Troops fail. It causes war!
Klein et al. 19 [Colonel Robert M. Klein, Senior Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University; Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist, Ph.D., Researcher and Faculty Board Member at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU); Colonel Ed Sumangil, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in CSR; Ulrica Pettersson, Ph.D., assigned to SEDU, Adjunct Faculty Member at Joint Special Operations University; 11-2019; "Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence"; Strategic Forum 301, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-301.pdf; KL]
As outlined, the RAND scenario leaves NATO with a series of bad options. To deter Russia from such a gambit, the Alliance could deploy ground forces forward in sufficient numbers to defend the Baltics. To this end, the U.S. Army has begun rotating brigade combat teams through the Baltics, and NATO has developed what it calls the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a rapid reinforcement capability in the Baltics in the event of a major crisis.4 However, under most likely scenarios, deploying additional conventional ground forces to the Baltics for forward defense is problematic, even if they could arrive in time and in sufficient numbers. First, it remains unclear whether these forces would have the intended deterrent effect. They might instead escalate tensions and stoke Russian aggression because Moscow seems likely to view additional NATO forces in the Baltics as a threat to Kaliningrad and perhaps St. Petersburg. Second, although additional conventional Alliance forces in the Baltics would undoubtedly drive up the costs of conventional attack by Russia, the entire region is one gigantic kill zone where Russia could immediately target NATO forces at the onset of hostilities, including vulnerable assembly areas, supplies, and fuel stocks. Russian attacks emanating through Kaliningrad, from Russia itself, over the sea, and likely from Belarus would almost certainly render additional prepositioned NATO forces vulnerable—at best delaying inevitable Russian victory or at worst dealing the Alliance an overwhelming defeat with very negative political repercussions for NATO.5