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Cyber attacks escalate---miscalc and misperception, tit for tat retal, and grid collapse ensure it

Healey 22. Jason Healey is a senior research scholar and adjunct professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. He is also a senior fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, where he was the program's founding director; “PREPARING FOR INEVITABLE CYBER SURPRISE”; January 12, 2022; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/preparing-for-inevitable-cyber-surprise/ //BY

Surprise in cyberspace is more important than in other domains for four reasons. The dynamics of cyber conflict lend themselves to surprising uses across all five meanings of surprise. They rely on deception and trickery; enable the unexpected and unforeseen; are sudden and fast, audacious and daring; and are especially useful early in a conflict. There are also significant first-use pressures, as they may present five ways to increase the danger of a . Because cyber capabilities are not easily observable, it is extremely difficult to assess an adversary’s order of battle or relative strength, or to detect the equivalent of tanks massing on the border. Any particular attack might have an asymmetric impact, keeping defenders on perpetual and  .

There is also a nearly limitless realm of the possible. Cyber capabilities can bypass fielded military forces to affect a seemingly indefinite range of elements within an adversary’s society, economy, and psychology. The pace of innovation and dependence creates countless paths to attain technical surprise, as does the use of “.” Even more so than in other kinds of intelligence warning, “,” so defenders have less chance of assessing where a blow may fall.

Further, economies, societies, and militaries are increasingly interconnected and deeply cyber-dependent, so cyber capabilities offer an attacker more opportunities to believe that they can shift the correlation of forces in their favor. Some experts assert that “,” as past attacks have only disrupted computer components that can be replaced relatively quickly. Yet this misses the scope of potential future cyber operations.

With the “internet of things” and cyber physical systems, attacks can now impact electrical grids, pipelines, and dams, , thereby boosting the potential impact of and opportunities for surprise attacks. The  will result in operations and outcomes far outside the expectations of academic theories and government strategies which can still treat cyber-physical systems as an edge case.

Even hard targets aren’t as hard as they might seem. Too difficult to directly hack FireEye or the Department of Justice? The Russians got both, plus thousands more, by going after SolarWinds.

States are also not limited to the capabilities that they patiently build over time, as with more conventional forces. Iran has  its capabilities so that Leon Panetta, the then-Secretary of Defense, told New York Times reporter  the Department of Defense “was astounded that Iran could develop” sophisticated capabilities. Iran’s Gulf rivals, such as the United Arab Emirates, have  for a turn-key cyber command. States are more likely to deliver offensive surprises when their reach is not just limited by what they nurture, but also by what they can buy.

Lastly, there is high potential for mistake and miscalculation. The novelty of cyber attacks means that adversaries are more likely to misjudge how their operations will be perceived by the recipient. The attacker might believe that its attack is within the norms, justified because it is a tit-for-tat reprisal, or similar to a past operation that acted as a pressure release, defusing a crisis. A rival might shrug off being the target of a disruptive operation conducted in relative peacetime (“Ah, it’s just an intelligence contest,”) only to respond aggressively to a lesser attack in the midst of a crisis (“This could be the prelude to a surprise attack!”).

Cyber attacks are likely to flop (or worse, messily cascade) if they are not backed by meticulous intelligence, careful planning, and extensive testing — although these only reduce, rather than eliminate, the risks. Mistakes can take the target (and indeed, the attacker) by surprise, as happened with North Korea and Russia with WannaCry and NotPetya, respectively.

Surprise, Russia, and Ukraine

The Russian buildup in late 2021 for a possible invasion of Ukraine highlights the worrying role of cyber surprise in geopolitics. Just a year ago, the cybersecurity company Mandiant discovered an  that had been propagated through network management software made by SolarWinds. Imagine for a moment that this intrusion were still undiscovered — or that the Russians have a similar but as yet undiscovered campaign, perhaps built using the .

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