US-NATO cyberwarfare must be defined by resilience---interoperability and cyberwarfighting are crucial
Moens ’15 [Alexander, Seychelle Cushing, and Alan Dowd; March; professor of political science at Simon Fraser University and a Senior Fellow in Canadian-American Relations at the Fraser Institute; M.A. with Distinction from the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in 2014; Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow and Senior Editor with the Fraser Institute; “Cybersecurity Challenges for Canada and the United States,” https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/cybersecurity-challenges-for-canada-and-the-united-states.pdf]
The absence of formal international agreements on cybersecurity does not mean there are no rules or boundaries in practice. The rule of consequences and of self-interest is in play, as is the logic of cost-benefit in escalation. For example, using cyberspace to inflict fatalities on foreign citizens or physical damage to key economic assets is not something APTs would consider lightly. Experts debate whether such extensive attacks are even possible given current capabilities (Rid, 2013; Libicki, 2009; Samaan, 2010; Clarke and Knake, 2010). To illustrate: it may be possible to interfere with the operation of a large dam via cyberspace from abroad, but destroying the concrete structure and drowning a city down river is quite another matter. To be sure, President Barack Obama is on record warning hostile players that cyberattacks are not isolated from the rest of defence policy and national security. In 2011, he used the loaded term “all necessary means” to describe the possible American reaction should the nature of the attack so warrant (U.S. White House, 2011: 14). Interestingly, Russian military officials have argued that “the use of information warfare against Russia or its armed forces will categorically not be considered a non-military phase of a conflict, whether there were casualties or not” (Hildreth, 2001: 11). If deterrence is what kept the peace during the Cold War and the Nuclear Age, resilience may be the governing principle of the Digital Age. Deterrence, after all, works best when your adversaries have a clear idea of what you can and will do if attacked (Betts, 2013). Yet, in cyberwarfare, secrecy is paramount in maintaining a competitive edge. Defining what weapons you will retaliate with when attacked invariably reveals part of your capabilities. Having an effective deterrent in cyberspace is thus problematic. The apparent attack by the North Korean government under the name of “Guardians of Peace” against the Sony Corporation in late 2014 seems to have set off a US reaction. The wiper malware used against Sony wreaked havoc on the company and brought to a halt its imminent release of the satirical movie about Kim Jong-un called “The Interview”. A few days later, North Korea’s admittedly small Internet went dark for a period of time. Possibly, Obama made good on his threat that North Korea’s “cyber vandalism” would be met with “a proportional response” (Perlroth and Sanger, 2014, December 22). In short, the operational concept best suited for cybersecurity per se is resilience. Resilience is quite different from deterrence, since resilience presupposes weathering an attack, while the aim of deterrence is to prevent an attack through the avowal of overwhelming retaliation. Moreover, given that the nature of cyberattacks is still evolving and that attackers increasingly use third and fourth parties to channel their attacks, and thus create false leads for those trying to find the attacker (Geers, 2010), traditional notions of deterrence may not apply in cyberspace. A better defence is the ability to sustain one or more cyberattacks and to be able to counter and restore defensive capacity (Lindsay, 2013). How you recover and how you function when compromised becomes of utmost importance. This appears to be the path NATO has chosen. The alliance regularly conducts defensive war games, such as Baltic Cyber Shield and Locked Shields, in cyberspace. In 2013, NATO defence ministers agreed to establish Rapid Reaction Teams to provide better protection for NATO’s networks (NATO, 2014a). In 2014, the alliance declared cyberdefence “part of NATO’s core task of collective defence” and noted that cyberattacks could lead to invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s all-for-one collective defence commitment, which has been the foundation of Western deterrence since 1949 (NATO, 2014b: §72). Still, NATO’s 2011 policy on cybersecurity focuses on “prevention, resilience and defence of critical cyber assets to NATO and Allies” (NATO, 2011: 1).