Regulate solves comparatively better – accesses the benefits of LAWS AND maintains balance of power
John Williams 21, is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, UK. His research addresses ethical, regulatory, and security issues associated with new and emerging military technologies, “Effective, Deployable, Accountable: Pick Two’: Regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, E-International Relations, 8-12-2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/12/effective-deployable-accountable-pick-two-regulating-lethal-autonomous-weapons-system/)/maze
Secondly, I assume efforts to ban the development and deployment of LAWS will fail. Despite a large coalition of NGOs, academics, policymakers, scientists, and others (e.g. , , ) LAWS development is more likely than not. Amandeep Singh Gill (, 175), former Indian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament and former Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), stresses how:
The economic, political and security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies [AI] into security functions are simply too powerful to be rolled back. There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications – minimizing casualties and collateral damage …, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases – to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental wars caused by machine error.
Appeals to the inherent immorality of allowing computers to make life and death decisions about human beings, often framed in terms of human dignity (e.g. ; ; ), will fall in the face of ostensibly unstoppable forces across multiple sectors making incorporating AI into ever more aspect of our daily lives almost inevitable. From ‘surveillance capitalism’ () to LAWS, human beings are struggling to find ways to effectively halt, or even dramatically slow, AI’s march (e.g. ).
Effective
LAWS’ potential military effectiveness manifests at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Operating at ‘machine speed’ means potentially outpacing adversaries and acquiring crucial advantages, it enables far faster processing of huge quantities of data to generate new insights and spot opportunities, and it means concentrating military effect with greater pace and accuracy (e.g. ; ; ). Shifts, even temporary, in delicate strategic balances between rival powers may appear as unacceptable risks, meaning that for as long as adversaries are interested in and pursuing this technology, their peer-rivals will feel compelled to do so too (e.g. , 141-43). Altmann and Sauer (, 124) note, ‘operational speed will reign supreme’. The ‘security dilemma’ looms large, reinforcing amongst leading states the sense they dare not risk being left behind in the competition to research and develop LAWS (e.g. ; ). Morgan et al (, xvi) argue the US, for example, has no choice but to, ‘… stay at the forefront of military AI capability. … [N]ot to compete in an area where adversaries are developing dangerous capabilities is to cede the field. That would be unacceptable’. Things likely look the same in Moscow and Beijing. Add concerns about potential proliferation to non-state actors (e.g. ), and the security dilemma’s powerful logic appears inescapable.
Of course, other weapons technologies inspired similar proliferation, strategic destabilization, and conflict escalation concerns. Arms control – a key focus for current regulatory debate – has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, banned chemical and biological weapons, and prohibited blinding laser weapons before they were ever deployed (e.g. ). International regulation can alter the strategic calculus about what weapons do and do not appear effective and persuade actors to deny themselves the systems in the first place, or limit their acquisition and deployment, or give them up as part of a wider deal that offers a better route to strategic stability. LAWS present specific arms control challenges because they incorporate AI and robotics technologies offering many non-military opportunities and advantages that human societies will want to pursue, potentially bringing major benefits in addressing challenges in diverse fields. Key breakthroughs are at least as likely to come from civilian research and development projects as from principally military ones. That makes definitions, monitoring, and verification harder. That is not a reason not to try, of course, but it does mean effective LAWS may take many forms, incorporate inherently hard to restrict technologies, and offer possibly irresistible benefits in what the security dilemma presents as an inescapably competitive, militarized, and uncertain international environment (e.g. ; ; ; ; ).