Their author agrees!
Bowne ’18 [Andrew; 2018; Major and Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army; Military Law Review, “Defending the New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against the Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147, lexis]
The lack of clarity for EDI authorities notwithstanding, efforts to build defense capacity in the Baltic States were bolstered by the overhaul of the security cooperation regime in the FY17 NDAA. In an attempt to simplify the quagmire that security cooperation authorities had become over the past fifteen years, Congress streamlined the dozens of various temporary and permanent sources of authority and codified them under one chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 125 Congress noted the increasingly more important role security cooperation plays in DoD operations, 126 and the below discussion of how EUCOM can leverage these new authorities to augment EDI demonstrates the potential utility such activities can have within NATO's deterrence strategy.
3. Defense Security Cooperation and the Baltic States
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Congress granted more authority to the DoD to engage in security cooperation with foreign militaries, a mission originally conducted by the DoS. Over that time, security cooperation became an integral part of the DoD's mission and is considered an important tool for executing its national security responsibilities. 127 The FY17 NDAA overhauled the previously unwieldy patchwork of authorities that made up the security cooperation regime and provides authority for the DoD to enhance interoperability and increase defense capability of friendly foreign militaries. As building partner capacity with newer NATO members is one of the five lines of effort under EDI, 128 these new authorities should be leveraged to the maximum extent possible by EUCOM in the Baltic States to ensure sufficient capability exists in that vulnerable region to deter Russia aggression. However, as discussed below, the source of funding for these authorities and whether they can be used in conjunction with EDI funds remains ambiguous.
a. Building Defense Capacity
Key among the changes is the replacement of 10 U.S.C. § 2282 on "Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces" with a new permanent authority that widens the scope of security cooperation the DoD can provide. 129 While the scope of Section 2282 was limited primarily to counterterrorism and stability operations, 130 broadens the scope of authorized foreign capacity building to include, among other purposes, training, and equipping for border security and operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation that is in the national interest of the United States. 131 Moreover, 10 U.S.C. § 333, Section 2282's replacement, will permit the DoD to provide lethal equipment on a global scale, which it was unable to do under Section 2282. 132 Finally, Section 333 allows the DoD to support the sustainment of previously provided equipment to foreign partners, whereas such sustainment was previously under the exclusive purview of the DoS through its Foreign Military Financing account. 133 This bureaucratic anachronism resulted in equipment at risk of disrepair, misuse, and inoperability by the foreign recipient. 134
Under the definitions section of the Security Cooperation chapter, security cooperation programs, such as those authorized by Section 333, include building and developing allied security capabilities for self-defense and building relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. 135 The DoD should utilize these new authorities to build capacity in the security forces of the Baltic States in a way that it was unable to do so under the previous law. However, because Section 333 did not become law until the final days of Fiscal Year 2017 when it replaces Section 2282, 136 the utility of this new authority was largely unknown in FY17 and remains little used due to the complexity of funding Section 333 activities. Section 333 provides the sole source of funding shall come out of amounts authorized and appropriated for such fiscal year for O&M, Defense-wide, and available for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 137 However, Section 1241 of the FY17 NDAA adds additional sources of funding for Fiscal Year 2017 relevant to the Baltic States, including O&M Defense-wide, available for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as specified in the funding table in Section 4301 of the FY17 NDAA, 138 as well as for the same line of items in the OCO O&M funding table in Section 4302. 139 The dual funding sources, O&M and OCO O&M, highlight the potential overlap between Section 333 capacity building, which are funded by O&M, and EDI capacity building, which is funded by OCO O&M. To avoid obligating funds from the wrong account, commanders must know whether the activity falls under EDI, and whether security cooperation funds can be used in addition to EDI or exclusively. Clarifying legislation can help resolve this confusion. 140
b. Operational Support to Foreign Forces
In addition to the replacement of Section 2282, the FY17 NDAA greatly expands the authority to provide support for conduct of operations to friendly foreign countries, replacing Section 1207 from the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, which was limited to providing support to African countries conducting counterterrorism activities. 141 Section 1245 of the FY17 NDAA, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 331, greatly expands the scope of the previous authority by eliminating geographic limitations. 142 This new authority provides funding of logistic support, supplies, and services to security forces in a friendly country, as well as small-scale construction projects to facilitate friendly country participation in U.S.-supported operations. 143
One provision that, if utilized by EUCOM, could meaningfully assist improving the defense capability in the Baltic States is the special procurement authority that allows the DoD to procure equipment "for the purpose of the loan of such equipment to the military forces of a friendly foreign country participating in a U.S.-supported coalition or combined operation." 144 This is "to enhance capabilities or to increase interoperability with [U.S. forces] and other coalition partners." 145 Because the intent of the authority is that the friendly country will reimburse the United States for the procurement, or the U.S. forces can to reuse the equipment, there is no limitation on the value of the procurement. 146
The DoD should utilize this authorization to procure an excess quantity of U.S.-used systems to ensure friendly forces use and train on the same equipment as U.S. forces. Use of equipment, coupled with training and exercises will increase familiarity and interoperability with U.S. forces and provide friendly foreign forces with confidence in operating weapon systems alongside the United States. A successful loan may influence the friendly force's procurement decisions, leading to more effective use of defense spending by the friendly force at no real cost to the United States, as the equipment is returned at the end of the loan period. However, it remains unclear as to what limitations on the type of procurement there are, if any. For example, the law is silent as to whether this section authorizes procurement for loaning weapon systems. 147 Nor does it provide the maximum duration of any loan. Nonetheless, the DoD should leverage the seemingly broad authority granted by Congress to procure equipment for the purpose of loaning such equipment to its allies to improve interoperability and bolster the defense capability of its allies in Eastern Europe.
c. Training and Exercises
Finally, perhaps the best way the DoD can maximize the operational readiness of its NATO partners is through extensive training and exercises. 148 Training of NATO members near Russia is essential to ensure those members, such as the Baltic States and Poland, can cope with hybrid warfare that may not trigger Article 5. 149 Moreover, frequent military exercises with U.S. forces can enhance those armed forces' capabilities. Wide-scale multinational exercises on NATO's eastern flank would also serve a dual purpose of reassuring allies and warning foes. 150 Recognizing the importance of multinational training and exercises, Congress sought to provide broader authority for commanders of combatant commands and service secretaries to authorize payment of certain expenses for friendly foreign countries resulting from participating in training and exercises with U.S. general forces. 151 This expands the previous authority, which was limited to payment of only incremental expenses to developing countries when authorized by the Secretary of Defense. This was only after a determination that "the participation by such country is necessary to the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the exercise and that those objectives cannot be achieved unless the United States provides the incremental expenses incurred by such country." 152 The new authority requires only the determination by the Secretary of Defense that support of the friendly foreign force is in the national security interest of the United States to do so, and expands the scope and type of payment for training and exercise expenses. 153 It allows a commander of a combatant command to authorize payment for expenses associated with training, exercises, deployment to such events, incremental expenses, and small-scale construction directly related to the effective accomplishment of such events, with the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. 154
Beyond the benefit of paying for expenses to attract participation by other countries, this authority also appears to permit foreign forces to develop new capacity by allowing for training to improve the capacity of foreign forces beyond minimal level necessary to achieve interoperability, safety, or familiarization with U.S. forces in preparing for combined military operations." 155 While the new law states that the primary purpose of the training and exercises is to train U.S. forces, 156 there is no limiting language, such as restricting the training of foreign forces to only safety and interoperability. Thus, so long as U.S. forces are receiving the benefit of the training and exercises, the participation by other friendly forces and use of this authority for funding is permitted. Granting the DoD this authority allows it to better program more robust exercises and training focused on capacity building of the Baltic States' forces.
Consistent with the intent of EDI and RAP, EUCOM should use this authority to the fullest extent practicable to integrate multinational forces, particularly in command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber defense, where interoperability is critical to defending against Russian aggression. 157 Moreover, this authority's provision for small-scale construction permits to building necessary infrastructure within Eastern Europe that would otherwise be challenging for approval. Provided the project does not represent a foreign assistance program, structures built in support of U.S. military personnel participating in overseas training and exercises need not be temporary structures. 158 The explicit limitation on such military construction is that no one project may exceed $ 750,000 in costs, 159 and the implicit limitation comes from the absence of any authority for the maintenance of such construction projects after the completion of the exercise. Nonetheless, this authority appears to permit the United States to fund and build in a friendly foreign country, and the beneficiary can then decide to keep and maintain the project for its own future use. The resulting infrastructure will provide training and exercise opportunities where there may have been none absent this authority.