Turkish-NATO relations contain Russia. The relationship is sustainable but on the brink.
Kara 22 [Mehtap Kara, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University; 6-13-2022; "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081?journalCode=fbss20; KL]
American analysts have also raised the question of Turkey’s expulsion from NATO (Carpenter 2019). The suspension of membership rights or the explosion of a member is not clearly stated in NATO’s founding treaty. Turkish policymakers do not consider unilaterally withdrawing from NATO’s collective security umbrella due to its troubled neighbourhood and history with its current allies, Russia and Iran. However, the escalating tension between the US and Turkey and restrictions on security and defence alliance are likely to isolate Turkey from NATO activities. Several NATO allies, including Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and Canada, have already announced that they have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey (BBC News 2019b). After the UK, another NATO member Canada also decided to suspend exports related to drone technology to Turkey on the basis that Turkey provided these technologies to Azeri forces during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Reuters 2020). The US Ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, underlines that Russia is trying to flip a key member of NATO, and Russia would be one of the main beneficiaries of the destabilization of the alliance and Turkey’s expulsion (Hurriyet Daily News 2018). Turkey was always seen valuable ally and indispensable member of NATO because of its geostrategic significance and military capabilities. It has been argued that alienating Turkey from NATO is not possible for these reasons, but there has been an ongoing Western effort to develop alternative options for Turkey by promoting closer cooperation with Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania (Idiz 2021). With increasing isolation from NATO, Turkey would continue strengthening its military ties with Russia. Erdoğan has already confirmed that Turkey will jointly produce S-500 defence systems with Russia (Reuters 2019). He underlined that ‘if the US. refuses to sell F-35 fighter jets, then Turkey turns to other options’ (Hurriyet Daily News 2019b). Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program might likely force Turkey to look for other options, possibly Russian Su-34 and Su-57 fighter jets (Groll and Seligman 2019). In this case, Turkey’s over-reliance on Russia will reduce its capacity to formulate independent foreign policies and pursue its national interest. Russia is increasingly becoming Turkey’s neighbour, which might be a problem for Turkey in the mid-to-long term.5 Turkish policymakers are aware of this dilemma, and instead of opting for Russian jets (compensate F-35), in October 2021, Turkey has requested to buy 40 new F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernization kits for its existing air forces from the US (Pamuk and Stone 2021). The American attitude will be decisive in Turkey’s return to the Western fold or further isolation from the alliance.
Following the American withdrawal and Turkish military incursions in Syria, French President Emmanuel Macron criticized the lack of coordination between NATO allies. He expressed his frustration by stating that NATO is experiencing ‘brain death’ (Solletty 2019). Biden calls for a renewed commitment to multilateralism and strengthening the transatlantic ties that were weakened during Trump’s America first policy. Pentagon defines the current security environment by identifying China as a ‘pacing challenge’ within the strategic competition, whereas Russia has been identified as a significant but ‘lesser threat’ to US interests and security (Vergun 2021). The Biden administration re-embraces the ‘pivot to Asia’ rhetoric introduced by the Obama administration in 2011, referring to the development of a grand strategy to deal with the North Korean threat and China (Manyin et al. 2012). However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that currently, Russia poses a greater risk to the rule-based international system, and the American pivot will be towards Russia and Europe. Strengthening transatlantic ties is not possible without taking Turkey back from Russia. Turkey, NATO’s second-largest army and third most populous member, has a geostrategic significance due to its proximity to Russia and the Middle East. It would help limit Russian expansion in several regions, including the MENA, Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Therefore, bringing back Turkey to the Western camp is important to contain the US adversaries in multiple regions since Turkey actively fought on the opposing side of Russia in those regions. Turkey actively has pursued increasingly military engagement abroad; it has launched four major military operations in Syria, deployed military troops in Qatar and Somalia, introduced the Blue Homeland doctrine, and expanded its defence exports. Turkey’s indigenous unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) capabilities are an element of Turkey’s changing defence and security policies, as its drone capabilities are progressing rapidly. Israel was the main contractor supplying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to the Turkish military (Defense Industry Daily 2011). However, with the flotilla crisis in 2010, Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations collapsed, and Turkey has started to focus on developing its domestic drone program UCAV fleet known as the Bayraktar TB2. The Bayraktar TB2 has been operative since 2015 and became a valuable strategic asset in Turkey’s counterterrorism operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, Syria and Libya. In recent years, Turkey’s drone power gained attention internationally. The Bayraktar TB2 armed UAVs significantly contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory (Kınık and Çelik 2021), and Ukraine has been relying on Turkish-made drones to target Russian targets (Forrest and Malsin 2022), which implies the possibility that Turkey’s indigenous, but ambitious defence industry can be used to balance against Russia.
Turkey did not participate in the EU sanctions against Russia after Russia’s military incursion in 2014 due to economic reasons (Sputnik News 2015), and Turkish authorities declared that Turkey had no intention or plan to join/impose sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevüt Çavuşoğlu emphasizes the importance of keeping communication channels open and underlines that ‘we are the country that can establish a dialogue on both sides in order to end the war’ (Hurrriyet Daily News 2022). Turkish authorities are willing to continue cooperation with Russia due to trade and energy dependency and the national security interests in Syria. A successful balancing strategy between Russia and the West in Ukraine might give Erdoğan a win in the international arena that he desperately needs for the upcoming 2023 general election. Turkey has adopted a ‘strategic balancer’ position, and it is trying to balance its NATO alliance by cooperating with emerging non-Western partners in Eurasia, including Russia, Iran, and China (Flanagan et al. 2020, 47). While Turkey’s manoeuvre is perceived as a threat to the Western alliance, Turkey’s competition with Russia in various regions could also be an asset for NATO to balance against Russia in the long run.
Recently, Turkey has been signalling to block NATO’s expansion and inclusion of the two Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden, in the security alliance. Turkey’s concerns regarding accepting new members are based on these two countries’, especially Sweden’s, support for terror organizations, referring to the PKK. Turkey insists that both countries should amend their terror laws. Turkey’s threat to veto NATO’s enlargement is consistent with policy-making elites’ security-first rhetoric. Russian aggression and NATO’s enlargement agenda become an opportunity for Turkey to pressure the two to revise their law, stop harbouring terrorist groups, and pressure NATO allies to lift sanctions on Turkey’s defence industry. Turkey’s objection to the transatlantic alliance enlargement will likely dominate the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid. As the NATO members prioritize strengthening the alliance in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s security-driven discourse and possible veto for new members might lead to re-questioning Turkey’s faithful ally role.
Conclusion
Syrian civil war and regional instabilities as independent variables have been incorporated with unit-level intervening variables (Turkish decision-making elites’ threat perceptions, nationalism, societal cohesion, and AKP’s vulnerability to domestic instabilities) and eventually have shaped the Turkish foreign policy formulation and outcomes. The analysis of intervening variables helps to understand how Turkish policymakers extracted and mobilized state resources to respond to systemic pressure and identified threats in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. Both the internal and external factors have been influential in the country’s security-first policy and military activism, deteriorating relations with the US, and competitive-cooperation with Russia. Turkish policymakers have prioritized Turkey’s national security over its faithful ally status. The first delivery of S-400s and the US decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program were among the most significant ruptures in Turkish-American relations. Any expectation of achieving a mutually acceptable solution on S-400s and the YPG seems impossible anytime soon. Turkey still insists on keeping S-400s despite its expulsion from the F-35 program. The US decision to continue its support to the YPG will push Turkey to make new deals with Russia to get a second battery of S-400s. The development in Ukraine is a game-changer for Turkish-American and Turkish-Russian relations.
The visible shift in Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the recent decade cannot be interpreted as a shift in Turkey’s overall foreign policy orientation. The AKP-MHP policy-making elites aim to reposition Turkey in the changing geopolitical realities by adopting a balancing strategy to manage the country’s relations with the US and Russia while maintaining power at home. Turkey’s NATO membership is still the main axis of Turkish foreign policy. Russian challenge to the rule-based liberal international order is likely to end discussions regarding Turkey’s NATO membership at a time when the Western alliance cannot afford any friction among NATO members. The solidarity among NATO allies will be the most critical concern among the Western countries in the following years. Thus, despite Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism and acquisition of S-400s Biden administration is likely to avoid escalating tension with Turkey. Turkey’s geostrategic significance for NATO missions makes it an indispensable ally. Turkey hosts the Incirlik airbase and Kürecik radar base and controls the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Recently initiated Blue Homeland doctrine to demonstrate Turkey’s willingness to strengthen the country’s naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which can help balance against Russian revisionism. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is on a knife-edge relationship, so NATO plays and will continue to play a central role in Turkey’s national security strategy. Turkey’s isolation from NATO activities will force Turkey to find alternative security and defence alliances with other actors. It will likely continue to deepen its military ties with Russia by being part of the S-500 supply chain and purchasing Russian Su-34 or Su-57 fighter jets. At this point, Turkey still can be a member of NATO, but without having coordination in military activities, neither Turkey nor NATO members will have a strong commitment to supporting each other’s policies as a faithful ally in the form of a collective security alliance.