iraqi Kurds as key regional allies of the United States also meant that US-Turkey interests found a new point of contention. While Turkey initially had opposed any plans for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, it later moderated its stance to conform with post-war reality. On the one hand, it accepted the prospect of a federal system, while stressing its full opposition to any partition plan. On the other hand, it included support for Turcomans in its Iraq agenda.16 By assuming the role of the guard ian of Iraq's Turcoman minority, Ankara hoped to gain additional leverage in domestic Iraqi politics. This became evident when Turkey openly took sides in the domestic Iraqi dispute over the future status of the city of Kirkuk. However, playing the Turcoman card yielded little to Turkish foreign policy, as many of the Turcomans ? particularly those who were Shi'ites ? remained indifferent to Turkish sponsorship. Ankara's involvement in Kirkuk became an additional thorn in US-Turkey talks over Iraq.17 The Kirkuk province, in which the second biggest oilfield in the world is located, was claimed by the Iraqi Kurds who pointed at Saddam's intensive and violent efforts to alter the demographic balance of the city in favor of Sunni Arabs. In the aftermath of the 2003 war, Kurds started repopulating it, allegedly in an effort to restore the previous demographic balance.18 Consequently they claimed it for the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government. Controlling oil-rich Kirkuk was thought to be a crucial lifeline for the Kurdish federal entity, and potentially could financially support an independent Kurdish state. Turkey vehemently objected to these plans, fearing that such a development would destabilize Turkey's Kurdish-inhabited southeastern and eastern provinces. Instead, it championed the rights of Kirkuk's sizable Turcoman minority. While the future status of Kirkuk was set to be decided by a referendum, Turkey objected to any measure which could lead to the incorporation of Kirkuk into the KRG. An event whose details still remain unclear triggered a major crisis in US-Turkey relations and further fueled anti-Americanism. On July 4, 2003, US soldiers arrested 11 Turkish special forces officers in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya, who were suspected of planning the assassination of a local Kurdish politician.19 The arrested Turkish officers were hooded and led away from their headquarters for questioning. When this news became public, the media and popular reaction was unprecedented. Such treatment was deemed disgraceful and a national insult coming from a traditional ally.20 The fact that the victim of the insult was the Turkish army made things even worse for US-Turkey relations. The military has traditionally enjoyed high popularity and esteem in Turkish public opinion, and it also was among the most pro-US actors in Turkish domestic politics. The Sulaymaniya incident alienated even some of the most loyal supporters of the US-Turkish strategic alliance. It was added to claims that the United States was considering partition plans of Iraq and the establishment of a fully independent Kurdish state in the north of the country, or even a large-scale redrawing of the map of the Middle East which would entail territorial losses for Turkey. These added fuel to existing nationalist conspiracy theories and further aroused anti-US feel ings in Turkey, which for the first time appeared significantly among secularist elites. This shift was clearly documented in opinion surveys.21 According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the number of Turks who had a favorable view of the United States fell from 32% in 2004 to 23% in 2005 and to a mere 17% in 2006. The corresponding numbers were 27% in Pakistan, 36% in Indonesia and Egypt, and 38% in Jordan.22 Support for the US-led War on Terror fell from 37% in 2004 to 17% in 2005, and 14% in 2006.23 At 3%, Turkey recorded the lowest level of confidence in President George W. Bush among the 15 countries of the survey.24 In 2007, the results of the same survey were even more telling. The number of Turks who had a favorable view of the United States fell to a tiny 9%, the lowest among all states and considerably less than even the Palestinians, of whom 13% expressed a favorable view of the United States.25 Eighty-one percent of Turks expressed their dis like of US ideas about democracy, while 83% expressed their opposition to US "ways of doing business" in international affairs.26 Twenty-two percent expressed positive views of US movies, music, and television, 37% for US science and technology, but only 4% for the spread of US ideas.27 The situation slightly improved in the following years. The election of Barack Obama to the US presidency was a primary reason for that. As in most countries, Turkish public opinion favored Obama, who was seen as a harbinger of change in US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. His decision to visit Ankara in early April 2009 made Turkey the first Muslim country that he visited. This was well received in Turkey. In his address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Obama took the opportunity to send a message to the Muslim world. He argued that The United States is not and will never be at war with Islam. In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject but also to strengthen opportunity for its people. ... America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot be based just on the opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.28 Nonetheless, the visit proved to be of little avail regarding the restoration of the US image in Turkey. According to the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the number of Turks with a favorable view of the United States rose to 14% in 2009 — up from 12% in 2008.29 These were still the worst ratings for the United States among all sur veyed countries. According to the same survey, 40% of Turks saw the United States as an enemy while only 18% saw it as a friend.30 Mistrust of US foreign policy remained strong. Only 19% of Turks expressed the view that Obama would be fair in the Middle East, while 52% argued the opposite.31 Although 33% of Turks expressed confidence in President Obama ? compared to only 2% for President Bush in 2008 ? 52% showed little or no confidence in Obama.32 These findings seem to confirm that anti-American ism in Turkey is not ephemeral, but tends to establish its position33 and is becoming an important component of contemporary Turkish nationalism. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE The rise of anti-Americanism in Turkish society also can be documented in the media and popular culture. Beyond the legitimate reaction to US wrongdoings in Iraq, wide publicity was given to unfounded claims or conspiracy theories regarding the US role in the Middle East and the actions of US troops in the region. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal of 2003 was presented as evidence of the evil character of the US occupation and of the United States itself. Accusations that US soldiers were harvesting organs from Iraqi prisoners and insurgents and selling them abroad found a following in Turkey.34 Scathing attacks against the United States during the bloody operations for the recapture of the city of Fallujah in November 2004 were followed by the publication of official statements in which US operations were called genocide and compared to the Holocaust.35 The alleged role of Israel in post-war Iraq also stirred the ire of the Turkish press. Widespread claims appeared that Israel was actively involved in northern Iraq36 to support Iraqi Kurds and the creation of a Kurdish state as an Israeli client between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab world. This often resulted in the coupling of anti-American and anti-Semitic feelings in parts of Turkish society. These attacks were not only limited to the Islamist media. Anti Americanism was crossing political and ideological lines.37 In the field of popular culture, books and films in which Turkey came into direct — and successful — military confrontation with the United States met with unprece dented commercial success.38 The fictional book Metal Storm (Metal Firtina), narrated a war between Turkey and the United States in the near future.39 According to the plot, the United States invades Turkey from Iraq. Operation "Metal Storm" results in the occupation of Turkey's large cities. In a second phase, Operation "Sevres,"40 Turkey's archenemies — Greece, Armenia, and the Kurds — plan the partition of the country. The Turks then forge a global anti-US alliance with China, Russia, and Germany, while a Turkish agent detonates a nuclear device in Washington, DC. This brings the occupation to an end, and Turkey triumphs.41 The book, which ran to ten editions and sold about 500,000 copies in the first 18 months of its publication in late 2004, was a prominent example of a best-selling book characterized by rampant anti-Americanism. The authors skillfully capitalized on emerging anti-American feelings and existing phobias in Turkish society. They created a nationalist epic, in which Turkey defeats new — the United States — and the Kurds — and old enemies — Armenia and Greece – to trium phantly reclaim its independence. The commercial success of the book led to the pub lication of a sequel, which also was well-received by the public.42 The commercial success of a movie based on a popular TV series was an addi tional manifestation of rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. The Valley of Wolves: Iraq (Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak) was, at the time of its release, the most expensive production in the history of Turkish cinema and eventually became its biggest commercial success as well. It featured the adventures of Polat Alemdar, a Turkish intelligence agent who operates in Iraq, defending justice, restoring Turkish honor, and avenging American atrocities in Iraq. The movie combines nationalist, Orientalist, and Occidentalist stereo types.43 Alongside anti-American and anti-Semitic tones, the movie depicts the Iraqis as backward, cowardly, overtly religious, and clearly inferior to Turks. The only groups that enjoy a positive portrayal are the Turcomans, Turkey's alleged ethnic brethren in Iraq, and those Kurds who collaborated with Turks. Positive critiques of the film were found not only in the nationalist media but also came from high-ranking ministers and MPs.44 The spectacular commercial success and popular appeal of a book and a movie replete with nationalistic and anti-American messages comprised a clear signal of the growing popular anti-American nationalism in Turkey.