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Moral hazard causes human error and miscalc—LAWs are net better

Umbrello, et al, 20—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020), dml)

Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an unfounded fear that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to demolish current, human-involved warfare practices. Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future, it is reasonable to expect future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to reliably and accurately differentiate between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this could even occur in the near future (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be developed but surpass human performance capabilities (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an ethically superior way to humans in war, saying that: The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015). One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3 Second, the emotional and physical pressures that human combatants must endure during wartime have performance costs. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to perform optimally, and thus affects the accuracy of their shots (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are naturally unaffected by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to continually perform accurately and as expected. The ability for LAWs to engage in unwavering, precise combat also resolves some ethical issues that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under even the most physically—or to a human, emotionally—stressful conditions, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a more humane manner. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure). Already, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets far more accurately than any human counterpart can (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is far more accurate and thus ethical4 as a consequence of LAWs’ technological superiority. Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they never tire, but because they are impervious to the psychological shortcomings of humans. Though a contentious topic, several high-profile cognitive psychologists suggest that humans fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be irrational, to make unreasoned decisions toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is not the nature of a robot. As mentioned, LAWs do not have any particular affinity to or personal interests in surviving battle; they do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness against enemies of a certain culture; and they do not, outside of their goals, worry about winning the war and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their particular set of rules, their value-laden code that dictates how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner during combat.

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