Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

EU Fails

Libicki 19. Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California; “For a Baltic Cyberspace Alliance?”; 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_01_For-a-Baltic-Cyberspace-Alliance.pdf //BY

One such institution is the EU. Because cyberattacks can influence economic and political well-being, there is a natural compatibility between the EU’s mission and collective action to help promote cybersecurity. Certain critical infrastructures under threat from cyberattack, notably the electric grid, span the EU. Correspondingly, the EU is a vital participant in whole-of-infrastructure protection efforts. But cyber security is not just a matter of hardening networks and systems. It involves intelligence to understand how and why such systems may be attacked and it may 13 involve active defenses to stymie imminent and ongoing cyberattacks.23 There may also be circumstances where reprisals may be called for; even if some reprisals such as economic sanctions can be organized under EU auspices,24 those that involve cyber operations are, again, incompatible with the EU’s purpose. Intelligence, active defenses, and retaliatory cyberattacks are, instead, actions of national security communities. The question of membership in the Baltic cyberspace alliance involves tradeoff: more members means more clout but also less focus and possibly less consensus. As noted, Norway and the Netherlands may be useful members of such an alliance even though neither abuts the Baltic. What about France? On the one hand, France’s emphasis on cyberspace25 looks much like Germany’s, and the bilateral relationship between France and Germany can be understood as the cornerstone of Europe’s stability. On the other hand, geography (e.g., distance from Russia) and history (e.g., former colonies) may lead France to different perspectives from Germany on the Russian threat from cyberspace. What about the UK? On the one hand, the UK government’s skepticism regarding Russian intentions is well understood, and its GCHQ brings considerable assets to the fight in cyberspace. But the UK is part of the Five Eyes group; thus, any intelligence-sharing arrangement the UK has with Baltic states necessary means similar intelligence-sharing arrangements with all the other Five Eyes members (notably, the United States), who may be uncomfortable with such sharing. Furthermore, the advantage of ambiguity afforded by having two independent alliances taking on Russia in cyberspace would be vitiated if both alliances contained the same member

The EU can’t deploy C4ISR, interoperability. It’ll take decades or more.

Meijer and Brooks 21 [Hugo Meijer, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies; Stephen G. Brooks, a professor of government at Dartmouth College; 4-20-2021; "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back"; MIT Press; https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/4/7/100571/Illusions-of-Autonomy-Why-Europe-Cannot-Provide; KL]

THE COMPLEXITY OF EMPLOYING MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS

As dramatic as these weapons shortfalls are, European defense spending—if allocated properly—could eventually secure the needed systems. Yet, not only is the efficient allocation of resources a major challenge because of Europe’s strategic cacophony (as detailed below), but securing the needed weapons systems would only be the first step.

The effective employment of modern weapons systems is far more challenging than in past eras for a variety of reasons. A key consideration is the immense premium put on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). C4ISR—often referred to as the “nervous system” of modern militaries—is crucial for gathering information about the combatants, for effectively processing that information, and for disseminating and using that information to develop and implement complex plans.99 NATO’s 2011 mission in Libya shows the heavy reliance of Europeans on the United States’ C4ISR capacity. Europeans would therefore need to develop their own C4ISR capacity to be able to autonomously balance Russia, which would not be an easy undertaking given that Russia is no Libya. They would need large amounts of new C4ISR systems (e.g., reconnaissance and communication satellites; early warning and control aircraft; sensor systems; air, naval, and land command and control platforms), the most complex of which have very long development times. Notably, the already significant difficulty of Europeans assembling the needed systems would be made even more acute if the UK’s exit from the EU ends up meaning that British capabilities also need to be replaced: at present, the UK detains, among other capabilities, 53 percent of the EU’s combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance heavy unmanned aerial vehicles (CISR UAVs), 42 percent of airborne early warning and control aircraft, and 38 percent of electronicintelligence aircraft.100

In addition, European countries lack the kind of specialized personnel needed to operate modern weapons systems effectively. Redressing this weakness would be a significant undertaking, as they have reduced their number of military personnel drastically since the end of the Cold War. As figure 2 shows, the size of the total active militaries of the large European powers declined by 57 percent during the 1990–2020 period.101 Furthermore, beyond the difficulty of securing the financial resources to pay the needed personnel, recruiting sufficient specialized personnel would be a major challenge, as demonstrated by the difficulties faced by many European militaries in attracting personnel for skilled positions.102 Notably, a recent study has shown that the employment of advanced weaponry calls for highly skilled and highly trained military personnel, which are now more difficult to recruit and retain in the military.103 Obtaining specialized military personnel to operate modern weaponry is only the beginning; they must also be trained to effectively use modern weapons, which is extremely challenging and time consuming, partially because these weapons need to be used as part of a cohesive package that places a premium not just on information gathering, but also on coordination and delegation.104 It has taken U.S. military personnel an extraordinarily long time to develop the skills required for effectively using today’s weapons systems: as Posen stresses, the United States’ “development of new weapons and tactics

depends on decades of expensively accumulated technological and tactical experience.”105 It would likely take Europeans even longer to develop the needed skills, given differences across countries regarding operational cultures, levels of ambition, languages, and so on.106 Finally, the effective use of modern weaponry in the European theater depends on European forces being able to move quickly and securely over large distances within Europe. Yet, as a UK parliamentary report puts it, “NATO has difficulty moving large forces” across Europe.107 In recent years, the Europeans have sought to bolster military mobility through a variety of initiatives dispersed across different institutions (within both the EU and NATO).108 Yet, the movement and training of military personnel and assets in Europe remain severely hampered by a combination of capability shortfalls, legal/procedural hurdles, and infrastructural deficiencies that will not be easy to resolve.109

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.