The best studies prove that effective OCO’s deter conflicts --- Alternatives risk quick escalation
Leuprecht et al. 19 – Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and Queen's University, and Matthew Flinders Fellow at the Flinders University of South Australia Christian Leuprecht, Joseph Szeman, David B. Skillicorn, “The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1590960
At a more strategic level, OCOs can be used to constrain or enhance the effects of other capabilities and strategies. Whether they can be used for deterrence, and whether the concept of deterrence is even meaningful under conditions of persistent attack, is a matter of controversy. OCOs have the advantage that costs incurred or damage caused to an adversary can be controlled so that it falls short of the generally accepted level of an armed attack, and can be even reversible (Owens et al., 2009). In his book about the Trump White House, Woodward (2018) comments that military advisers to the President were reluctant to recommend offensive cyberattacks against North Korea because they thought the U.S. itself was too poorly defended to withstand retaliatory cyberattacks, a nascent example of deterrence in the cyber domain. To date, no direct use of OCO capabilities has resulted in the outbreak of traditional conflict, perhaps owing to uncertainties in the novelty of the attacks, the difficulty of attribution, and the reluctance of national cyber actors to retaliate when the path of escalation is unclear (Rid & Buchanan, 2015). Most importantly, however, the actions of armed forces in democratic countries are constrained by the rule of law, which translates into multiple authorities to ensure responsible and acceptable use, and safeguard against escalation. The fine-grained control of OCOs compared to conventional military force provides a way to manage escalation without the direct use of physical or military assets, whose effect in sparking conflict is much better known. In other words, instead of reacting to an escalating conflict by deploying physical military assets to a region, an OCO can be employed covertly to incur more controllable costs on the adversary, with the benefit of plausible deniability (Hare, 2018). Depending on the type of OCO employed, if there is a reduction in tension, the effects of the OCO can be reversed or scaled back.