Disinfo wrecks Baltic stability. Prefer the first and only statistical study.
SEM = structural equation modeling method
Morkūnas 7-12 [Mangirdas Morkūnas, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vilnius University; 7-12-2022; "Russian Disinformation in the Baltics: Does it Really Work?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10999922.2022.2092976; KL]
Introduction In recent years, awareness of Russian disinformation activities and disinformation efforts has been growing both in the West and in Central and Eastern Europe (Baumann, 2020; Kuczyńska-Zonik & Tatarenko, 2019). Russian disinformation is considered to have achieved some success even in the most developed western countries, where it is presumed to have interfered in the election campaign in the USA (Golovchenko et al., 2020), harassed and impeded independent investigations in Western Europe (Aro, 2016), sought to impair public support for Western assistance to former Soviet countries (Richey, 2018), and significantly affected the election campaign in France (Makhashvili, 2017). Among the main targets for Russian disinformation are the former Soviet Union countries that in Russia are referred to by a unique term coined in 1992, called “near abroad,” (ближнее зарубежье) which attempts to emphasize their status as foreign countries not fully recognized by Russia (Rotaru, 2018). Russian disinformation in the “near abroad” countries seek two main objectives: to inflict as much damage to the statehood of the target countries and to portray Russia in much better colors in the eyes of their citizens (Shakrai, 2015), typically by distorting historical events (Ehrlich, 2021). Although the aim of preventing former Soviet Union Republics from fully diverging from the Russian sphere of influence (Cooley, 2017; Dunn & Bobick, 2014), the Russian Federation has made the Baltic States a target of continuous negative disinformation and psychological subversion tactics (Veebel, 2015), making the disinformation dominated by negative messaging (Thornton & Karagiannis, 2016). It is even stated that among all the European nations, citizens of the Baltic States experience the most concentrated and sophisticated disinformation efforts as an expression of soft power (Simons, 2015). Such Russian disinformation has been affecting the citizens of the Baltic States for more than the past three decades. Arguably residents of the Baltic States are believed to be more susceptible and receptive to various forms of Russian disinformation, having been subject to some 50 years of Soviet brainwashing (Schuhrke, 2019; Thompson, 2019). Such disinformation increases dissatisfaction with domestic governments (Golovchenko, 2022) and the state of democracy generally (Oates, 2016), lowers incentives for personal self-development (Benkler et al., 2018), and provokes anger and social inequality within society (Bardach-Yalov, 2012). There are additional thoroughly documented cases about the intimidation of Baltic States from the Russian side. Matthews (2020) points out at Russian actions aimed at increasing ethnic tensions within these countries. It becomes possible because Baltic States have a significant Russian minority (Best, 2013). Russia is also fully engaged in spreading false information about the possible revision of various treaties between the Baltic States and Russia (Matthews, 2020) up to revoking the recognition of Lithuanian independence (Labanauskas, 2022). Baltic States also have been a subject of various cyber-attacks from Russian based hackers and are expected to experience even more sophisticated cyber-warfare activities it in a foreseeable future (Mälksoo, 2018). The position of Baltic States as a frontline in a cyber-warfare was acknowledged also by NATO by a decision to establish its cooperative cyber-defense competence centre of excellence in one of the Baltic States – Estonia (Kovács, 2018). In this study the follow the definition of disinformation presented by Bayer et al. (2019). It covers the spreading of information which is designed to be false or manipulated or misleading. It also has the intention of generating insecurity, tearing cohesion or inciting hostility, or directly to disrupt democratic processes (Bayer et al., 2019, p. 18). Although in recent years, Russian disinformation reached the level of “strategic information operations” (Flanagan et al., 2019), there have been very few studies on the actual effect of such disinformation. Completed studies were based on qualitative evaluations (Surowiec, 2017), focused on Western countries (Carter & Carter, 2021), or investigated only specific issues – mostly the Russia-Ukraine dispute (Gerber & Zavisca, 2016). Therefore, the present paper aims to evaluate the effect of Russian disinformation on the Baltic States. In order to assess the latent variables related to the effect of disinformation activities on citizens’ minds, this paper uses the structural equation modeling method (SEM), in which a partial least squares technique is employed. To our knowledge, this is the first study on the effect of disinformation on the target countries’ populations using sophisticated statistical methods. The study consists of several parts: the introductory section provides a brief overview of the aims and impact of Russian disinformation in the Baltics, the “Materials and Methods” section introduces the research model and the hypotheses for the study, and the main results are presented in the “Results” section. Finally, the “Conclusions and Discussion” section summarizes the insights of the study, juxtaposes it with the prevailing theoretical streams, and offers directions for future studies in the subject area. Theoretical background There is increasing debate about the socio-political consequences of negative disinformation. Arguably, disinformation enables the success of populist parties during election campaigns (Chernobrov & Briant, 2020) and affects political decisions, as politicians are reluctant to take actions that are potentially unpopular with certain voting groups (Acemoglu et al., 2013) that could be subject to various disinformation tactics (Van Herpen, 2015). Prolonged negative disinformation campaigns lower public participation (Bonch-Osmolovskaya, 2015) through both increased perception of negligibility of voters actions (Van Herpen, 2015) and increased apathy (Gulenko, 2021). In recent years, the intensity of Russian disinformation has substantially increased, especially on social media (Prier, 2020). One of the main aims of destructive Russian disinformation, which has intensified since 2014, is to discredit national authorities by questioning the independence of their actions or decisions (Lelich, 2014). This leitmotif of the “other hand ruling the government” has also been applied through information warfare against another post-soviet country – Ukraine – and is considered to be highly effective (Karlsen, 2016). It also increases citizens’ perception of hostility with respect to the surrounding environment and diminishes their participation in public life and socio-economic activity (Irisova, 2015). Furthermore, Russian disinformation in post-Soviet states boosts nihilism to substantially undermine the economic activity of their populations, especially with respect to future gains (Julukhidze, 2020). Nihilism as a result of increased distrust provoked by Russian disinformation is mentioned by Paul and Matthews (2019), and Russian disinformation objectives to create and facilitate distrust in Government were also noticed by Sanovich (2017). Disinformation also violates the self-identity and perception of justice (Blouin & Mukand, 2019). Reflections on the exaggerated perception of corruption within the state apparatus were found to be one of the most discussed topics (Miller, 2019). The emphasized narrative of the “failed state” in which everything is decided in advance, and in which citizens can neither influence policy decisions nor be the masters of their own personal or career development, is also important for Russian disinformation architects (Helmus et al., 2018). The disinformation-related influence of diminished motivation for positive, personal development has also been mentioned by Smith and Lasswell (2015). Attempting to undermine the perception of safety within the country through constant intimidation and threat of imminent military actions is another major tactical aspect of Russian disinformation (Giles et al., 2015). Although in the short term, the effect may be opposite to that expected by the disinformation designers – a consolidation of the nation in the face of immediate aggression (Yurkova, 2018), in the long term, it rewards the disinformation creators in the form of decreased trust in public institutions (Haas, 2017) and the state itself (Redley, 2007) in the target country. Such dual effects of disinformation not only increase the complexity of how it may be detected, (Kausar et al., 2020) but also make understanding its effects even more puzzling. It has been noted that although Russian state disinformation is very effective within Russia itself by forcing the Russian population to accept a distorted reality, it becomes a counterproductive element outside Russian borders (Belousov, 2012) where it no longer achieves its main objectives (Benkler et al., 2018). These contradictions not only substantiate polemics about the ambiguity of Russian disinformation outcomes but also add weight to arguments in favor of the present study. In summary, Russian disinformation in the Baltic States is directed at increasing the populations” distrust in their governments (Lough et al., 2014), promoting the perception of a lack of justice (Paul & Matthews, 2016) or career possibilities (Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2017) within the country, and reinforcing the threat of the imminent military action in the region (Buinauskas et al., 2016).