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The aff opens up the gateway for the military to conduct exacerbated surveillance that disproportionately affects people of color through the lens of white technomasculinity.

Philip Olson and Christine Labuski, 8-7-2018, "‘There’s always a [white] man in the loop’: The gendered and racialized politics of civilian drones," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306312718792619

As corporations and civilian actors grasp the economic potential for UAS, drones are becoming an increasingly common sight in US civilian airspace. Non-military UAS have existed for decades, consisting mainly of remote control (RC) aircraft used by amateur pilots and hobbyists, but the past decade has seen UAS pressed into service for a wider range of purposes, including agriculture, search and rescue, cinematography and remote sensing (The Economist, 2017). And while military-domestic transfers of technology are common, advancements in civilian drone technologies also benefit the military by offloading research and development to the private sector (Boucher, 2015). Widely perceived as ‘exceptional [military] tools’, drones ‘are fast becoming everyday tools’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505), and UAS are often deployed in similar ways across both military and domestic contexts. Targeted surveillance is among the most conspicuous of shared applications. UAS visualizing capacities developed alongside the use of other technologies for surveillance, including ‘security’ cameras, cell phones, laptop computers, body and dashboard cameras, global positioning systems (GPS) and geographic information systems (GIS). The near-ubiquity of surveillance devices has led to what some scholars refer to as an age of omniveillance, in which ‘everyone will soon be watched, targeted, and tracked’ (Shaw et al., 2012: 1505) and where it is ‘unreasonable to expect to not be recorded at all’ (Tran, 2015: 195). Though often referred to in ordinary and distributive terms (Bell, 2009; Koskela, 2012), these surveillance technologies index a ‘scopic regime’ (Gregory, 2011: 190) through which social hierarchies of race, gender and geopolitical location are enacted and enforced in intrusive and often violent ways. AbuLaban (2015) refers to this regime, including its ability to render a growing number of people ‘targetable’, as a ‘key organizational practice of late modernity’ (p. 46). We identify two broad groups in our study: established and emerging users. In comparison with emerging users, who exhibit a range of interest in and understanding of the roles that UAS will play in their lives, established users possess more of the technical knowledge, skills and control through which UAS have thus far been interpreted. A key distinction between our two user groups is demographic: established users are almost exclusively white and male/masculine, while emerging users are more diversely identified (Mellström, 2004; Wajcman, 1991). Given that established users have been tasked with advising the FAA on civilian UAS regulation, it is important to consider not only who might soon be sharing the sky with law enforcement, farmers and hobbyists, but also how drone technologies are discursively constructed across these populations. In this study, established users aligned – though not to a person – with the focus groups that contained the highest percentages of men: TEST, SCI and USER. And though we are keenly aware of gender’s arbitrary and plural nature (Connell, 1998), the men from these groups enacted a strikingly consistent hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschimdt, 2005), one that valued and elevated technological expertise, even as it left unmarked the stratified social origins of this technoscientific knowledge (Cockburn, 1985). In this essay, we interpret the discourse of these white technomasculine experts as a form of prototypical white technomasculinity. Our data also suggest that military-civilian continuities persist for established users and that this group sees the challenges to greater civilian uptake of UAS as technical and individual rather than collective and justice-oriented. Sclove (1995) refers to focal and non-focal features of technological systems, but our analysis of race, gender and drones reveals that we can also distinguish between focal and non-focal people, or groups of people – that is, between the perspectives of those who control the development of civilian UAS and those whose lives are more likely to be disrupted or menaced by these systems. Surveillance remains central to how UAS are imagined and we further argue that via prototypical white technomasculinity – a subject position interpreted as original, standard and in no need of justification (Gordon, 2006: 242) – surveillance can be perceived as unproblematic and even ‘cool’. This perspective differs sharply from how surveillance technologies are experienced and described by so-called minority groups in the US and elsewhere, including people of color (of all genders), women (of all racial groups), and queer and other nonconforming people (e.g. Abu-Laban, 2015; Browne, 2015; Tran, 2015). We employ the term ‘so-called’ here in order to underscore that though white technomasculine people often understand their discourse to reflect a neutral or majoritarian stance, it is more accurate to describe them as a particular minority interest group. Browne suggests that the experiences of black women in particular, whose lives are routinely subjected to what she calls ‘a scrutinizing surveillance’ (Browne, 2015: 156), can be instructive for interrogating the racialized and gendered dimensions of security and surveillance. It is our worry that racialized and gender minorities in the US will bear a disproportionate burden of what Koskela (2012) calls ‘the fruits of surveillant labor’ (p. 53). Related, we are concerned that uncritical and/or under-informed perspectives on UAS will mask the role of discriminatory attitudes and affects in shaping how these technologies are deployed. Prototypical white technomasculinity camouflages digitized data as both neutral and precise, despite the fact that even cursory assessments of such data reveal that algorithms rely upon developers’ perceptions of normality and difference (Magnet, 2011; Wilcox, 2017). Gender and race are ‘intertwine[d] with practices of intense information gathering’ and ‘[d]isciplinary power and control’ (Koskela, 2012: 50) and, in military contexts, analysts have argued that drone surveillance and signature strikes are often ‘little more than a form of high-tech racial profiling’ (Wall, 2016: 1123). In sum, though there might be consensus regarding military drones’ capacity to carry out ‘lethal surveillance’, there is disagreement among differently ‘targetable’ populations regarding the dangerous nature of civilian UAS. Following Browne (2015: 116–121), we advocate for the cultivation of a critical technological consciousness in relation to civilian UAS. Such a consciousness would apprehend the particularity of the white technomasculine perspective – evinced here by our focus groups – through which UAS are constructed, and would advocate for ‘informed public debate … accountability by the state and the private sector’, and an acknowledgement of the ‘connections between contemporary … [UAS] technologies and their historical antecedents’ (p. 116). Absent such a consciousness, the public uptake of commercial drones will likely rehearse the social hierarchies by which they were generated and that perpetuate unmarked white technomasculinity. To highlight the constructed specificity of this subject position, we use transcript data from the white technomasculine actors in our focus groups to demonstrate that UAS can scarcely be discussed – by these actors and those they influence – without masculine pronouns and imagined scenarios involving exclusively male actors. We refer to this discourse as a white technomasculine imaginary, given the disproportionate role these actors play in designing, employing and now regulating these and other technologies. Such an imaginary may constrain the abilities of emerging users to identify and develop alternative uses, questions and ethical norms related to civilian drones. Highlighting the specificity of white technomasculinity helps us to see that masculinities are not only constructed and plural, but also contingent upon the mutable social arrangements through which they are upheld (Cockburn, 1985; Connell, 1998; Salter, 2014). Civilian UAS technologies may facilitate new ways of living race and gender in an omniveillant world; we note focus group moments where anxiety and vulnerability inhere in white technomasculinity. Here we join Daggett (2015) in asking whether civilian drones, despite their militaristic and imperial origins, can subvert or even queer social relations. Though not currently marketed as tools with which emerging users can engage in sousveillant acts – ‘taking back the night’ or ‘shooting back’ (Beirne et al., 1997), for example – our focus groups suggest that drones have the capacity to produce ontological insecurity in white technomasculine actors who may newly perceive themselves as ‘targetable’.

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