We’d beat A2AD
Gompert et al. 16 – David, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and is a Senior Fellow for the RAND Corporation, Astrid Cevallos is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation, Cristina Garafola is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation (“War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable”, RAND Corporation, 2016//Kosack
While intensity depends on the use and loss of engaged U.S. strike and Chinese A2AD capabilities, the significance of total military potential, including reinforcements and mobilization capacity, could increase the longer the war’s duration. Likewise, economic resilience, political support, and international assistance could affect the ability of one or both sides to continue fighting. Both the United States and China have considerable, if asymmetric, capacity to prolong a conflict that neither one is militarily compelled or politically ready to end. A critical question is whether one side or the other can achieve such a clear advantage in the early stages of an intense conflict that the other has little choice but to concede. The U.S. ability to achieve such an advantage is declining as China improves its A2AD capabilities. At the same time, China’s increasing ability to prevent a decisive, early U.S. advantage does not necessarily translate into its ability to conclude a war quickly on its terms. Because a mild conflict would place smaller demands on total war-making capacity than a severe one would, it could have a greater potential than the latter to drag on—even becoming a “frozen conflict.” Conversely, and obviously, a long, severe conflict would involve greater costs on both sides than other cases in military, economic, and political terms. That a long, severe conflict would be the most costly does not mean it is the least likely. The disposition at any moment to keep fighting depends not only on results, losses, and costs to that point but also on expectations of what is to come. As long as neither side expects to lose, hostilities might continue. The United States presently has more military capacity than China to wage a long, severe war. For one thing, the United States has substantial forces located in or designated for other regions that it could bring to bear on a conflict in the Western Pacific, though security conditions in those regions might make it reluctant to do so.16 (Over the years, the Pentagon has crept away from its traditional standard of having sufficient total forces to win two major wars simultaneously.) Furthermore, U.S. forces today could degrade Chinese A2AD capabilities faster than Chinese A2AD capabilities could degrade U.S. forces. While both might suffer significant losses in early severe hostilities, U.S. prospects currently look better than China’s. Future conditions could differ, owing to the potential for greater losses of U.S. forces from Chinese A2AD and, in turn, reduced Chinese losses from those U.S. forces. Moreover, as U.S. military-operational advantages wane, China’s position as the “home team” could become less of a liability and more of an asset, owing to internal lines of communication and movement. A corollary of these shifting military odds is that the expected duration of war, however intense, could increase as Chinese capabilities improve, for the simple reason that China will retain more warfighting capability and face less pressure to yield. More generally stated, the less lopsided a war is likely to be, the less likely it is to end quickly in victory by the stronger side. Since Chinese and U.S. capabilities, operating concepts, incentives, and expectations all point to severe hostilities, this could mean that a war could last longer and be costlier than has been assumed or, paradoxically, than either side would want.