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Destroys the entire legal system

Pulignano ‘16 Vincent Pulignano: Managing Editor, Florida Law Review; J.D. 2016, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law “A KNOWN UNKNOWN: THE CALL FOR AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION” FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 67] 2016 http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/Pulignano.pdf

A. The Fear of a Runaway Convention The threat of a runaway convention is the primary reason why the People are hesitant to call a convention of states. A runaway convention is a convention that begins proposing other policies that were not supposed to be considered, and authority for such consideration was not granted to the convention at the outset. Hence, the fear is a runaway convention ultimately could throw out the U.S. Constitution and replace it with a new one. However, commentator Michael Stern notes that when one is evaluating the risk of a runaway convention, one must also consider the risks that may be reduced with the use of a convention and its prevention of a “runaway Congress.” 29 Advocates for a convention think that a runaway convention is really not a threat at all for three reasons: (1) the convention can only be called for a limited purpose, (2) the Supreme Court would be able to weigh in on any violations of specific rules and procedures the convention creates for itself, and (3) more states are needed to ratify the proposals than are needed to call the convention. There are several perspectives on whether the convention can be limited in scope to prevent a runaway convention.30 First, some advocates believe that Congress can limit the scope of the convention and propose rules for it under the political question doctrine.31 However, most believe this is untrue and hold that Congress’s calling of the convention is merely ministerial because the entire purpose of the convention is to circumvent a corrupt Congress.32 Since limiting the scope of the convention is not constitutionally committed to Congress, it falls outside the political question doctrine.33 Furthermore, Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 85 specifically mentions Congress’s inability to limit the convention.34 Because Federalist No. 85 never mentions a restriction on the states to place limits on the convention,35 the states are the ones most likely to implement the limits. Under another perspective, opponents of a convention believe that, based on the original text and meaning of Article V, there are no limits that can be placed on a convention that would hold any legal force.36 They conclude the states have no authority to limit the scope of the convention for two reasons. First, the original text of Article V provides for making “amendments” plural, therefore precluding any attempt by the states to limit the convention to proposing one amendment.37 This argument fails, however, because the use of “amendments” only gives discretion to the convention to propose more than one amendment that will achieve its explicit goal.38 Second, opponents hold that states have no constitutional grant of power beyond initiating the convention.39 This argument at least partially fails because in order to give states the ability to circumvent a corrupt Congress, states must be able to limit the convention to achieve this purpose.40 Therefore, the inability of states to limit the scope of the convention would frustrate the purpose of the Convention Clause. Instead, while they may not have direct, explicit authority to limit the procedures of a convention themselves, states can curtail the convention’s scope by limiting the purpose for which it is formed. A third perspective reveals the debate over whether the convention can propose anything it so decides or whether it can only propose amendments covering the subject matter detailed in the states’ applications.41 If, once the convention is convened, it can propose anything outside of the subject matter discussed in the applications, then there is a chance—albeit remote—that the convention could claim ultimate authority and create a separate governing body.42 However, this fear can be checked by the requirement that three-fourths of the states must ratify any convention amendments.43 The ratification process can also place a check on the possibility the convention would exceed its scope.44 Additionally, the history of the Convention Clause suggests that the convention is only supposed to act as an aid to the states rather than as a separate entity in and of itself.45 But again, questions swirl as to whether the delegates can change the ratification process and require ratification by a majority of states in the convention (or something to that effect).46 This idea appears unfounded. Any convention-made “rule” like this that would affect the Constitution as it stands today would still require ratification to have any legal effect on the current U.S. government.47 Another check on the convention process is that Congress would have the right to not propose to the states for ratification any amendment that surpassed the convention’s scope.48 This reasoning falls in line with Congress’s—and even state legislatures’—responsibility to uphold the Constitution if the convention entered the process having limited itself to a single subject.49 B. The Supreme Court’s Potential Role Another area of primary concern is whether there is any body of government that can enforce any rules and procedures a convention would make for itself. If the Supreme Court can rule on issues regarding a convention’s rules and procedures, would this upset the purpose of the convention because a government branch, which the convention is trying to bypass, is interpreting its rules and procedures?50 There is no good answer to this question, but it appears the Supreme Court weighing in on violations of convention rules would not upset the convention’s purpose, as the Supreme Court’s duty is “to say what the law is.” 51 C. Threats to the Convention Process and the Constitution In addition to the concerns already discussed, there are others worth noting. First, the convention could be open to special-interest lobbying from groups that deal with issues over which the convention would be deliberating.52 This could threaten the integrity of the negotiations and the proposal of amendments.53 Also, a more apocalyptic concern is that a convention of states could result in a complete overhaul of the Constitution.54 This is unlikely for the reasons explained above, but some commentators still hold this belief based on the only other convention in American history, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.55 There is a debate over whether that convention stayed within its scope when revising the Articles of Confederation and producing the current Constitution.56 However, in any case it would seem all convention “proposals would be subject to the checks and balances written into the Constitution.” 57

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