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LAWs can contain the rise of terrorism but a ban increases casualties

Yoo 17 [Joh Yoo (A professor of Law at UC Berkeley), 2017, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, California Law Review, Vol 105: 444-448, https://29qish1lqx5q2k5d7b491joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Yoo-4.pdf] // st

Unmanned Predator and Reaper drones rove the skies above the Middle East and Africa. They hover over a target for days and launch Hellfire missiles on a moment’s notice. Robots on the battlefield below breach doors in house-to-house searches and explode improvised explosive devices common in wars with terrorists or resistance fighters. Future advances will bring armed sentry robots, autonomous armored vehicles, and automatic missile and artillery fire. On the sea, X-47 aerial drones take off and land on aircraft carriers while others already perform strike and reconnaissance missions. Soon, unmanned surface combat vessels may deploy close to shore, and others may track enemy submarines beneath the waves. Combat is not just moving toward the robotic; it is also becoming ethereal.1 During its 2008 Georgia incursion, Russia became the first nation to deploy cyberattacks on enemy command, control, and communication systems to augment a ground invasion.2 To delay the Iranian nuclear program, the United States and Israel allegedly deployed the Stuxnet virus to damage centrifuges engaged in uranium enrichment.3 China has stolen large databases of U.S. government personnel information in addition to penetrating the networks of U.S. defense contractors, airlines, and technology companies.4 Russia, meanwhile, has allegedly hacked into databases and email systems of the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, along with those of the Democratic National Committee and the campaign of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.5 These examples illustrate the dramatic advances in weapon technology over the last two decades, which observers sometimes refer to as the “revolution in military affairs.”6 The United States now fields thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both reconnaissance and armed attacks. Combined with stealth technology, these drones allow the United States and other nations to gather intelligence around the clock and launch immediate attacks in trouble spots around the world. In the future, the most advanced ground and sea-based armed forces will employ remote-controlled units, such as sentries, light armor, and littoral naval vessels. Advances in missile technology and precision targeting will allow the United States to field a conventional global-strike capability that can hit any target in the world within an hour. Some experts even anticipate autonomous weapons systems that militaries can program for action independent of direct human controllers. The revolution in military affairs may reduce the destruction of war. A nation will place fewer soldiers in harm’s way when remote-controlled combatants are available. Precision-guided weapons and clearer real-time intelligence will inflict less death and destruction on soldiers and military assets. With drones available, for example, nations will no longer need to resort to World War II or Vietnam-era bombing runs to destroy arms factories or oil installations. Precision-strike technology may also shorten war by targeting an opponent’s leadership and strategic vulnerabilities, as it did with the one hundred-hour Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the lightning-quick invasion of Iraq in 2003. Future technology could also reduce harm to civilians—one of the central principles of the laws of war—by tightly concentrating the use of force on military targets. Technology will contribute to changes in tactics that are already blurring our understanding of what constitutes “war.” While modern war has concentrated highly destructive forces on discrete battlefields, new technology may disperse less destructive forces across the globe. For one, technology has played a central role in the rise of nonstate actors. The September 11, 2001, attacks and the evolving sophistication of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) show that states no longer have a monopoly on international violence that can rise to the level of armed conflict. Nations have responded to unconventional attacks by nonstate actors with a mixture of armed force, economic sanctions, and criminal prosecution, leaving unclear where law enforcement ends and armed conflict begins. Technology allows nations to gain better intelligence on these groups and attack them without deploying large conventional forces. Moreover, high-tech surveillance and strike systems allow nations to identify enemy groups that hide among civilians, follow a decentralized command structure, and attack civilian targets as often as military targets. While technology has contributed to the effective reach of nonstate terrorist groups, it has also assisted nations in responding to them both domestically and abroad. Critics, however, worry that advances in weapons could increase conflict by making war easier to initiate. If a nation can simply press a button and destroy a target or cripple enemy infrastructure without risking its own personnel, it will choose a military response more often than it should. United Nations officials give voice to these growing worries. “The expansive use of armed drones by the first States to acquire them, if not challenged, can do structural damage to the cornerstones of international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the globe in the longer term,” declares Christof Heyns, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.7 States can use drones and other technology, such as cyberweapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection, and perhaps even responsibility. Ultimately, pinpoint strikes and cyberattacks will continue to blur any clear line between war and peace. Cyberwarfare further blurs this line. Internet attacks can cause real-world destruction and harm, or they can simply interfere with another nation’s communications, financial, or information networks. A cyberattack, for example, could cause a flood by disabling the control mechanisms for a dam or trigger an explosion by forcing a power plant to malfunction. As Russia demonstrated in its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, nations can also launch cyberattacks as part of an electronic warfare campaign to support a conventional armed attack.8 They can use cyberweapons in place of conventional weapons to commit sabotage, such as the Stuxnet virus. Or governments can use the Internet to steal significant military or intelligence information, such as weapons designs or strategic plans, which appears to be occurring with increasing frequency between the United States and China. “China is using its cyber capabilities to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs,” the U.S. Defense Department stated in a 2016 report to Congress.9 “The accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct cyber attacks.”10 The anonymity of cyberattacks may prevent open armed conflict because targeted nations will not know against whom to retaliate. Indeed, nations have been uncertain about their responses to robotic and cyberwarfare attacks. They sometimes treat them as a form of espionage or covert action, refusing to consider the resulting damage as an act of war. China’s theft of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management database did not prompt an official use of U.S. force, nor did North Korea’s hacking of Sony’s electronic files. Iran took no overt military response to the Stuxnet virus. American drones execute dozens of strikes in countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, without sparking any military reaction. And yet, use of these weapons in other contexts would likely start an armed conflict. Cyberattacks to disable military units or critical civilian networks, or to augment a broader military offensive, would surely constitute acts of war, as would the use of robots and drones to harm people or real property. Robotics and cyberweapons could also exert force that does not necessarily kill or destroy tangible objects, but fall somewhere in between the line between domestic crime and an act of war. Governments and scholars are not always clear about when such attacks meet the legal standards for an armed attack or something less. For example, the new United States Law of War Manual, issued by the Department of Defense in 2015, declares that the existing laws of war should apply to what it calls “cyber operations.”11 But it then concedes that the rules here are “not well-settled” and are “likely to continue to develop.”12 The United States even takes the position that it may not have a position, as the manual declares that it does not “preclude the [Defense] Department from subsequently changing its interpretation of the law.”13 This Essay argues that efforts to constrain new military technologies with ex ante per se rules, rather than ex post reasonable regulation, are not only doomed, but dangerous. History is littered with proposals to stop advances in weapons. Medieval leaders tried to ban crossbows, early artillery, and firearms because they violated chivalry and honor.14 During World War I, nations argued over whether international law prohibited airplanes from bombing targets or submarines from sinking ships without warning.15 But by the end of World War II, the United States used atomic bombs to end the war against Japan.16 International agreements, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, failed to stop the Axis. History tells us that restraint arrives through deterrence, not law or morality. In World War II, the Allies and Axis stockpiled ample arsenals of chemical weapons, but did not use them for fear of retaliation.17 During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction ultimately led both superpowers to agree to limits on, and then reductions of, nuclear weapons. International law, rightly understood, does not prohibit the use of these new weapons. The United States will not stop China from stealing its government personnel databases by appealing to common values, but by deploying equally effective offensive and defensive cyber weapons. Europeans will not force the United States to limit its drone campaign against terrorist leaders through legal arguments, but they could pressure Washington by refusing to cooperate with intelligence sharing and joint operations. In fact, limiting, and especially prohibiting, the use of robotic and cyber weapons could have perverse effects on the very goals of international law. If nations cannot employ new, more precise weapons, they will have to resort to traditional conventional warfare, using human soldiers and pilots in larger numbers with more destructive weapons. In addition to causing greater destruction, limits on new weapons will discourage nations from using force when the international system needs it most: to stop terrorism, human rights disasters, nuclear proliferation, and aggression. Perversely, banning new weapons out of a vague desire to make war harder to start will make war more destructive and harmful to the innocent—the very antithesis of the laws of war.

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