Estonia especially good at countering disinfo
Cyberattacks in general too
Pernik 21 (Piret, is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training. She is also a co-editor of the volume Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, published by the CCDCOE. Her articles have been published in academic journals and she has written book chapters, as well as online commentaries. She holds an MA in Social Sciences from the University of Tallinn, and an MA in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University, Budapest. “Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice”, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf)LR
Estonia does not have a standalone policy of cyber deterrence, but strategic documents relating to national security, foreign policy and cybersecurity describe diverse components of cyber deterrence. Cybersecurity is deemed a part of foreign, security and defence policy, as well as domestic/internal security. It is also included in strategic documents and policies concerning digital modernization, technology, education and research, and so forth. The review and analysis of Estonia’s strategic documents associated with cybersecurity (presented in Annex I) shows that two concepts – cross-domain deterrence and cyber deterrence – play an important role in the government’s cybersecurity discourse. Three layers of deterrence – entanglement and norms, denial and punishment – are equally upheld. Generally speaking, the analysis demonstrates that in the Estonian national security discourse, deterrence by denial and punishment tend to be conceptualized in the context of national security and defence policy; entanglement and norms in the context of foreign policy and cyber diplomacy; and denial (domestic defence/resilience) in the context of digital and technology policies. In the latest strategy (2019–2022), cyber deterrence is referenced almost as frequently as in the 2014–2017 document, apart from the fact that cross-domain deterrence and military deterrence are not mentioned. Rather, concerns about challenges relating to digital modernization and technology policies come to the fore in this strategy. The last column of Table 2 provides examples of how a deterrence tool has been implemented. To strengthen its cyber diplomacy capacity, Estonia established a position in 2018 for an ambassador-at-large for cybersecurity. Estonia is one of the leaders among the Baltic and Nordic countries when it comes to cyber diplomacy. It has been a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts for many years, and is also a leader in cyber diplomacy education for foreign diplomats.35 As a member of the UN Security Council in 2020– 2021, in June 2021 Estonia organized for the first time in the Council’s history an open meeting on cybersecurity, where it raised the issue of state behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security.36 Since 2008, Estonia has hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which sponsors the publication of world-renowned scholarly works on international law applicable to cyberspace – the Tallinn Manuals 1.0 (2013), 2.0 (2017), and the forthcoming volume 3.0.37 Deterrence by denial, conceptualized in Estonia primarily as domestic defence/resilience measures, is foundational for the country’s cybersecurity posture.38 Deterrence in this area includes a full spectrum of activities prescribed in the national cybersecurity strategies, in cybersecurity legislation and other relevant ministerial regulations. Some of the resilience-related objectives have remained constant since 2008, such as applying measures to harden networks (for example, standards, risk analysis and management tools, incident response, raising awareness, building cybersecurity capacity and competence, to name a few).39 In June 2021, Estonia published its first national information security standard entitled E-ITS, which is a guideline for public and private network owners and operators to ensure minimum security standards.40 The Estonian Information System Authority regularly alerts stakeholders and the general public to cyber threats, vulnerabilities and exploits, and helps them to protect their networks. These activities contribute to deterrence by denial by increasing the ability to protect networks and recover from cyber incidents. Public attribution can be regarded as a tool for deterrence.46 Indeed, among Estonian experts, public attribution is regarded as a primary tool of cyber deterrence.47 As noted by scholars, one aim of public attribution is the act of norm-setting – that is, establishing “the rules of the road” and subsequently enforcing appropriate behaviour in cyberspace (response measures).48 In a similar manner, the Estonian government holds that “public statements on attribution can be made, with the aim of increasing accountability in cyberspace and emphasising the importance of adhering to international law obligations and norms of responsible state behaviour”.49 The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subscribes to the opinion that “public attribution […] allows states to send clear messages and shape expectations that malicious cyberspace operations will not be tolerated” and “it is necessary to send a message that harmful cyberspace operations are not part of acceptable state behaviour”.50 In other words, Estonia directly links public attribution to setting cyber norms, thus connecting deterrence by entanglement and norms to legal consequences, namely deterrence by punishment. According to this view, Estonia supports public attribution and collective measures “where possible” and “public attribution and messaging are tools for deterring and responding […] but also for raising wider awareness”.51 To support collective public attribution and to hold violators responsible, Estonia actively contributes to EU and NATO cyber deterrence discussions, and belongs to the US-led international cyber deterrence initiative.52 Based on the Estonian case study, a policy recommendation for EU and NATO countries is to apply a three-layered deterrence model.73 First, EU and NATO countries should participate in entanglement and norms measures such as cyber diplomacy and capacity-building globally. Second, they should invest more in denial measures and, third, jointly develop policies for punitive response options, including developing public attribution procedures to enable quick attribution, and systematically implementing sanctions regimes. It would be feasible to establish memoranda of understanding, and operational- and technical-level frameworks to radically improve information- and intelligence-sharing. Participation in cyber defence and crisis management exercises should be open to like-minded NATO partner countries. Joint bilateral cyberspace operations likewise contribute to mutual trust-building and information-sharing, and increase parties’ operational and technical competence.74 Operational- and technical-level joint activities should be regularly practised among allies and with like-minded partners as they contribute to deterrence by denial. Given that NATO’s cyber With regard to deterrence by denial, Estonia, together with other EU and NATO countries, should develop a zero trust security strategy and architecture.75 Zero trust is a cybersecurity paradigm that treats networks as untrusted, and that moves defences from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. It assumes that there is no implicit trust granted to user accounts or assets in any network segment (including a corporate local area network), and applies authentication and authorization before a session is established.76 While deterrence might work at the high end, novel security principles should be implemented by governments because deterrence is not sufficient to deter cyberattacks. Estonia’s public attribution guidelines serve as a blueprint for other countries to attribute cyberattacks and impose meaningful costs. A sharper focus on responses to high- and low-end cyberattacks should be developed in the future along with concrete deterrence actions and tools for individual 75 For example, the US government has released a strategy, architecture and maturity model that the US federal government agencies will implement: ‘Moving the U.S. Government Towards Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles’, The White House, https://zerotrust.cyber.gov/. 76 Scott Rose, Oliver Borchert, Stu Mitchell and Sean Connelly, ‘Zero Trust Architecture SP 800-207’, August 2020, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final. 77 ‘Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace’, p. 62. sectors and target types. For example, deterrence tools can differ for diverse targets: internet voting and e-health systems would be targeted by different cyber threat actors that have political or criminal motives, and the same tool is not effective across all actors. Estonia’s forms of cyber deterrence are not effective individually, nor every time, but when implemented together in a whole-of-society approach, and systematically over a longer period of time, it is likely that many malicious cyberattacks can be deterred. As Joseph Nye pointed out, deterrence tools “can complement one other in affecting actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of particular actions”.77 Certainly, one cannot deter all cyberattacks – especially those conducted as part of malicious influencing campaigns below the threshold of the use of force – however, it is possible to reduce the number and effect of strategic cyberspace operations. It is likely that punitive responses may deter hostile actors from conducting similar attacks in the future. It will remain to be seen whether the EU and NATO can deter cyberattacks both above and below the threshold of an armed attack better in the future when they apply systematically stronger punitive responses.