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Studies are at best uncertain

Albrecht 20 — Department of Political Science, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Holger Albrecht, "Diversionary Peace: International Peacekeeping and Domestic Civil-Military Relations," Taylor & Francis, 5-20-2020, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2020.1768073, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

To introduce an important caveat, the research programme on diversionary war hardly ever presents robust evidence for the fact that a decision to go to war was prompted mainly by an incumbent’s intent to coup-proof. While intentionality is uncertain, scholars found empirically that war reduces the likelihood of military coups in autocracies.16 Cemal Eren Arbatli and Ekim Arbatli most forcefully described the mechanisms believed to underlie the effects that a military’s engagement in war has on coup risk.17 For one, the ‘rally-around-the-flag mechanism’ implies the emergence of a public cry for national unity at the time of war, increased political support for executive office holders, and hence less support for a coup among officers and the broader public. For another, the ‘feasibility mechanism’ means that a military’s deployment abroad reduces the organizational and combat capacities necessary to undertake a coup attempt. Finally, the ‘credible commitment mechanism’ implies that an increased external threat catalyzed through a militarized dispute substantiates the importance of the military in politics and society more broadly. Hence, the military’s political and economic interests would most likely be sustained as a consequence of its role as a ‘savior’ of nation and state, rather than an ordinary power grab.

Arguments assuming a connection between war and the reduced likelihood of coups are intuitively compelling and have received some empirical support. Yet, quantitative tests of the effect of diversionary wars suffer from methodological challenges that, at least in part, explain inconclusive results in existing studies.18 What has largely gone unnoticed is a problem related to the selection of the universe of empirical cases. In fact, many systematic studies in diversionary war theory disguise an empirical blind spot: not all states have a credible threat at challenging their neighbours, let alone to going to war, for their own limitations in military strength and/or their neighbour’s superior firepower. It does not make much sense to assume that incumbents in a small country, with military capacities vastly inferior to those of its adversaries, would even consider going to war for coup-proofing. While a stake in international conflict might generate an initial rallying-around-the-flag effect at home, almost certain defeat in war reduces the likelihood of authoritarian leaders to stay in office.19

Empirically, proponents of diversionary war theory therefore often ignore relative military strength as an important context factor for the assumed effects of war on coup-proofing. Theoretically, however, it remains an inspiring point of departure to explore alternative strategies in foreign policy decisions and their possible effects on domestic civil-military relations. While war may not always be an option, opportunities may appear for weak states to link foreign policy making to coup-proofing: the diversionary peace.20 In a nutshell, I argue that participation in peacekeeping missions abroad produces similar effects for coup-proofing as diversionary wars. As an added benefit, participation in peacekeeping operations avoids the risk for incumbents associated with losing a war. Rather, the humanitarian nature of peacekeeping missions allows politicians to claim additional support from both their own populace and the international community.

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