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Empirics prove—Erdogan uses diversion to distract from domestic problems

Kara 22 — Mehtap Kara Mehtap Kara. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University, Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (2022): Linking Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy: the justice and development party’s political strategies and their divergent foreign policy effects, Turkish Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2022.2060082 WMK

The AKP government continued to manipulate the country’s foreign policy through military operations and escalated tension with foreign countries to contain domestic opposition, especially (as noted in Figure 1) prior to elections or whenever the approval rating of the government declined.46 A series of incidents and dog fights between the Turkish and Greek warplanes in April 2018 before the snap elections in June is an example of these policies.47 Turkey’s traditional competition with Greece and the RoC was periodically used to increase tension and mobilize the nationalist base and distract people’s attention from problems at home.48 During this episode with Greece and the RoC, Bahçeli and Erdoğan submitted another joint proposal to move the elections forward (originally scheduled to be held in November 2019), and on June 24th, the presidential election and parliamentary elections were held on the same day. Although the AKP failed to secure the necessary majority of 300 deputies in the election, its alliance with the MHP gained 342 out of 600 seats. Interestingly, the new system was designed to reduce the possibility of coalitions to ensure that coalition governments were not able to return decades of instability. However, the AKP failed to obtain the 300 deputies needed for the majority of the seats in the first general election of this new system. Therefore, it had no choice but to continue cooperating with the MHP. Hale points out that in the American presidential system, if a president lacks the majority in Congress, then a ‘log-rolling’ method is utilized, which requires compromise and individual persuasion.49 Under the new presidential system, the AKP adopted a log-rolling strategy to maintain its parliamentary majority. The AKP gained the MHP’s support after the failed coup attempt, but following the June 2018 election, it became dependent on the MHP’s support in the National Assembly. Along with the mobilization strategy, the AKP also adopted insulation and accommodation strategies against its ostensible ally. The AKP-MHP alliance is a nationalistic partnership, and it is based on the creation of external problems and military engagement abroad like the ‘forever war’ where conflicts constantly remain in the political background. Neack describes this as Hagan’s ‘insulation strategy with a twist’ where the coalition of elites wants to stay in power by creating ‘an external situation that diverts attention from them, insulating them from critical domestic opponents and popular demands.’ 50 The MHP exerted a greater influence on Turkish politics as the AKP needed its help to pass legislation. Thus, the alliance empowered the MHP to actively participate in the country’s foreign policymaking process. However, this alliance has been faced with challenges and a clash of interests. The MHP proposed a partial amnesty law in May 2018, but the AKP chose to insulate the MHP by overriding this request and rejected the proposal (this was before the election in June and the AKP’s dependency on the MHP). The Student Oath issue became another divisive problem between the AKP-MHP partnership that led the MHP to suspend the People’s Alliance during the local elections in March 2019. Bahçeli announced that his party would not use the alliance to propose joint candidates. Later, he agreed not to nominate any candidate for big cities and announced his party’s support for the AKP’s candidate in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. This example illustrates how the AKP utilized an insulation strategy along with a mobilization strategy where policymaking elites gained support for their policies, but also coopted the MHP to achieve a dual agenda of staying at power and building a coalition. At this point, insulation and mobilization strategies were entwined, making it difficult to indicate where insulation ends and mobilization begins. Neack’s statement of ‘insulation with a twist’ points out the complexity and difficulty of implicitly separating these two strategies from each other. In February and March 2019, the TAF launched the ‘Blue Homeland’ naval exercise simultaneously in the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean. This action allowed the AKP-MHP coalition to pursue coercive policies and gunboat diplomacy against Greece, but was also intended to regain domestic support to achieve their policy objectives. The word ‘homeland’ has a strong meaning for the Turkish population, which is oversensitive about national sovereignty, especially due to the failed coup attempt. Military training was also held a few weeks before the 2019 local elections. However, despite the MHP’s support and naval training that appealed to nationalists, the AKP lost to CHP candidates in all of the big cities. In response, the AKP applied to the Supreme Electoral Council to annul election in Istanbul, while also launching a cross-border military operation, ‘Operation Claw’, in Northern Iraq against Kurdish separatists before the June 23rd re-run election election in Istanbul, which was similar to its 2015 general re-election strategy. In addition, in May, the government also announced that Turkish ships would drill for natural gas off the southern coast of the RoC and sent two drill ships that were accompanied by Turkish naval frigates and three gunboats.51 Nevertheless, this mobilization strategy and manipulation of Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and cross-border operations in Iraq failed to bring the desired result. The CHP’s candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu won again by increasing his margin from 13,000 to nearly 775,000 votes.52 The CHP’s victory in Istanbul demonstrated declining support for the AKP’s policies and ended the 25-year rule of Erdoğan in Istanbul. Despite this failure, it is clear that Turkey’s cross-border operations to address security concerns and assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean correlate with general/local election dates. Therefore, the timing of these policies/operations further strengthens suspicions that the AKPMHP alliance intentionally exploits and manipulates Turkey’s national security and national interest related issues to suppress and prevail over domestic opposition. Economic problems have become the most important domestic challenge to the AKP. The Turkish lira (TL) has dramatically lost value, falling against the US dollar from 4.70 on July 2018–18.05 by December 2021. Weak institutions, declining rule of law, growing political influence over the judiciary, and failed monetary policies have negatively affected foreign direct investments (FDI) in Turkey. According to the World Investment Report, FDI inflow to Turkey was reported at $19 billion in 2015, fell to $13.5 billion in 2016, $11 billion in 2017, and dropped to $9.2 billion in 2019.53 The failed coup attempt, political instability, deepening problems with the West over the Kurdish issue, and the snap elections in 2018 contributed to declining FDI inflows and Turkish economic performance. Erdoğan portrayed the economic crisis as an economic war against ‘the devil’s triangle of interest and exchange rates and inflation.’ 54 He compared current economic problems with the War of Independence that Turkey fought against the Western imperialist powers almost a century ago. In this way, he identified this new ‘war’ as another historical fight against those who want to divide the Turkish nation through terror attacks, coup attempts, and economic restrictions.55 Erdoğan framed the country’s struggles as ‘us vs them’ or ‘Turkey vs the West’, which allegedly tries to weaken and destabilize Turkey.56 Through anti-Western rhetoric, Erdoğan not only found a means to exploit nationalism, but also portrayed the AKP-MHP alliance as an ultimate force to fight against foreign enemies. The ongoing anti-terror operations in Syria and Iraq, and Turkish military activism abroad were also presented as a part of Turkey’s historical fight against its enemies. The nationalistic rhetoric and military operations, while appealing to the nationalist base at home, also discourage foreign investors and further deepen the country’s economic problems. However, the parties in the Nation Alliance were hesitant to oppose Turkey’s military operations. They did not want to be labeled as being against Turkey’s national security interests or pro-American and pro-Western, which would only strengthen the AKP-MHP alliance’s hand domestically. Turkey’s military activism against Kurdish militias to contain domestic opposition also weakened domestic support for pro-Kurdish HDP. Following the US withdrawal from Syria in the fall of 2019, the TAF launched largest operation in Syria, ‘Operation Peace Spring’, to create a 32km (20-mile) safe zone along the Syrian border. With this operation, Turkey aimed to eliminate terror corridors in northeastern Syria, push the Kurdish militia forces back from the Turkish border, and resettle Syrian refugees in the safe zone. The mobilization strategy as a risk-taking strategy escalated the conflict in Syria, and resulted produced costs for Turkey, notably when dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed by Russian-backed Syrian Air Forces in Idlib in February 2020. The government reacted to the incident by lifting the Western sea and land border controls, which allowed refugees to cross into Europe through Greece. The AKP’s reaction was also the result of the EU’s lack of financial commitment to Syrian refugees in Turkey as part of the 2016 migration deal, as well as a lack of support for Turkey’s policies and military operations in Syria. In this way, the government attempted to contain possible negative blowback from the Turkish public, which was increasingly critical of Syrian refugees and less supportive of Turkey’s military operations in Syria. In addition, to prevent domestic opposition and conceal Turkey’s inability to respond to the Russian-backed Assad regime, Turkish elites manipulated the country’s foreign policy and further escalated tension with Greece. Thus, they have aimed to divert people’s attention away from the Idlib incident and foreign policy failures in Syria. 16 M. KARA The AKP has also shifted its insulation strategy vis-à-vis the MHP to one of cooptation with political favors and policy concessions. This shift became visible during the summer of 2020. The AKP agreed to pass the previously rejected amnesty law as a policy concession to contain the MHP and a recognition that ignoring the MHP’s demands and challenges was no longer an option since it did not have a parliamentary majority to rule on its own. The convicted former mafia leader, Alaattin Çakıcı, was released from prison by benefiting from the partial amnesty law.57 Soon thereafter, he posted a threatening letter on Twitter targeting the CHP leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as a response to Kılıçdaroğlu’s criticism of Bahçeli during the party parliamentary group meeting. AKP policymakers initially remained silent to protect their alliance with the MHP, but later initiated a probe against Çakıcı. Bahçeli backed Çakıcı and described him as a ‘son of an ‘Ülkücü’ (an ultra-nationalist) who loves his country and nation.’ 58 Since the AKP’s political survival depends on maintaining an alliance with the MHP, it combined its insulation strategy accommodation by avoiding conflict on this issue. Another example of the accommodation strategy is the AKP’s adoption of the ultra-nationalist rhetoric to show unity with the MHP. This strategy raises an important problem for the AKP’s authority because it provides disproportionate power for the MHP compared to its size in parliament and may lead to unintended consequences.59 Based on the idea of the extremity of coalitions’ foreign policy choices, coalition governments are usually vulnerable to being hijacked by junior parties and are more likely to adopt extreme foreign policy behaviors than single-party governments.60 The hijacking is more likely if the government’s survival depends on the junior party and if the junior party’s ideology is more extreme than the larger parties within the coalition government.61 The MHP offers a life vest for the AKP, but in return, hijacks the government, receives policy concessions, and finds an opportunity to implement its hawkish/nationalist policies. By 2021, Bahçeli was seen as a very powerful person in Ankara, and he pulled Erdoğan toward ultranationalism.62 The AKP-MHP alliance constantly underlines its capacity to provide security and protect Turkey’s national interests against all forms of enemies. Erdoğan claimed that ‘We [the AKP] continue to collaborate with MHP on issues regarding our country’s survival and future.’ 63 His statement stresses that cooperation between the two parties is necessary for a country’s survival rather than party survival. The nationalist approach in the alliance aims to gain support for the government’s policies. Bahçeli uses similar rhetoric and underlines that the People’s Alliance ‘will be the main protector of Turkey’s future.’ 64 He claims that the alliance is‘Turkey’s only hope, its only guarantee against the world.’ 65 He creates imaginary enemies and a ‘Turkey versus the rest’ perception. To this end, the AKP-MHP alliance is no longer only targets opposition figures, journalists, or foreign countries/nationals as the enemy of the state, but anyone who opposes any of their decisions regardless of the issue. Being in opposition or a dissident to the AKP or the alliance is equated with being a terrorist or an enemy of the state who seeks to undermine the country’s prosperity and stability. From university students who protest state-appointed rectors to medical workers who claim that official figures of actual COVID19 cases were manipulated, everyone and anyone can be labeled as an enemy of the state. In addition to military operations, Turkey has also deployed military troops abroad as part of the government’s mobilization strategy. Turkey’s pro-Qatari stance in Qatar dispute with its Gulf neighbors facilitated the deployment of Turkish troops on Qatari soil in June 2017. Turkey also opened its biggest overseas military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in September 2017. Nearly 1,500 Turkish troops have been training Somali soldiers to help rebuild the country. Turkey’s commitment to the Somalis is part of the country’s policy to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. In November 2019, Turkey signed a memorandum with the UNbacked GNA government in Libya to cooperate on various areas including military, maritime rules, and drilling rights in the Mediterranean.66 The Turkish parliament also approved military assistance and the deployment of Turkish troops in Libya. Turkey’s presence in Libya is a part of the Blue Homeland doctrine and is important for maintaining a country’s assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s cooperation with Libya is also an act of retaliation against the alliance of the RoC, Greece, Egypt, and Israel, which was created to limit Turkey’s regional maneuvers and isolate Turkey from regional issues. Thus, the AKP-MHP alliance portrays the Blue Homeland doctrine from the nationalist narrative and describes it as ‘striking a balance’ that has transformed Turkey into a ‘game setter’ in the Eastern Mediterranean.67 To divert people’s attention from economic problems and the COVID-19 pandemic, Erdoğan also announced the discovery of a total of 405 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, the largest hydrocarbon resource discovery in Turkish history.68 These discoveries were announced as a way to reduce the country’s external dependency on natural gas by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Through this, the AKP-MHP alliance would like to validate the country’s Blue Homeland doctrine and gain support for its adventurous policies. This new doctrine offers an new area of manipulation for Turkish foreign policymakers to contain domestic opposition and change the narrative to something other than Turkey’s somewhat failed policies in Syria. The AKP’s alliance with the MHP is necessary to retain power, but, notably, it also limits the AKP’s foreign policy options on several issues. The AKP’s conflict avoidance strategy on the Çakıcı issue (the AKP initiated the probe case late and is likely to stall the case for years) demonstrates the AKP’s dependency on the MHP. As the accommodation strategy suggests, any significant 18 M. KARA changes in Turkish foreign policy behavior without the MHP’s consent is almost impossible. For instance, it is difficult to initiate a new phase in the Kurdish peace process, make a deal with Greece and the RoC, change policies in Syria, and normalize Turkey’s relations with the US without the MHP’s support or consent. Clashing statements from both sides of the alliance over the recent crisis with Greece highlights this problem. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, emphasized Turkey’s openness to negotiations in settling differences with Greece. However, Bahçeli claimed that ‘Turkey will not negotiate its interests.’ 69 His statement restricts the AKP’s ability to de-escalate the crisis. Although the AKP and MHP leaders insist on solidarity for the upcoming general election (set to be held in 2023), ongoing economic problems and domestic instabilities continue to undermine constituents’ support for both parties and the alliance.

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