Lewis ‘15
(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/the-case-for-regulating-fully-autonomous-weapons //40)
Opponents of FAWs invoke each of these critiques to argue in favor of an absolute, preemptive ban on FAWs.24 In their view, once nations have developed FAW technology, it will be difficult to get them to stop.25 The time to act is now, before the military utility of FAWs has been demonstrated and before other countries develop FAW technology in response. These arguments resonate with apocalyptic images, replete in pop culture, of killer robots run amok—think Terminator.26 Yet they also exaggerate the danger posed by FAWs and underappreciate regulation’s potential to respond to the threats that FAWs do pose.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATION, RATHER THAN PROHIBITION
This Comment begins from the proposition that the purpose of international humanitarian law is to minimize harm understood in terms of suffering—primarily to civilians, but also to combatants.27 Many have argued that public policy should be guided by consequentialist aims, given, among other things, the differences between individuals and states28 and the inevitability of trade-offs in policymaking.29 Gabriella Blum contends that the argument for consequentialism is particularly strong in the case of armed conflict, which “is about committing evils and choosing between evils.”30 Following Blum’s logic, this Part brackets the deontological critique of FAWs—understood as the view that the use of FAWs is wrong independently of its consequences—and focuses on the possibility of regulatory regimes that minimize suffering in practice. While the deontological critique of FAWs presents a serious challenge, it loses much of its force if the responsible use of FAWs can reduce harm.31
A consequentialist approach focused on minimizing harm also makes less compelling the objection that the use of FAWs reduces accountability. While the “autonomous” nature of FAWs appears to distance decision makers from the harms they inflict, commanders remain responsible for the initial use of FAWs. A commander must give the order to deploy a FAW and set parameters for its use—for example, by instructing that a FAW has X mission and must operate within Y area. In this sense, there is no such thing as a fully autonomous weapon. Any weapon will require human intervention at some point, if only to activate it. The commander is ultimately responsible for using a FAW within its programming and within legal limits. If humans must remain an integral part of the decision to take a life in order for a weapon to fulfill the condition of accountability, then FAWs satisfy this requirement.
I focus, therefore, on the question whether, as a legal matter, FAWs can be regulated in ways that minimize the suffering that they cause. This Comment argues that they can, for two reasons. First, FAWs are highly amenable to regulation. As quasi- but never fully autonomous systems, FAWs are ripe for a regulatory scheme that provides standards for permissible usage and holds commanders accountable. Second, given the potential military utility of FAWs, states are more likely to comply with regulations than with an absolute prohibition. This point matters because, even if the critics are correct that FAWs will always violate international law, they are wrong to think that prohibition will avert these harms.
A. FAWs May Be Used Lawfully
Whether FAWs can be deployed lawfully depends in part on whether they can be used in a manner that avoids civilian casualties. Given the pace of technological development, it is too early to say that a FAW could never make the contextual and difficult decisions that soldiers must make when distinguishing between combatants and civilians.32 As George R. Lucas, Jr. argues, the critical question is not whether FAWs can “be ethical,” but whether they can perform at the level of a human soldier.33 Human soldiers aren’t perfect.34 Indeed, robots may have a number of advantages over humans, including superior sensory and computational capabilities, a lack of such emotions as fear and anger, and the ability to monitor and report unethical behavior on the battlefield.35 A robot might also have access to greater information about the value of a target, and hence may be able to make a better determination on an issue like proportionality in the heat of the moment. Even if robots lack quintessentially human characteristics like empathy,36 they may nonetheless be able to respect the rules of combat.
Whatever we might think about the capabilities of FAWs as a general matter, in some circumstances the use of FAWs will be wholly unproblematic. Imagine a robotic submarine operating in an isolated undersea environment, far from any civilians.37 Here the risk of the submarine violating international humanitarian law is exceedingly low. This is a best-case scenario, but it illustrates a broader point: the efficacy and legitimacy of FAWs will depend on the circumstances. In this regard, FAWs are unlike some weapons that have been banned by the international community, like non-detectable fragments and blinding laser weapons, which cause unnecessary suffering no matter how they are used.38 In the future, FAWs may have the ability to patrol an urban area and seek out combatant targets; for now, perhaps they are best left to operate in isolated environments or in a purely defensive capacity. In either case, the need for clear guidelines is not an argument for an outright ban. Rather than prohibiting FAWs writ large, international law should recognize that in some circumstances, they may permissibly be used—bolstering the case for regulation.
Regulating FAWs would also help to resolve issues of compliance and accountability. International law sets out fairly broad standards: weapons must distinguish between civilians and combatants, they may not cause disproportionate collateral damage, and so on. Yet in any given case, there is ambiguity about what the relevant standard requires, and this ambiguity hinders effective compliance and accountability. For instance, a commander, in the heat of battle and with incomplete information, may not know whether a particular use complies with abstract concepts such as distinction or proportionality. Defining the bounds of permissible conduct more precisely via regulation can minimize these concerns.39
For this reason, various actors have recognized the need for guidance regarding FAWs. In 2009, the Department of Defense issued a directive on autonomous weapons, thereby taking a strong first step toward regulation. That directive primarily addresses mechanisms for approving the development of new weapons systems, though it does also consider both the levels of autonomy present in a given system and the purposes for which systems may be used.40 The directive also generally dictates that commanders using automated weapons should apply “appropriate care” in compliance with international and domestic law.41 An ideal regulatory scheme would develop beyond this Directive: it would be international in nature, would focus more heavily on use, and would provide greater specificity regarding how and when particular systems may be used. A complete regulatory scheme would also tackle other thorny issues, including research, testing, acquisition, development, and proliferation.42 In these early stages, the project of regulation ought to begin with the issue of permissible usage, given that it presents difficult—yet familiar—questions under international law.
B. States Are More Likely To Comply with Regulations
In the previous section, I suggested that not all FAWs present an unacceptable risk of civilian casualties, and, as such, that these weapons are not wholly impermissible. Yet, even if FAWs ought to be categorically rejected, it is not clear that a ban would actually be effective. Robotic weaponry in the form of unmanned drones has already begun to revolutionize the ways in which nations fight wars. At least one military analyst has suggested that fully autonomous weapons will represent the biggest advance in military technology since gunpowder.43 Other commentators have argued that it would be unrealistic to expect major world powers to ban FAWs altogether, especially if some states refused to sign on and continued to develop them.44 FAWs may have significant military utility, and in this respect, they are unlike many other weapons that the international community has banned.45 Even if a ban were successful, moreover, nations might interpret the terms of the ban narrowly to permit further development of FAWs46 or violate the prohibition in ways that escape detection.47 The better approach to ensure compliance overall would be to establish minimum limitations on FAW technology and specific rules governing use.
Two cases, landmines and cluster munitions, help to illustrate this point. The Ottawa Treaty formally banned landmines in 1997. However, several states, including the United States, China, Russia, and India, declined to sign the treaty, invoking military necessity.48 Nations that have refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty have generally complied with the more modest regulations of the Amended Protocol.49 In a similar pattern, several states, invoking claims of military necessity, have declined to sign the Oslo Convention of 2008, which banned cluster weapons.50 However, these nations have signaled that they would be willing to negotiate a set of regulations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.51 These cases suggest that nations are unlikely to accept a full ban on weapons that they frequently use. Among those states that are inclined to use FAWs, a more modest attempt to regulate these weapons may result in higher initial buy-in, as well as higher overall compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality.