Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Jurisdiction is with the UN---conventional weapons convention is normal means for a ban.

Dawes, 21 [James Dawes is a Professor of English at Macalester College, 12-20-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, The Conversation, "UN fails to agree on 'killer robot' ban as nations pour billions into autonomous weapons research", https://theconversation.com/un-fails-to-agree-on-killer-robot-ban-as-nations-pour-billions-into-autonomous-weapons-research-173616]/ISEE

Autonomous weapon systems – commonly known as killer robots – may have killed human beings for the first time ever last year, according to a recent United Nations Security Council report on the Libyan civil war. History could well identify this as the starting point of the next major arms race, one that has the potential to be humanity’s final one. The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons debated the question of banning autonomous weapons at its once-every-five-years review meeting in Geneva Dec. 13-17, 2021, but didn’t reach consensus on a ban. Established in 1983, the convention has been updated regularly to restrict some of the world’s cruelest conventional weapons, including land mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons. Autonomous weapon systems are robots with lethal weapons that can operate independently, selecting and attacking targets without a human weighing in on those decisions. Militaries around the world are investing heavily in autonomous weapons research and development. The U.S. alone budgeted US$18 billion for autonomous weapons between 2016 and 2020. Meanwhile, human rights and humanitarian organizations are racing to establish regulations and prohibitions on such weapons development. Without such checks, foreign policy experts warn that disruptive autonomous weapons technologies will dangerously destabilize current nuclear strategies, both because they could radically change perceptions of strategic dominance, increasing the risk of preemptive attacks, and because they could be combined with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons themselves. As a specialist in human rights with a focus on the weaponization of artificial intelligence, I find that autonomous weapons make the unsteady balances and fragmented safeguards of the nuclear world – for example, the U.S. president’s minimally constrained authority to launch a strike – more unsteady and more fragmented. Given the pace of research and development in autonomous weapons, the U.N. meeting might have been the last chance to head off an arms race.

UN action solves for the case – it establishes global norms, provides flexibility, and serves as a clearinghouse for information even without a formal treaty.

Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]

Fostering norm development in the CCW LAWS keep steadily gathering media attention around the globe.104 With mounting public pressure and increased scrutiny, there will be a strong incentive for CCW States Parties to produce tangible results for the 2021 Review Conference. The “aspects of the normative and operational framework” that are to be further developed over the course of 2021 could take a more concrete shape in three steps. First, consensus seems achievable on shared language that adopts the by now widely accepted functionalist view of weapon autonomy as well as a common understanding that some form of positive obligation and affirmation of the principle of human control over weapons systems is required.105 The CCW's guiding principle (b) already points this way in stating that “[h]uman responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines”.106 The Forum for Supporting the 2020 GGE on LAWS conducted in April 2020 as a webcast by the German Federal Foreign Office, with 320 registered participants representing sixty-three CCW States Parties, underlined the importance of further conceptualizing the human element. Controllability of weapons is arguably a proto-norm already,107 and a shared terminology – be it “meaningful human control” or some other formulation – could be found to stipulate in a general sense when humans and when machines are to be performing which function in the targeting cycle. The ICRC and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently presented a conceptual framework that can support this effort of operationalizing human control – that is, of clarifying the “who, what, when and how” of controlling weapons and limiting their autonomy.108 Second, since there is no one-size-fits-all standard of meaningful human control, the sharing of best practices and, more importantly, of case studies of specific weapons systems and operational scenarios could allow CCW States Parties to develop a deeper, shared conceptual grasp of the intricacies involved with implementing human control in design and use. The GGE is uniquely suited to facilitate these sorts of deep dives with analyses from multiple stakeholders and a sharing of legal, ethical and operational views. Smaller expert groups such as the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW) and the commission on the responsible use of technologies in the Franco-German Future Combat Air System are already beginning to organize their research toward that end. Third, a differentiated implementation scheme could be developed that conceives of human control as being exercised in a context-dependent way – that is, contingent on the weapons system, its mission environment, “target profiles”109 and additional factors such as mission duration.110 This human control scheme could prescribe minimum standards for controllability by design, for example regarding the ergonomics of human–machine interfaces, and determine “levels of human supervisory control”111 in use – that is, the tactics, techniques and procedures required to keep human control and responsibility intact during the system's operation. It currently seems unlikely that the CCW process, even if it were to complete these three steps, will end up yielding more than “soft law”, such as a consensual political declaration or a catalogue of best practices. In fact, a complete breakdown of the CCW process in Geneva is also within the realm of possibility. But even if the CCW turns out not to be the venue from which a legally binding regulation for weapon autonomy emerges, it has already served as an information hub and norm incubator for the last six years – and will continue to do. Especially considering the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on meeting schedules around the globe, it is currently too early to tell if other fora – and if so, which ones – can and should pick up the ball on regulation where the CCW leaves it in 2021, in order to further develop and codify the human control norm as binding international law.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.