Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Allied cyperwarfare enables rapid crisis response and the use of OCO’s in warfighting

Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14703]

In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.61 Multiple backdoor entry points are preferable given that America cannot be absolutely certain of what vulnerabilities the target system will contain62 despite extensive pre-launch cyber attack testing63 and customization.64 A successful cyber attack needs a minimum of one undetected vulnerability to gain access to the target system. Each successive zero-day that works adds to the strength and sophistication of a cyber assault.65 As one vulnerability is patched, America can still rely on the other undetected vulnerabilities to continue its cyber strike. Incorporating multiple undetected vulnerabilities into a cyber attack reduces the need to create new cyber attacks after each zero-day fails. Stuxnet, a joint US-Israel operation, was a cyber attack designed to disrupt Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program.66 The attack was designed to alter the code of Natanz’s computers and industrial control systems to induce “chronic fatigue,” rather than destruction, of the nuclear centrifuges.67 The precision of Stuxnet ensured that all other control systems were ignored except for those regulating the centrifuges.68 What is notable about Stuxnet is its use of four zero-day exploits (of which one was allegedly purchased)69 in the attack.70 That is, to target one system, Stuxnet entered through four different backdoors. A target state aware of a specific vulnerability in its system will enact a patch upon detection and likely assume that the problem is fixed. Exploiting multiple vulnerabilities creates variations in how the attack is executed given that different backdoors alter how the attack enters the target system.71 One patch does not stop the cyber attack. The use of multiple zero-days thus capitalizes on a state’s limited awareness of the vulnerabilities in its system. Each phase of Stuxnet was different from its previous phase which created confusion among the Iranians. Launched in 2009, Stuxnet was not discovered by the Iranians until 2010.72 Yet even upon the initial discovery of the attack, who the attacker was remained unclear. The failures in the Natanz centrifuges were first attributed to insider error73 and later to China74 before finally discovering the true culprits.75 The use of multiple undetected vulnerabilities helped to obscure the US and Israel as the actual attackers.76 The Stuxnet case helps illustrate the efficacy of zero-day attacks as a means of attaining political goals. Although Stuxnet did not produce immediate results in terminating Iran’s nuclear program, it helped buy time for the Americans to consider other options against Iran. A nuclear Iran would not only threaten American security but possibly open a third conflict for America77 in the Middle East given Israel’s proclivity to strike a nuclear Iran first. Stuxnet allowed the United States to delay Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to kinetic action.78

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.