No impact to election hacking.
John Mueller 22, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, 3/22/2022, “The Cyber-Delusion,” https://www.cato.org/commentary/cyber-delusion, cc
Election interference also features prominently in alarmist discourse on cyberthreats. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for instance, the United States highlighted apparent attempts by Russian hackers to undermine Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Although Clinton still handily won the popular vote, many analysts argued that digital interlopers sought to undermine the integrity of U.S. elections and perhaps democracy itself.
These warnings are exaggerated and—coming from U.S. policymakers—arguably hypocritical. It is worth noting that the United States has intervened in foreign elections for decades. Moreover, the idea that elections and voters are easily manipulated is suspect. If extensive promotion could guarantee success, Americans would all be driving Edsels and drinking New Coke—legendary marketing failures in 1958 and 1985 by two of the most successful businesses in history: the Ford Motor Company and Coca-Cola. In any capitalist society, people are regularly deluged by advertising and marketing campaigns. In all cases, those petitioned remain free to ignore the ads, and most become quite good at it. In fact, studies have shown that campaign information rarely changes many votes. As political scientist Diana Mutz points out, the impact of campaign advertising “is marginal at most.”
Political campaigns, as anyone who has suffered through one knows, are also rife with falsehoods: incumbents strategically distort their record, and challengers do the same in reverse. The 2016 Russian contribution to this flood of misinformation was tiny. On Facebook, where most of the manipulation supposedly took place, Moscow’s intervention totaled perhaps a fraction one percent of the content on the platform’s news feed. Much of this was also wasted because the people who embraced it were already committed to a particular party or lived in states that went solidly for one or the other candidate. Russia’s efforts, moreover, proved wildly counterproductive. Instead of weakening U.S. policy, Moscow generated bipartisan support for anti-Russian sanctions when the two U.S. political parties could agree on little else.