Lewis ‘15
(John, JD from Yale, the San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, and the International Refugee Assistance Project, Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward. John has filed multiple cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, other federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, John has represented or co-counseled with governments and non-profit organizations in cases involving immigration, civil rights, health care, education, veterans’ affairs, and other issues., frmr executive editor on the Yale Law Journal and a member of the Supreme Court Clinic, “The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons,” pg online @ https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/the-case-for-regulating-fully-autonomous-weapons //40)
In response to this claim, opponents of regulation make a slippery-slope argument, stressing that once nations invest in FAW technology, it will be difficult to encourage compliance with even modest regulations.52 Alternatively, there is some evidence from the case of landmines that an absolute prohibition can establish a norm against a weapons system that buttresses other, more modest regulatory schemes.53 This may be true, but if FAWs turn out to revolutionize warfare, then states may continue to develop them regardless. Furthermore, the causality may work the other way—”soft law” norms, like nation-specific codes of conduct, can often ripen into “hard law” treaties.54 If a ban turns out to be necessary, then it may be easier to build on an existing set of regulations and norms rather than to create one from scratch. For these reasons, it is important to consider the components of an effective regulatory scheme.