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Models---it would only take 7% of our nukes---assumes their warrants

Heginbotham 15. [Eric; 2015; principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues, PhD in political science from MIT, former senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led research projects on China, Japan, and regional security issues and regularly briefed senior military, intelligence, and political leaders; “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html]

For several years, U.S. military publications have suggested that China is working on MIRVing ICBMs.37 The 2015 DoD report on Chinese military power stipulates, for the first time, that MIRVed missiles have been deployed operationally, specifically on the CSS-4 Mod 3 (a modified version of the DF-5A).38 In both our high and low estimates, therefore, we posit that number of Chinese CSS-4s (DF-5As) remains unchanged at 20, but that half of the force has been MIRVed, with each of the MIRVed missiles carrying three warheads.39 It is unclear why China would begin MIRVing with its force of DF-5s, which, due to their vulnerability, will not contribute much to second-strike survivability even with more warheads. Beyond 2017, it seems likely that China may MIRV its road-mobile DF-41, which is currently under development and which would yield more in terms of retaliatory credibility.40 **FOOTNOTE 40 BEGINS** 40 Given that existing mobile missiles (including the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2) are relatively small and would require miniaturized warheads, they are unlikely candidates. The DF-41 is said to be some 25-percent heavier than the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A). Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, “DF-41 (CSS-X-10),” January 6, 2015. **FOOTNOTE 40 ENDS** Both our high and low estimates for China posit that the number of CSS-10 Mod 1s (DF-31s) will remain unchanged at 12, but in the case of CSS-10 Mod 2s (DF-31As), there is some uncertainty with regard to the size of the force, and we estimate the potential inventory at between 24 and 48.41 There is also some uncertainty as to how many CSS-NX-14s (JL-2s) might be in service by 2017. Jane’s Fighting Ships reports four Jin-class submarines in service by the end of 2015, with a fifth to be commissioned in 2017.42 The JL-2 SLBM, carried by the Jin, encountered problems during testing, but DoD suggested that tests in 2012 were successful, and DoD’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress on Chinese military power reported that the Jin would undertake its first operational patrols shortly.43 We posit that China will have five Jin-class submarines in service by 2017, with between 50 percent and 100 percent of their full complement of 12 JL-2 SLBMs each (totaling between 30 and 60 missiles).44 Both the Jin-class platform and the missile it carries will be a dramatic improvement over the minimal capability offered by the single Xia-class (Type 092) submarine in past years. We assume that the single Xia-class SSBN will be taken out of service. If it remains in the inventory, its operational status and usefulness will be questionable. The U.S. nuclear arsenal size in 2017 will be constrained by the New START agreement with Russia and, as a result, will be smaller than it was in 2010. For the sake of simplicity, we use the end-point 2018 delivery system numbers for 2017, since it is uncertain when the United States will reach the New START 2018 limits (see Figure 12.7). We do not follow the New START definition of “deployed warheads.” Under New START, the United States and Russia are each limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery systems (ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable bombers), with up to 100 in reserve. The treaty allows each side up to 1,550 deployed warheads. However, New START counts nuclear-capable bombers as a single deployed warhead, despite the ability to place more weapons on the platforms during wartime.45 Using the New START numbers for 2017 delivery vehicles but a somewhat more liberal definition of warheads, the number of U.S. delivery systems will fall from 882 in 2010 to 700 and the number of deployed warheads will fall from 4,806 to 2,144.46 Based on current plans, it appears that the number of Minuteman III ICBMs will be reduced from 450 in 2010 to 400 in 2017, and all will be fitted with a single warhead. The United States will maintain its fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, but at least two will be in overhaul at any one time (and not count against limits), and each boat will sail with only 20 of its 24 tubes loaded with nuclear-capable Trident D-5 Mk-4A and Mk-5 SLBMs. The United States will maintain 60 nuclear-capable bombers, which we posit will include 44 B-52Hs and 16 B-2As. While we assume that there will be enough gravity bombs for each B-2A to carry a full complement of 20 weapons (for a total of 256 warheads), the load-out for B-52Hs will be limited by the inventory of air-launched cruise missiles (a total of 528 missiles and warheads). Finally, the United States expanded its number of GBIs from 24 to 30 in 2010, and, in March 2013, DoD announced a further increase to 44 by 2017.47 Chinese Vulnerability to First Strike, 2017 Even the low-end projected Chinese force structure outlined above suggests a more robust and survivable Chinese second-strike capability by 2017, though U.S. missile defense and intelligence efforts against PLAN SSBNs will likely continue to cause concerns in Beijing about the viability of its second-strike forces. In the low Chinese case, U.S. forces must target the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31), CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), and CSS-4 Mod 3 (DF-5B) ICBMs and SSBN bases harboring the Jin-class (Type 094) that employ SLBMs. At the lowest alert level, the United States can target and destroy all of the weapons that are located and susceptible to attack with an 80 percent chance of success using 157 weapons. While this represents approximately 7 percent of the total U.S. arsenal, it still leaves 1,987 warheads for other purposes. The number of surviving Chinese weapons (15) in the 2017 case is marginally larger than the surviving number in the 2010 case (13). In reality, the gains to survivability should be considered more significant than this modeling might suggest. The surviving systems in the 2017 modeling include three types of relatively modern systems: the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31), the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), and the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2), associated with the Jin-class (Type 094) submarine. With five operational submarines and 36 road-mobile ICBM launchers, it becomes more reasonable to imagine modest alert levels that would ensure that a portion of both the land- and sea-based legs of China’s nuclear dyad are kept deployed on an operational basis. While the Jinclass SSBNs will require a “shakedown” period, their introduction into operational service represents a major advance for Chinese nuclear forces and their survivability. The results of attacks against the 2017 upper bound (“high estimate”) case for Chinese missiles, which includes a larger number of CSS-10 Mod 2s (DF-31As) and CSS-N-14s (JL-2 missiles), are somewhat different. In this case, China possesses 160 warheads able to reach the United States prior to the attack, instead of 106. After the hypothetical U.S. first strike, 27 Chinese warheads remain, 12 more than in the “low estimate” case (see Figure 12.8). The additional Chinese missiles and the warheads atop them provide an additional buffer against the possible compromise of some portion of China’s alert forces, and they provide a more convincing second-strike capability in the face of U.S. missile defenses, even when those defenses are assumed to be relatively effective in engaging targets. Note that in neither the low nor high estimate cases does the MIRVing of DF-5 missiles contribute to survivability against a first strike, since the missiles themselves are highly vulnerable to attack. Beijing will continue to harbor concerns about U.S. missile defenses, as well about intelligence-gathering efforts directed against Chinese SSBNs. In the 2017 low Chinese case, the 44 interceptors deployed by the United States will outnumber surviving Chinese strategic warheads by nearly three to one. In the “high” case, the ratio is less than two to one. In the more distant future, if U.S. GBI missile deployment halts at 44 and each interceptor continues to carry only one warhead, the Chinese secondstrike capability will ultimately be able to overwhelm U.S. defenses, especially if China puts MIRVs in the more survivable portion of its missiles. However, Chinese confidence in the effectiveness of its second-strike capability will likely depend on the extent of U.S. interceptor deployment, as well as the state of U.S. missile defense technology and advances in Chinese penetration aids. It will also depend on the survivability of China’s alert forces, especially its SSBNs. In addition to hosting large numbers of survivable missiles, SSBNs are the only Chinese weapons that can launch missiles at U.S. targets from areas where the trajectories do not take them near U.S. GBI sites in Fort Greely, Alaska. Our counterforce first strike modeling, and the sensitivity of results to the size of mobile forces, helps explain why Beijing has reacted to the activities of special oceanographic surveillance ships equipped with SURTASS, such as with the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23), near Yalong Submarine Base in March 2009. The sonar on these ships is designed “to perform acoustic collection surveillance to help locate and identify submarines.”48 As mentioned earlier, Yalong, with its underground submarine portal is a likely location for the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN. If the U.S. Navy can detect and trail Chinese SSBNs in the open sea, the Chinese second-strike capability once again becomes questionable, especially when U.S. anti-submarine warfare activities are combined with an active missile defense program. This prognosis, however, only pertains to the immediate future. Looking somewhat beyond 2017, China will likely be able to achieve a highly secure second-strike capability (even with very conservative estimates from China’s perspective), and further increases on its part beyond that point may raise more serious questions about its ultimate intentions. Conclusions Given the asymmetry in the respective number of nuclear weapons, it is hardly surprising that our modeling shows severe structural imbalances in outcomes (see Table 12.7). In every period, a U.S. first strike could destroy all targets with known locations with a relatively high degree of confidence, leaving a relatively small number of missiles on alert and therefore ostensibly not susceptible to attack. Given the small numbers of systems that might be deployed at any given point in time, Beijing would almost certainly have concerns about the effectiveness of its second-strike capability. Assuming a similar level of alert for each of the periods considered, our modeling suggests that the number of Chinese warheads that might survive a first strike has increased over time, from four in 1996 to six in 2003, 13 in 2010, and between 15 and 27 in 2017. More importantly, the systems deployed have become more dependable and survivable over time. In 1996, survivability depended entirely on the status of the Xia, with silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2s (DF-5As) being in fixed locations and therefore highly vulnerable to attack. Since 2003, however, new classes of road-mobile missiles, the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and, later, the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), have been deployed, representing a second type of mobile asset in the Chinese inventory. Unlike the CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), these missiles are solid-fueled and are therefore capable of launch on short notice. The Jin-class SSBN (Type 094), five of which are either complete or near completion, will replace the Xia-class (Type 092) by 2017 and provide a far more robust sea-based deterrent. Despite these developments, however, Beijing continues to harbor concerns about the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders express particular unease about the future of U.S. missile defenses and their potential impact on the nuclear balance.52 While we did not attempt to model missile defense with any fidelity, our nuclear exchange modeling suggests that the planned number of deployed U.S. GBIs alone (without considering the SM-3 or other systems) could continue to outnumber China’s expected survivable second-strike warheads as late as 2017. Any expansion of the missile defense architecture or enhancements to its capabilities, such as a move toward multiple exo-atmospheric kill vehicles on each interceptor, would further heighten concerns in Beijing about its retaliatory capability. Moreover, Chinese planners may question whether the United States, with its sophisticated space-based and air-breathing ISR assets, might be able to locate and attack a larger portion of China’s nuclear forces than our modeling suggests. Our model probably assumes a higher-alert posture for China than it presently practices, though it is true that China now has much greater capability to keep a portion of its force on alert, should it choose that course. New generations of Chinese land-based missiles (e.g., the DF-31A) are movable but not highly mobile. Chinese analysts question whether, in fact, SURTASS-equipped ships near China are seeking to collect acoustic data on PLAN SSBNs to facilitate their trail and destruction during a crisis or conflict.53 And Chinese concerns about advanced conventional munitions affecting the strategic balance are also increasingly pronounced.

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