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SSBNs fail

Kristensen and Norris, ’18 Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists and his collaboration with researchers at NRDC in 2010 resulted in an estimate of the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile that was only 13 weapons off the actual number declassified by the U.S. government, and Robert S. Norris, senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC and a former senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council, June 25th, 2018, “Chinese nuclear forces”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 74, Issue 4: Special issue: Missile Defense, around the world and, perhaps, in space, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486620, EO

China currently operates a fleet of four Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). All are based at the Longposan naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island.

Each Jin SSBN is designed to carry up to 12 JL-2s (CSS-N-14), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is a modified version of the DF-31. Each JL-2 is equipped with a single warhead (and, possibly, penetration aids). The JL-2 has not been flight-tested to its full range but is thought to have a range of 7,000-plus km. A 2015 Pentagon report estimated its range is 7,400 km (US Defense Department 2015, 9), and a 2016 Pentagon report put the range at 7,200 km (US Defense Department 2016, 26). The 2017 NASIC report sets the range at 7,000-plus km (US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017, 33). That would be sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia, and India from waters near China – but unless the submarine carrying the weapon sailed significantly eastward, it could not target the continental United States.

We are uncertain how many SSBNs China plans to build. The US Office of Naval Intelligence predicted more than a decade ago that China might build five Jin-class SSBNs (Kristensen 2007). The 2015 Pentagon report agreed with that projection, saying “up to five may enter service” before China begins work on a next-generation SSBN (US Defense Department 2015, 9), and the US Director of National Intelligence stated in 2018 that China “might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines” (Coats, 7).

Although the Jin-class is more advanced than China’s first experimental SSBN – the single and now inoperable Xia (Type 092) – it is still a very noisy design (Kristensen 2009b). It seems more likely that China will end production after five boats and turn its efforts to develop and produce a better third-generation (Type 096) SSBN over the next decade. The next SSBN is expected to carry a new missile, the JL-3.

It remains uncertain whether Jin submarines have ever sailed on deterrent patrols with nuclear weapons on board. US Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy said in early 2015 that one Chinese SSBN had gone on a 95-day patrol (Osborne 2015). In late 2015, STRATCOM Commander Admiral Cecil Haney said Chinese SSBNs had been at sea, and that he didn’t know if they had nukes on board but had to assume they did (Gertz 2015). In early 2016, the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said the Chinese navy “deployed the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in 2015” on an extended patrol far from Chinese waters (Stewart 2016, 12).

These statements indicate that although one of the Jin submarines apparently sailed on an extended voyage in 2015, it is not clear that it carried nuclear warheads, or whether it was conducting a formal deterrent patrol. The voyage might have been a first step towards developing the capability to conduct deterrent patrols in the future.

To achieve that capability, the Chinese SSBN fleet will face several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints. Although Chinese missile forces frequently practice the procedures required to load warheads onto missiles, China’s Central Military Commission has long resisted handing out nuclear warheads to the armed services to deploy on missiles under normal circumstances. Giving custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines during peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese policy. Moreover, before doing so, the Central Military Commission and China’s navy would first have to build up experience to operate an SSBN force during realistic military operations, which would require development of improved command-and-control technologies and procedures.

The SSBNs would also need a destination. Even if China deployed nuclear-armed SSBNs to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to be able to strike targets in the continental United States, a Jin SSBN would have to sail across the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would draw attention and be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare (see Figure 1).

China’s main concern is making sure that its minimum nuclear deterrent would survive a first strike, and for that reason it spends considerable resources on modernizing and hiding its land-based missiles. This frankly makes its submarine program puzzling, for it seems much riskier for China to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by adversaries, than to hide the nuclear weapons deep inside China’s vast landmass (Kristensen 2014).

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