Hybrid war escalates.
Wierenga 22 [Louis Wierenga, Junior Research Fellow, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu | Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College; 2022; "Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats in the Digital Baltic States: A state of the art"; Hybrid Threats in Baltics and Taiwan: Commonalities, Risks and Lessons for Small Democracies; https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf#page=58; KL]
In a very recent and insightful study on AI for digital warfare, Hageback and Hedblom (2022) in their synonymous monograph pose a fascinating question: what Clausewitz would have thought of digital warfare.1 Hageback and Hedblom (2022) then correctly note that the new digital technology which we are now in possession of has led way to a new digital sphere which substantially increases the speed, reach, stealth, precision, diffusion, and breadth of a potential attack.2 Much has changed in the realm of cybersecurity and cyberwar since academic literature first took note.
There is broad consensus amongst academics and policy makers that the nature of warfare and security is changing.3 While this is not disputed, and warfare changes and progresses with time, this claim should be placed within the broader notion of a changing geopolitical landscape and a multipolar world order and in light of Hageback and Hedblom’s (2022) aforementioned observation, relating to digital warfare and cyber conflict. Moreover, there is a growing consensus that within renewed great power competition, the likelihood of a ‘great power war’ is enough to resurrect old fears and direct contemporary security debates. Hybrid warfare usually precedes kinetic warfare or take place simultaneously.4 The targets of acts of hybrid aggression tend to be small states which are geographically near greater powers which seek to dominate them.5
Thus, this article focuses on cybersecurity and hybrid threats facing the three Baltic states, collectively known as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. First, I provide a brief overview of the development of cyber security and hybrid threats in the region, and a brief synopsis of the current state of affairs and conclude by offering some policy recommendations. Although the Baltic states are small states, they carry a big stick when it comes to dealing with cyber and hybrid threats. This can be used as an advantage not only internally when dealing with hostile actors in cyberspace, but when bolstering their voice within NATO and the EU. Estonia has been active in doing precisely this and Lithuania and Latvia are also answering the call.
The development of cybersecurity in the Baltic states: Primary challenges, risks, and lessons learned
Estonia, the small Baltic nation of just over 1.3 million people, certainly packs a big punch when it comes to all things digital, becoming the world’s most advanced digital society. The small, digital nation suitably markets itself as ‘e-Estonia’, with a center bearing the name. Collectively, the three Baltic states fare very well in cyber-preparedness. All three are ranked by the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) in the top 20 out of 193 countries. Estonia places third, after only the United States and the United Kingdom.6 Lithuania is ranked 6th, whereas Latvia is further down, ranking fifteenth.7 Lithuania and Estonia rank very high in the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI), among the top ten,8 whereas Latvia is slightly behind, placing 25th. 9
The aforementioned rankings are both impressive and encouraging. However, an alarming ranking to be placed within is the ten counties which are most likely to experience brute-force attacks on Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services.10 RDP brute-force attacks account for over 80 percent of all network accounts in each of the Baltic states.11 Yet, the Baltic states remain vigilant.
Within the short history of the Baltic states, post-occupation, it has usually been Estonia leading the charge. However, this is not always the case. For instance, in 2019, Latvia was among the first countries in Europe to launch 5G (fifth generation) for commercial use and a year later opened the first military 5G test site in Europe, located at the Ādaži military base.12
Lithuania has also been incredibly proactive in facing up to cyber threats. A recent initiative in the summer of 2021 was the establishment of the Regional Cyber Defence Centre (RCDC).13 The RCDC operates under the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. The RCDC relies on bilateral partnerships. Most strongly with the United States, as well as with Ukraine and Georgia.14 The RCDC is one of two cyber defence centres in the Baltics, the other being the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn.
It is hard to separate technical innovation from what history has taught the Baltic states, in terms of facing larger powers with nefarious intentions and a faulty understanding of territorial integrity. Many academics and policy makers and think tankers have noted the change in the global power balance, the changing nature of warfare15, as well as the growing importance of cyberspace as a battleground.16
In 2015, Richard Stiennon warns in his book which bears the candid title “There Will be Cyberwar” of precisely this. Stiennon ends his 2015 publication highlighting geographical hotspots of potential conflict: the loss of Taiwan, naval defeat in the South China Sea, and the loss of territory and sovereignty in Eastern Europe to Russia.17
If 2007 was the initial alarm bell for cyber and hybrid threats in the Baltics, 2020 and the onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic marks another notable date. Two important reasons underlie this. First, due to the lockdowns and social distancing practices enacted across most of the globe and in all Western democracies, education, higher education and a great degree of business was moved online.18 Therefore, online platforms became ‘the new normal and were utilized to a much greater extent, leading to the possibility of greater cyber threats. In the EU, major cyberattacks jumped from 146 in 2019 to 304 in 2020.19 This is something that Welscher (2021) argues has both reshaped cyberspaces as a whole and presented new threats to the Baltic states.20 There has been time to catch up and adjust. However, initially, due to the rapid move online, security became an afterthought in much of Europe.21 Cybercrime increased losses on a global scale by more than 50 percent, hitting also the Baltic states.22 This highlights the dire importance of remaining not just cyber-prepared, but one step ahead.
Second, and pertaining to hybrid and information warfare, both the increased amount of time people spend online during the ongoing pandemic as well as the ripe nature of a crisis of such magnitude for the spread of misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories highlight crucial vulnerabilities. A 2021 report for the European Commission found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the COVID-19 pandemic served as a catalyst for conspiracy theories.23 This at a time of extreme political and social polarization, coupled with preference bubbles and echo chambers, which allow misinformation and disinformation to both travel and be accepted by a wider audience. Though, with threats also come solutions, better resilience, and the possibility for a united front and further cooperation with allies.
In light of power competition vis-à-vis cooperation with the US, NATO, and the EU, and small states standing up to larger powers with nefarious intentions, the drawback is that no entity is capable of defeating all cyberattacks; rather, in order to succeed in cyberspace, the key is learning how to adequately cope.24 When it comes to information warfare, and one of the reasons for which it is so dangerous, is that the antagonist need not win – they succeed if they are able to successfully cloud the issue.25 It is no secret that Russia has waged numerous information warfare campaigns in the Baltics and show no sign of giving up.