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Diversionary war theory is bunk—there’s no good data

Butcher 21 — Department of Political Science and International Affairs, Kennesaw State University. Charity Butcher Diversionary Theories of Conflict: The Promises and Challenges of an Opportunities Approach," International Studies 3-25-2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.606 WMK

While a consideration of international and dyadic contexts as opportunities for diversionary uses of force is an important part of the diversionary puzzle, there are some key challenges with these considerations. Overall, one of the key challenges with scholarship on diversionary conflict is that it is extremely difficult to “prove” that diversionary motives are the primary cause of the use of force. The motives of leaders, especially if they are diversionary in nature, are not usually extremely transparent. As such, scholars must make assumptions about motives based on the best available information and situational contexts.

When considering the interplay between domestic problems and unrest, domestic opportunities for diversion, and international or dyadic contexts and opportunities for diversion, it may be difficult to specifically test diversionary motives. The fact that leaders consider both domestic and international factors when making decisions is certainly not new, but only a small number of such decisions are likely to be motivated by diversionary desires. Large-n quantitative analyses can help uncover patterns related to the connection between domestic factors and international ones but may not be able to fully ascertain whether diversionary motives were actually present in any given set of cases. Most large-n studies use measures of domestic unrest or problems, such as protest, leader popularity, and economic crises, to help demonstrate diversionary motives, but again, there are likely cases within these data that appear diversionary but really are not due to broad nature of measures of diversionary motives.

This problem is confounded further as more opportunities—and particularly international opportunities—for diversionary uses of force are added to the mix. In these cases, international opportunities for diversionary uses of force may also represent clear international security issues that affect the national interests of a state. As such, it is difficult to parse out conflicts that are occurring amidst both international and domestic pressures from those that have diversionary motives. This problem has yet to be fully explored within the diversionary literature.

In fact, some of the research discounting diversionary tactics has incorporated an international analysis, showing that these international factors are more important than domestic ones for impacting international conflict. For example, Meernik (1994) argued that, while some scholars previously found domestic political reasons to be important motivations for the use of force by U.S. presidents, these studies fail to fully consider the international considerations that affected presidential decision-making. When international considerations, such as the presence of an American military base, U.S. military aid, and prior use of force, are considered, Meernik found that the domestic political conditions are no longer statistically significant in affecting presidential decisions to use force. Instead, presidents seemed to be primarily motivated by these international conditions. Meernik found such domestic considerations are not important even in the face of international crises. Meernik’s study suggested the importance of focusing on international factors, but his analysis was limited only to the United States, and thus the generalizability was unclear. Similarly, DeRouen (2000) also considered the U.S. use of diversionary force, while controlling for international factors such as international crises and Soviet/Russian crisis activity and interactions. The author similarly found less support for diversionary tactics, and more support for the fact that Soviet crisis activity, was a major factor driving the use of force. Like Meernik (1994), these results suggested that, while international considerations are important in discussions of diversionary conflict, in some situations, when international factors are considered, diversionary tactics no longer seem present. These examples demonstrate the difficulty in parsing out the role of diversion as a motive in conflict.

The fact that many of the international opportunities that are linked to diversionary incentives, such as territorial disputes and rivalry, are also situations where wars are most likely, also makes it difficult to fully tease out the role of diversion. Another challenge with focusing on opportunities, particularly international ones, is that domestic problems (like economic crises) could be linked to the actions of other states (including rivals), and thus could represent legitimate grievances between states and grounds for potential armed conflicts. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea provides an example—where the economic crisis that Eritrea experienced was directly related to actions taken by the Ethiopian government (Butcher & Maru, 2018). In these cases, it becomes very difficult to disentangle traditional measures of domestic problems used as indicators of potential diversionary motives with other types of national security motives for imitating conflicts.

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