Consolidated OCO norms are key to democratic governance and the liberal international order
Liebetrau 22. Tobias Liebertrau is a Affiliated researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies; “Cyber conflict short of war: a European strategic vacuum”; February 4, 2022; Taylor and Francis; https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2031991 //BY
This article examined how three European NATO members – the Netherlands, France, and Norway – perceive and respond to continuous adversarial cyber operations short of war. The analysis demonstrated that the Dutch, French, and Norwegian decisions to develop offensive military cyber capabilities date 10–15 years back. In all three countries, the development of offensive cyber measures has been portrayed as a timely investment in necessary capabilities intended to deter and support military operations in armed conflict. The analysis also showed that the three countries – to different degrees and clarifications – have acknowledged that the adversarial nature of cyber operations short of war forms part of the current strategic reality. Yet, their cyber strategies and military doctrines continue to primarily centre on warfare and armed conflict.
Thus, the paper identifies a strategic vacuum as none of the three countries have formulated strategic frameworks that map onto the identified strategic reality. The recent publications of military cyber doctrines in France and the Netherlands provide initial strategic guidance for armed conflict, but it remains underspecified how the impact of continuous cyber conflict short of war affects the countries’ view on international political competition, their strategic positioning, and their military-intelligence relations. Questions concerning when, how, who and to what extent cyber countermeasures are deployed against hostile cyber operations short of war remain ambiguous and secretive. This lack of clarity, strategic guidance, and public debate puts societies at risk and undermines democratic governance.
The insistence on the importance of formulating strategy and publicly discussing how to deal with cyber conflict short of war does not deny that all three countries are already engaged in countering hostile cyber operations short of war in various ways. It is rather to argue that scholars should become more involved in research on European perspectives on cyber conflict short of war on the one hand, and European governments should strive to clarify the strategic consequences of continuous cyber conflict short of war, on the other. Both scholars and politicians need to engage with the security, political and democratic difficulties related to countering adversarial cyber hostilities short of war. This is not to say that European countries should blindly adopt the American strategy of persistent engagement and defending forward. They should, however, move beyond the current standstill and design strategic solutions to prevent, discourage, and respond to continuous cyber incidents short of war. In conclusion, the paper suggests three avenues for future scholarly and policy conversation on how European countries can accomplish this goal and fill this strategic vacuum. These suggestions are neither exhaustive, a panacea nor an argument for a one-size-fits-all European strategic approach. Based on the premise of a changing strategic environment in which cyber conflict short of war forms a fundamental part of strategic competition, they offer basic propositions for policy-makers and academics to engage.
First, European countries should define the problem to be solved, “as ambiguous terminology creates problems for distinguishing between different conceptions of strategy” (Hoffman , p. 133). They would benefit from operationalising cyber conflict short of war, unpack its core dynamics, and determine its strategic impact. At a macro-level, this includes elucidating whether cyber conflict short of war is an expression of fundamental strategic competition? Whether it taps into the intensified global technological competition, which includes control of internet infrastructure, power over international ICT supply chains and markets, global data flows, and innovation in emerging technologies? To what extent, if at all, cyber conflict short of war weakens the position of European countries in international politics?
At a meso-level, European countries should develop strategically guided frameworks for counter linked and coordinated cyber operations that accumulated over time do significant harm to European societies. In relation to this, European countries should clarify interagency competencies and processes to handle tensions between military and intelligence agencies. The analysis showed that inter-agency relations vary across countries: from a French separation model over a Dutch cooperation model to a Norwegian unity model. It furthermore demonstrated that challenges remain in developing operational and legal frameworks for the deployment of cyber capabilities at the intersection of the already indistinct and blurring categories of offence and defence, with consequences for escalation management and strategic stability (Buchanan ). Moreover, when formulating strategies European countries ought to consider the risk of exacerbating the tension between the stabilising effects of intelligence collection on international relations and the destabilising modes of its collection (Goie et al. ). At a micro-level, as part of developing such frameworks and interagency processes, European countries should consider establishing procedures for classifying and operationalising various forms of malicious cyber activity and formulating thresholds and trigger points. At all three levels, these are continuous efforts that are contingent on various factors counting developments in global politics, digital technologies, and strategic culture.
Second, national strategy building does not take place in a vacuum. European countries are involved in international cooperation engaging cyber conflict short of war in NATO, EU, and among the intelligence services. National strategy building should thus take place in conversation with allies and partners on how to strategise the involvement of military and intelligence entities in the increased cyber competition short of war. The significance of which was recently underlined by the 2021 NATO Brussels Summit Communique (, p. 10) stressing that “allies recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack”. The development of a new Strategic Concept for NATO – to be done in time for the Madrid summit in June 2022 – provides an excellent opportunity to formalise this conversation and increase NATO coordination on cyber strategy.
This broad conversation could focus on intelligence versus military norms and practices for cyberspace (see also Boeke and Broeders , Smeets , Jacobsen ). It might include discussions on establishing common and transparent vulnerability equities processes and decreasing the grey market trading by government agencies purchasing cyber weapon components (Christensen and Liebetrau , Perlroth ), working on creating a global governance framework for cyber weapons (Stevens ), and enhancing the protection of global supply chain integrity and the public core of the internet (Broeders ). Moving these discussions forward, European countries could boost norm-codification and progressive norm-making concerning cyber competition short of war with the shared goal of restoring confidence in a liberal rule-based order that can prove its relevance and avoid further poisoning of the global digital well.
Third, the present lack of transparent strategic approaches raises concerns about oversight and the democratic goal of fostering informed political and public debate. It is important to engage society in the deliberation on countering cyber conflict short of war, not least because citizens, private companies, and public authorities are often the victims of such cyber operations. Ensuring a continuous debate on the political and military framing of malign cyber operations and the opportunities to counter them is vital to democratic governance. The current situation thus demands greater transparency and debate about the deployment of cyber power – for all purposes including countering cyber hostilities short of war – across society from parliamentary scrutiny over oversight bodies to the media. The discussion on how to categorise, react, and respond to cyber hostilities short of war cannot entirely be left to military or intelligence authorities and experts. While the exact capabilities and tasks of intelligence and military cyber units are much likely to remain secret and classified, the increased acknowledgement of their existence needs to be supplemented with a targeted effort to increase transparency as well as public and political debate about their role in defence and foreign policy.