Norway is key. Incorporation reassures Russia and provides experience to allies, especially the Baltics.
Marius Kristiansen 7-12-2022. MS in Defense Analysis, Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, officer in the Norwegian Special Operations Command. Njål Home, Norwegian Special Operations Command. "Small state security sector assistance in the age of great power competition". Comparative Strategy an International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2087435. Pen-DL
Geopolitical realities, being NATO’s front to the northeast, largely defines Norwegians strategic- and security policy. The Russian bear is our neighbor and represents the strongest permanent military presence in our part of the High North. This is unlikely to change overnight, and Russia will thus remain “the defining factor of Norwegian defense planning in the foreseeable future.”5 Russia is also occupying a gradually more prominent place on the competitive stage, challenging western dominance and allied coherency. So amidst the (re-)emergence of great power competition, Norway is also predicated to take a greater responsibility for deterrence prior to aggression. Not necessarily because the relationship with Russia is set to deteriorate, but due to “growing uncertainty surrounding allied support to Norway in the most likely crisis scenarios.”6
Preserving regional (and global) stability is paramount for Norway’s security. Historically, Norway’s relations with Russia have consisted of a delicate balance of deterrence through NATO membership and reassurance through self-imposed military and nuclear restraints, diplomacy, and cooperation whenever possible. Reassurance might be described as a Norwegian strategic niche. Before the Baltic countries became members of NATO, Norway was the only NATO country that bordered Russia. General Philip Breedlove (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR]) describes Norway’s strategic role this way: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”7
However, given the immense military asymmetry between Norway and Russia, Norway is not able to generate any (significant) regional deterrent effect on its own. Thus, Norway is dependent on NATO regional and global deterrence capability to credibly succeed in deterring Russia. The reliance on NATO still complicates the value of deterrence – in the same manner as deterring a bully through having an older cousin that knows karate has it apparent limitations. The old, and friendly, relationship between the two neighbors is thus not only convenient, but a necessary and complementary security and stability tool. For NATO this also has obvious value; a more bellicose ally on the northeastern frontier could certainly create some predicaments for the alliance. As it stands, Norway offers a stable and predictable partner for both parties – thereby extending the value of reassurance to the relationship between Russia and NATO as a whole.
Norway’s contribution of reassurance is valuable, but that can hardly be seen as a sufficient contribution in an alliance. At least from a realist perspective, such soft power contributions are not far from “free riding.” The reliance on “deterrence by proxy” requires commitments and investments in a more profound way. Norway contributes with niche reassurance capability, is just above the NATO 2% GDP target,8 and has shown will and ability to work closely with allied strategic resources to demonstrate its deterrence capability.9 While these (and more) are important lines of operations, Norway must also seek to maintain and offer relevant capabilities to fulfill international expectations in other alliance-endeavors. In support of global peace and security NATO must have “the military capacity to undertake crisis management operations alone,10” and this requires active participation – also from small states. In a time where alliance cohesion is being challenged, military and security “protectionism” is counterproductive. An overly inwards focus to the detriment of supporting other campaigns may both undermine national political capital and the alliance itself. Norwegian politicians and flag-officers will do well to keep in mind that the performance of the alliance along the entire conflict spectrum is essential both for cohesion and the perception of deterrence that can be generated. “Ultimately, NATO’s strength and value lies in the unity and interoperability of its members.”11
Deterrence through proxy – Investing correctly in a strong alliance
In one way or another Norway has a long history of investing in security, both close and “out-of-area.” Early Norwegian international military engagements after World War II focused mainly on reconstruction in Europe. In parallel, Norway engaged itself in UN (and otherwise)-led peace operations, from United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956 until present day. When the global war on terror kicked off, Norway refocused its effort and initiated two decades of Norwegian alliance- and coalition-engagements abroad. Through its engagements, Norway has sought to be both an altruistic team-player on the world stage and a loyal alliance member. With the (re-)emergence of great power competition, these efforts have taken a back seat in the security discourse – presenting Norway and its allies a di- and occasionally tri-lemma.
Analysis suggests that in the midst of a new and more competitive normal, rather than merely refocusing at home – shutting the windows and locking the door – the relevance of using military means abroad in a globalized world will only increase. Beadle and Diesen suggest this is valid regardless of changes in the threat at home. 12 The interconnectedness of all actors makes it difficult to isolate both the problem and the solution geographically. The dilemma is that, although one acknowledges the need for allied solidarity in coping with global threats to secure a vital and effective alliance, there is also a strong urge to strengthen national defense. If you add the increasing military costs, you might end up as Norway has tended to – reducing size and refocusing on national defense.13 This might be well in line with the core task of collective defense in NATO’s Strategic Concept, but to the detriment of the remaining two core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security.14