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Leaving nuclear control with humans is disastrous – structural quirks of psychology makes deterrence impossible

King 19 King, Iain. Iain King CBE is Defence Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. "What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?" RealClearDefense, 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what_do_cognitive_biases_mean_for_deterrence_114182.html.

Humans make poor decisions—not just sometimes, but systematically—and new insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1] The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively? Abraham Wald and his study of aircraft armor (Slideshare) Wald researched where the bombers frequently suffered the most damage. After an extensive survey of the squadrons returning to base, Wald discovered most of the damage was to the wings and fuselage, whereas the engines and cockpits seemed to be hit much less. Initially, the War Department assumed the armour plating should protect the wings and fuselage, but Wald explained how they were completely wrong. Armour placement was needed where there was no damage since bombers hit there never returned home to be studied. On Wald’s advice, the armour plating was duly placed around the cockpit and engines. Wald demonstrated that the War Department was making a common mistake now known as survivorship bias.[2] By looking at a skewed sample—in this case, only those bombers surviving enemy fire—the War Department’s logic went awry. Survivorship bias is one of many deep-rooted and systematic flaws in the way humans process information. One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; in fact, however, we tend not to. We make bad decisions for many reasons. For one, thinking takes time and effort, and so we often go for heuristic short-cuts.[3] For another, like pack animals, we follow the herd.[4] Furthermore, we regularly misunderstand the world in systematic ways. We have deep-rooted attachments to what we already own, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them.[6] There are at least fifty of these proven quirks that warp our decision making.[7] One of these is confirmation bias, where we tend to underrate new information that challenges what we already believe. There is also optimism bias, which makes us overestimate our chances of getting away with something.[8] Next to these we have normalcy bias, where we refuse to plan for a disaster that has never occurred.[9] Then there is reactance, a phenomenon is which we do the opposite of what someone wants us to do just to defy a perceived constraint on our freedom of choice.[10] These biases can influence life in many ways, from who we marry to bad budgeting choices. But some of the most profound impacts are on deterrence. Promoted Content Mgid To understand the effect of these systematic mistakes on how we deter unwelcome behaviour, consider one of the oldest forms of deterrence, the threat of jail time to discourage theft. In a rationale calculation, a substantial prison sentence should be enough to deter almost anyone from stealing, but cognitive biases mean this is not necessarily so. Reactance spurs rebellious criminals to steal simply because stealing is outlawed. The normalcy effect makes the ruinous impact of a prison sentence just too hard to contemplate, so it does not factor properly in the criminal mind. Criminals who plan a clever theft and escape tune out ways they might be caught because of confirmation bias. Criminals who know successful thieves and none of the many others who are caught and locked up will suffer from survivorship bias if they calculate their own chances of getting away with crime. And some will suffer from and optimism bias if they just guess. So, every day punishments are in place that should deter every right-thinking individual in the world, but people still try their luck. Every prisoner is proof deterrence can and does fail. These biases affect us all—not just criminals—and they affect us much more than we realise. Almost all of us suffer from a bias blind spot: the proven tendency for people to recognise biases in others more readily than in themselves.[11] Thomas Schelling (EconLib) Proof that cognitive biases are real means several of the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory are wrong. Academics like Thomas Schelling, who led U.S. thinking on nuclear deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s and who was a contemporary of Abraham Wald, simply applied a standard hypothesis from economics at the time: that people knew how to behave in their own best interests.[12] People might make mistakes, went the theory, but they’d soon learn how to correct their behaviour because they would benefit from doing so. Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[13] Kremlinology, the study of key figures in the Soviet system and how they behave and interact, became a key part of the West’s approach to nuclear deterrence. People, not weapons, became the central focus of Western defence. The science of cognitive bias has advanced considerably since then. We now know people consistently behave in ways that go against their best interests in almost every field.[14] Indeed, in the last decade many governments have set up so-called nudge units, playing on these behavioural quirks to achieve policy goals, from increasing pension contributions to enforcing traffic laws.[15] In military matters, even though the stakes are usually much higher, cognitive errors are still rife. Indeed, history is packed with examples of wars that might have been deterred were it not for strong cognitive biases affecting decision makers. Consider Argentina in 1982, which might not have invaded the Falkland Islands if it had a less distorted view of the United Kingdom’s resolve and capacity to respond. Or consider France in 1870, where military groupthink tipped Napoleon III into a disastrous war with Prussia. And Europe in the summer of 1914 was a cauldron of cognitive biases, as countries—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain—made a succession of poor judgments about the deterrence posture of rivals, rivals who, in turn, provided misleading signals themselves, ultimately leading to a catastrophe that spread around the world.[16] Mgid Signals Of Lung Cancer Learn More→ According to one study, the weaker power initiates conflict in some 33% of observations, suggesting military might fails to deter as much as a third of the time.[17] Perhaps the attackers suffered from restraint bias—the tendency for people and groups to underestimate how easily they succumb to temptation? Perhaps groupthink infected the highest levels of combatants’ government and armed forces? Perhaps the parties to conflict missed important signals from an enemy because confirmation bias meant they were not looking for them? Whatever the reason, chances are cognitive biases were involved. These tragic examples of conventional wars contrast with a much better record in nuclear matters where deterrence has, so far, been entirely successful. Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, partly because cognitive bias has been almost entirely squeezed out of it. This suggests the calculus governing our nuclear deterrent, and the strategic weapons of those who may oppose us, is as protected from human shortcomings as it can be, thus keeping the world safe. We still need to watch for normalcy bias, though. No nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945, but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.

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