Aims to destabilize Baltics separate from NATO makes deterring Russia impossible – now is key after Ukraine
Kols 2022, Rihards Kols Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee The Saeima (Parliament) of the Republic of Latvia (3/17/2022 “Hybrid Threats: The Baltic Perspective” https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/RKols_Hybrid%20threats%20Baltic%20Perspective-2022.pdf
Since regaining our independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been under constant Russian pressure. This pressure has manifested itself is through the conventional military threat, punctuated by ongoing airspace violations by Russian military aircraft and navy, unannounced, large-scale military exercises of inherently offensive nature along their borders, and the general disposition of Russia's military forces in regions closest to the Baltic borders, doing so under the pretence of counteracting the "hostile West" and promoting militarism. Influence, psychological, and information operations have been part of Russian doctrine since the early days of the Soviet Union, but historically they have been relegated to supporting roles. Nevertheless, as General Gerasimov has observed and thus included in the Russian military doctrine, non-kinetic are exceedingly practical, and these instruments will become dominant in future warfare. This is reflected in most current Russian foreign, security and defence policies and doctrinal documents. For years, the strategic goal of Russian information operations in the Baltic states has been to create distance between the Baltics and the West. The Russian concept is rooted in the idea that democratic societies are vulnerable to political manipulation, and exploiting this perceived weakness is far less costly than pursuing annexation or occupation. Consequently, Russian information operations in the Baltics focus on nine objectives: (1) Encourage and support armed actions by separatist groups to promote chaos and territorial disintegration; (2) Increase polarisation between elites and society to foment a crisis of values followed by process of orientation toward Russian values; (3) Demoralise the military and otherwise attrit resolve; (4) Undermine socioeconomic stability; (5) Engender socio-political crisis; (6) Intensify simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare to demoralise the Baltic states' armed forces and population and break their resolve; (7) Incite mass panic and degrade confidence in crucial government institutions; (8) Defame political leaders not aligned with Russian interests; (9) and Undermine international alliances and partnerships.12 Russia seeks to achieve its strategic ends in the Baltics through influence operations rather than conventional means. Recognising resistance to deeper ties with Russia in the Baltics, Russia has diversified its messaging beyond pro-Russia content. Instead, the Russian strategy is to attempt to convince members of the population that their countries' current alignment with the West, embrace of democracy, and membership in NATO and the EU are in some way detrimental, degrading or dangerous. Russia heavily leverages Russian and local-language traditional media, social media, and the internet toward this end. There is no universally agreed definition of hybrid threats, considering that a wide range of activities falls under this term. Moreover, hybrid threats evolve constantly, and new means in hybrid warfare emerge. However, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats defines hybrid threats as "an action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronised and deliberately target democratic states and institutions' vulnerabilities". 3 The use of hybrid tactics often is based on trying to undermine fundamental democratic values and liberties, and it is done under what some call a "chaos strategy". Russia sows chaos to achieve its agenda beyond its borders by deploying an array of hybrid warfare tools - hybrid warfare is a tactical application of the chaos strategy. Total spectrum warfare deploys a blend of conventional and nonconventional means to affect on the ground changes in target populations or territories while seeking to avoid direct military confrontation. Hybrid warfare is employed in a tailored way to sow chaos in target countries. Such efforts generally include irregular warfare, active measures, and special operations. Like the world, hybrid war is not static, and new tools are developed and employed constantly. For the Baltics, having lived in this environment for the majority of their lives, both under Soviet occupation and after regaining their countries' independence, this multi-vector warfare - hybrid warfare tactics and the chaos they attempt to create, have become intuitively recognisable and often seep into the background like white noise.4 From the perspective of the Baltic states, the development of hybrid threat-related policies at the EU or NATO level has been a natural consequence of the changing security landscape in Europe, especially the gradually deteriorating relations between the West and Russia. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's first attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, different hybrid attack scenarios against one of the three Baltic states were envisaged, e.g., Russia's attempt to overtake Narva, a city in the extreme eastern point of Estonia, where more than 80% of the population are ethnic Russians; or the so-called "little green men", armed soldiers without insignia that were seen in Crimea in March 2014, entering Latgale, the region in Latvia's east5 ; or Russia creating an incident linked to Kaliningrad – the Russian enclave on the Baltic sea wedged between Lithuania and Poland. In the event of any war between Russia and NATO countries, it is through this gap that NATO would have to rush reinforcements and supplies from Poland to the Baltic countries, and it is this gap that Russia would have to close to prevent that. Military strategists have long suggested that Russian forces from Belarus could attempt to punch across the narrow Lithuanian territory known as the Suwalki Gap to the Moscow-controlled enclave of Kaliningrad, effectively cutting off the three Baltic states. 6 These scenarios included Russia sending troops to "restore order" in case of an uprising in Kaliningrad or sabotaging the train lines across Lithuania that serve as a vital transit corridor from Russia. Because Baltic rail infrastructure is still primarily dominated by Soviet-era rails of a specific gauge width, one incompatible with the EU standard rail gauge width, the risks are substantial enough to cause concern. It has been considered that Russia could use the same pretext as in Ukraine, i.e., protection of the Russian-speaking minorities, to target one of the countries in the region, or rely on state-controlled Russian TV channels widely watched by ethnic Russians in the Baltics to spread propaganda and air true and imagined grievances.7