Artificial intelligence perpetuates racial biases by paining people of color as expendable “human shields.” Search engines, algorithms, and networks have biases engrained within them which makes them predisposed to relegating entire communities as objects that can be disposed of.
Wilcox 22 Lauren Wilcox, 2-20-2022, "Becoming shield, unbecoming human," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-022-00141-5
The “human shield” is a civilian “whose status as a civilian is simultaneously assumed only to be disavowed” (Perugini & Gordon, 2017, p. 3) and said disavowal does not turn them into a combatant, but a liminal figure on the threshold between civilian and combatant. The war crime of using “human shields” becomes then a claim that these “human shields” are actually an attack, not on the so-called human shields but on those who are using violence against such persons. It is part of a calculative logic of making citizens responsible for their own deaths, instead of the military bearing responsibility to prevent civilian deaths, and it plays precisely on the question of how ‘the human shield’ is produced as an object of knowledge. Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini take readers on a far-reaching tour of historical and contemporary instances of human shielding, both voluntary and involuntary in Human Shields: A History of People in the Line of Fire (2020) with powerful story-telling that underpins disturbing truths about how violence becomes legitimated. The paradoxes of the figure of the “human shield” lie at the heart of the work, and Gordon and Perugini use this figure as a means to pry open international humanitarian law’s inconsistencies in regard to who counts as “the human”. Of critical importance is their insistence that “the seemingly neutral term human in the phrase human shield denotes not merely an ostensibly universal biological condition but also a political one” (p. 5). Gordon and Perugini’s wide-ranging series of vignettes on different aspects of how human shields have been deployed and/or invoked, and to what effect, provides a compelling read in which the abstract question of “who counts as human” comes to life with great complexity. Yet, the underlying argument speaks to deep injustices at the core of frameworks for thinking about the ethics of violence. “Human shielding” and the discourse around the legal and ethical implications of this category “illustrates how racial, class, religions, sexuality, and gender orders help shape our understanding of the human and thus the ethics of violence and how legal frameworks, particularly the laws of war reflect, reinforce, and even produces these orders and their ethical valence” (p. 6). As Gordon and Perugini argue, because the figure of the human shield elides the two main classifications of humans—combatants and noncombatants—this figure “destabilizes the order regulating the use of lethal violence in war” (2020, p. 7). Throughout the history of the use of such human shields from the American Civil War onward whether or not being a “human shield” protected one from the violence of war or did not reflects and reproduces racialized, gendered, and class about how life is valued by the opposing force. The claim that persons were “human shields” when used to justify treating such persons outside of the protections granted to civilians (inadequate as these maybe) makes humans into weapons of war who are positioned as defensive weapons to block or divert attacks: humans that are objects, obstructions. There is a paradox evident in this kind of use of “lawfare” as Gordon and Perugini show in many compelling examples: the deaths of civilians who are said to be “human shields” positions responsibility for the deaths of such persons in their own hands, not those who attacked them. While Gordon and Perugini note the paradox of the human shield being a civilian-who-is-not-a-civilian, another paradox might be said to exist in the coexistence of the “human” and the “shield”, that is, a human whose becomes less human, (that is to say, less worthy of humane treatment) when their bodies are considered weapons. As such, thorny questions of the ethics and politics of ‘human shielding’ revolve around the weaponization of the body. The weaponization of the body has most often been considered in terms of forms of military discipline, dehumanization, and even mechanization of the soldier’s body within the military apparatus (as Bourke, 1999 discusses for example). Paul Kirby has recently explored some of the uncanny and uncomfortable ways in which the soldier’s body and particularly, the body part of the penis figures in discussions of wartime sexual violence and the idiom “rape as a weapon of war” (Kirby, 2020). While IR traditionally considers weapons to be instrumental and as human artifacts, and recent critical scholarship has sought to examine how “objects, ideologies, practices, bodies, and affects get drawn into specific assemblages of violent intentionality” (Bousquet et al., 2017, p. 1). Benjamin Meiches has recently argued, “weapons operate as bodies that incite, prompt, and undermine human agency in ways that are largely unaccounted for by traditional security studies literature” (Meiches, 2017, 10). Referring to hunger strikers/death fasters struggling against the Turkish state, Banu Bargu has articulated this form of the “weaponization of life” as a form of necropolitical resistance to one’s construction as “bare life” (2014, 81). Here, it is not the “body” per se that is weaponized, but the body as a conduit through which the weaponization of life works as a political tactic (Bargu, 2014, p. 16). What particularly interests me about Gordon and Perugini’s work here is embodied persons made into weapons: the “becoming-weapon” of “human shields” especially when this is a designation given to certain persons. While Gordon and Perugini focus on instances that are or might be interpreted as involving human shields from a wide variety of examples (including environmental struggles), their primary concern is how human shielding is considered in the laws of war, including in appeals made to the laws of war. I wonder, however, if in thinking about the ways in which certain persons, certain bodies are made into weapons, or treated as such, we might locate these varied histories of human shielding into an even broader and longer standing set of concerns about the human, weapons, and war that extend even beyond the temporal and spatial limits of “war” as it is treated in the laws of war. To this end, Gordon and Perugini’s work on “proximity” and “proximate” human shields (pp. 159–169) was one of the most intriguing discussions. “Proximate” human shields are those who are categorized this way only due to their proximity to fighting, as in civilians located in and around Mosul, Iraq, when it was held by ISIS in 2016, rather than having been coerced into an area near a military target or intentionally choosing to put themselves between military force and a target. As Gordon and Perugini note, “Since practically any person trapped in a war zone can be cast as a proximate shield rather than as an innocent bystander without the accuser having to demonstrate anything about the action of that person of the belligerents, it becomes relatively simple to frame hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields. This act of framing convers entire urban populations trapped in a war zone into killable subjects” (2020, p. 164). Importantly, the civilian population was not depicted as human shields when the Iraqi army, assisted by the US and its coalition: “proximate human shields are the weapon of the state par excellence” (p. 165). Such “proximate” human shields are only framed as such by major media outlets when they are in supposedly decolonized parts of the world. As such, Gordon and Perugini put their respective fingers on the core of the issue when they write, after noting that human shielding was codified in international law when the laws of war became applicable to conflicts in (former) colonies, “[p]recisely when increasing numbers of nonwhites were finally recognized as fully human, they also become potential human shields, and when they are either used or framed as human shields, they lose some of the legal protections they gained following decolonization” (p. 169). This question of “proximate human shields,” as becoming less human as they “become shield” and thus “become weapon” through proximity and military/legal parlance is a form of objectification that recalls Frantz Fanon’s famous declaration “All I wanted was to be a man among other men” (Fanon 1967 [1952] p. 112) and its rejoinder “and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.” (p. 109). Making of persons into objects was and is legal, political, cultural, and epistemic strategy of colonialism to enable extraction. The native is one of many such things that need classification, management, containment. Such “body-objects,” as Mbembe elaborates in expanding upon Fanon’s work, is a matter of a “spectral and phantasmatic object, at the limit of desire and of terror….” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 133). The spatial designation of bodies is a core component of colonialism: “Colonizing broadly consisted in a permanent work of separation: on one side, my living body; on the other, all those ‘body-things’ surrounding it” (Mbembe, 2019 p. 46). In the work of designating which persons are “civilians” and which persons are “human shields,” there also seems to be some congruity with Denise Ferreira da Silva’s “transparency thesis,” which attempts to comprehend the role the “racial” plays in modern thought and its ties to the emergence of “the global” in the “first encounter” of Europe’s conquest of the Americas (2007). For Ferreira da Silva, this project produces the human body as the exteriorization of the mind and establishes the distinction between the “transparent I” of Europe post-Enlightenment and the “affectable other” institutes race as the signifier of those persons who are subject to universal reason, although not capable of grasping it. Ferreira da Silva locates this subaltern racial subject as being constituted temporally and ontologically before principles of universality upon which the laws of war are constructed. The designation of racial difference carries with it suggestion of threat, raising fears of insecurity, contagion, consumption, annihilation: it carries with it an inversion of the relations of violence in which, the recipients of violence are coded as having caused such violence. The racialized body is coded as a justifiable site pre-emptive violence as it is coded as always about to commit violence. Christina Sharpe captures that this inversion of how violence is framed: “We see in many visual and other representations in public life, certainly in the US…Black people ejected from the state become the national symbols for the less-than-human being condemned to death; become the carriers of terror, terror’s embodiment (an internal, the internal terroristic threat) and not the primary objects of terror’s multiple enactments but the ground of terror’s possibility.” (Sharpe, 2016, p. 79). The racialization of such weaponized bodies is not limited to prior racial categorization either: David Theo Goldberg, for example, describes as “racially indexed” the “prevailing proxy articulation” of migration, terrorism, contagious disease, and the threat of invasion implicit in each as racialized (2009, p. 359), and certainly other articulation of racialized threat and invasion can be cited and articulated. As Helen Kinsella points out, the commentary on additional protocol I suggests that civilians and combatants are to be differentiated “principally by visual means,” and that “visuality is not a neutral observation, but an embodied, racialized, and gendered practice that does not merely detect, but actively produces what is to be seen and how it is to be understood” (2016). Fanon’s description of epidermalization as means of estrangement from fully human being by colonial power has been supplemented by a range of digital technologies, vast, and complex surveillance and intelligence gathering systems involving facial recognition, digital databases, algorithmic analysis, AI detection of gunshots and more that are used by military and policing bodies alike to predict and track both known individuals and patterns of movement in order to identify potential threats to the order. Work by Timnit Gebru, Joy Buolamwini, Safia Noble, Ruha Benjamin, and others has drawn attention to how contemporary AI technologies like search engine algorithms, facial recognition technologies, and more are built upon, and reproduce, gender, and racial differences, often leading to the perpetuation of racial oppression. Ruha Benjamin refers to as “the New Jim Code” in terms of the use of new technologies that reproduce and even exacerbate existing power hierarchies, especially those of race, while appearing to be racially neutral (2019). This suggests that the “visual” means of identifying and producing human shields as objects of knowledge and either protection or vulnerability is not longer, if it ever was, dependent on the visual alone, but rather a broad array of technologies of visualizing, sensing, and data gathering and analysis, much of it indebted to prior “codes” of interpretation. The; in the context of the war spread of surveillance and targeting technologies suggest that the question of “who counts as human” in terms of how violence is regulated on terror, the US and NATO have shifted to “militants,” “insurgents,” “unlawful combatants,” and particularly in terms of the use of drone strikes, “military-aged males”: all whom make up the “ungrievable” and killable bodies. Rather than “civilians,” Christiane Wilke documents, for example, how the term “uninvolved” was used to refer to a much narrower range of perceived “innocence” following the September 2009 Kunduz air strike which killed up to 113 civilians (2017). In a similar vein, I’ve elsewhere written about how the use of various forms of digital surveillance and visual evidence was not enough to override the “racial schema” (including the labeling of certain activity as that of a “human shield”) that affected the decision to bomb an Afghan convoy on the basis of a perceived “imminent threat” (Wilcox, 2017). It is also certainly worth thinking about to what extent, given the racialization of how the figure of “human shields” has come to be treated, and the ongoing coloniality of many of the conflicts involving the use of, and framing battles over, the use of human shield (especially in relation to Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands) whether further consideration beyond the legal, temporal, and spatial limitations of the laws of war might push this work even further. The killing of teenager Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman who invoked “stand your ground” laws to enable his acquittal although Martin was only carrying a package of candy skittles, or police officer Derek Chauvin’s attempted defense of killing George Floyd—that Floyd was suffering from “excitable delirium” (a term with no medical definition meant to cast him as possessing superhuman strength) certainly resonate with ongoing legacies of racialized bodies as “always already” weapons. That is, absent almost uniquely compelling video evidence to the contrary (and in many cases despite such evidence) such racialized bodies are accepted as threats and therefore justifiably killed. Neither of these two, nor any of the thousands of other similarly killed were labeled “human shields” but both are examples of, Judith Butler’s words on the subject, “those who exemplify the form of human life worth saving and those who in their person and their cultural or racial status come to represent a living threat to a form of human life worth saving” (Butler, 2015 p. 233). Gordon and Perugini have powerfully, skilfully, and with great detail, shown how this division is reproduced in international law and practice; by tracing this through-line, they have brought to the fore the intricate workings of how “humans” can be made less so, and “shields” can be made to do the opposite of protecting.